Market evolution: Military ordnance (CN 93069010) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of EU trade in military ordnance — specifically bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, and other ammunition and projectiles for military purposes, excluding cartridges (CN 93069010) — over the period 2015–2025. The product scope covers a broad category of military projectiles and their parts, encompassing a wide range of ordnance types and sophistication levels.
Over this eleven-year window, EU trade in this product category underwent a dramatic transformation. What was a relatively modest and balanced market until 2021 became, by 2025, a sector characterised by explosive growth, extreme geographic concentration around the Ukraine conflict, and significant reorientation of both import and export flows. The data reveals three overarching dynamics: a growth surge overwhelmingly driven by geopolitical events; a structural shift in the EU's sourcing and destination patterns; and the emergence of specific member states — particularly Poland — as critical nodes in European military supply chains.
1. Explosive Growth and the Ukraine War Catalyst
The pre-2022 baseline: a stable, modest market
From 2015 to 2021, EU trade in military ordnance was relatively contained. Overall trade flows show that exports started at €55.7 million in 2015, with imports at €48.8 million, yielding a modest trade surplus of €6.9 million. Import quantities ranged between roughly 360 and 2,900 tonnes per year, while export volumes fluctuated between approximately 440 and 2,050 tonnes. Unit prices were comparatively moderate, suggesting a mix of conventional ammunition and lower-cost ordnance items.
The 2022 inflection point: a structural break
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered an unprecedented surge. EU exports to Ukraine alone grew from just €50,805 in 2015 to a peak of €2.46 billion, before settling at €1.48 billion in 2025 — an increase of over 2.9 million percent. Ukraine went from being a negligible destination to absorbing the vast majority of EU military ordnance exports. Total EU export value rose from €55.7 million to €1.76 billion (+3,064%), while total import value surged from €48.8 million to €1.50 billion (+2,984%).
The following table summarises the scale of this transformation:
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| EU exports (€ million) | 55.7 | 1,762.7 | +3,064 |
| EU imports (€ million) | 48.8 | 1,504.9 | +2,984 |
| Trade balance (€ million) | +6.9 | +257.8 | — |
| Export quantity (tonnes) | 2,049 | 32,074 | +1,465 |
| Import quantity (tonnes) | 2,890 | 13,009 | +350 |
Volume versus value: a divergence in unit prices
A notable feature of the post-2022 surge is the divergence between volume and value growth. Exports grew by 3,064% in value but only 1,465% in quantity, implying a near-doubling of the average export unit price — from €27,185/tonne in 2015 to €54,955/tonne in 2025. For imports, the gap was far more dramatic: value rose by 2,984% while quantity increased by just 350%, pushing the average import price from €16,802/tonne to €115,681/tonne. This sharp import price escalation suggests a compositional shift toward higher-value systems — likely guided missiles and precision munitions — in the EU's procurement, consistent with the nature of military aid packages to Ukraine.
2. Diverging Partner Dynamics: Sources and Destinations
Ukraine: from marginal partner to overwhelming destination
The single most striking feature of this market is Ukraine's role. In 2015, exports to Ukraine totalled just over €50,000. By 2025, Ukraine accounted for €1.48 billion — approximately 84% of all EU military ordnance exports. The peak was even higher in an intermediate year (€2.46 billion), indicating the intensity of initial aid surges. Ukraine also became a source of imports for the EU, rising from €0.9 million to €36.9 million, likely reflecting re-imports, repair cycles, or reciprocal supply arrangements.
The United States and Israel: emerging import giants
On the import side, the United States became the EU's largest supplier, with imports rising from €3.8 million to €349.0 million (+9,097%). Israel's imports grew even more dramatically in proportional terms, from €0.2 million to €141.1 million (+62,314%). Both trends are consistent with the EU's broader rearmament effort and reliance on US and Israeli defence manufacturers for advanced systems.
Türkiye: a bidirectional partner of growing importance
Türkiye emerged as a significant partner on both sides of the ledger. EU imports from Türkiye surged from €9,000 to €196.4 million — by far the largest proportional increase among import partners (+2.2 million percent). Simultaneously, EU exports to Türkiye rose from €0.5 million to €82.0 million. This bidirectional flow suggests a complex defence-industrial relationship, potentially involving subcontracting, component sourcing, and finished product trade.
Declining traditional partners: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Belarus
Several traditional partners saw declining flows. Exports to Saudi Arabia fell by 93.8%, from €69.0 million to €4.3 million, while exports to Iraq dropped by 81.7%, from €44.1 million to €8.1 million. On the import side, Belarus saw a 94.4% decline, from €6.7 million to €0.4 million — a clear consequence of EU sanctions following Belarus's involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The table below highlights the most significant partner shifts:
| Partner | Flow | 2015 (€ M) | 2025 (€ M) | Change (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | Exports | 0.05 | 1,481.1 | +2,915,180 |
| Türkiye | Imports | 0.009 | 196.4 | +2,188,915 |
| Israel | Imports | 0.23 | 141.1 | +62,314 |
| United States | Imports | 3.80 | 349.0 | +9,097 |
| Saudi Arabia | Exports | 69.0 | 4.3 | −93.8 |
| Belarus | Imports | 6.7 | 0.4 | −94.4 |
Import diversification versus export concentration
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) reveals a contrasting trend. For imports, the value-based HHI fell from 3,779 to 2,071 (−45.2%), indicating a meaningful diversification of the EU's supply base. This is a positive development from a supply-security perspective. For exports, the HHI remained very high at 7,102 (from 6,819), reflecting the overwhelming dominance of Ukraine as an export destination. This extreme concentration poses a strategic risk: any shift in the conflict or in Ukraine's procurement policy would have outsized effects on the EU ordnance export sector.
3. The Ascendancy of Eastern European Producers and Procurement Hubs
Poland's transformation into a military-industrial pivot
Poland's emergence as the EU's leading exporter and importer of military ordnance is one of the most consequential structural shifts of the period. EU-reported exports through Poland surged from €51.5 million to €1.06 billion (+1,959%), while Poland's imports rose from €36.0 million to €803.2 million (+2,131%). Poland's geographic proximity to Ukraine, its own accelerated defence modernisation programme, and its role as a logistics hub for Western military aid all contribute to this pattern. By 2025, Poland alone accounted for roughly 60% of total EU exports and 53% of total EU imports in this product category.
The broader Eastern European corridor
Poland was not alone. Estonia's imports surged from €7.3 million to €181.5 million (+2,400%), Slovakia's imports grew from €3.3 million to €59.1 million (+1,685%), and Lithuania's imports increased from €0.09 million to €12.4 million (+14,393%). This Eastern European corridor — Poland, the Baltic states, Slovakia, and Romania — collectively became the primary interface between the EU's defence-industrial base and the conflict zone.
Romania occupied a distinctive position as both a major exporter (from €644.8 million in 2015, declining to €353.8 million by 2025, −45.1%) and a significant importer (from €134.9 million to €214.8 million, +59.2%). Romania's high export baseline likely reflects its legacy defence-industrial capacity inherited from the Cold War era, while its rising imports indicate a dual-track approach: maintaining domestic production while also procuring Western systems.
Specialisation patterns: who makes what?
The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals that Spain (RSCA: 0.84), Romania (0.81), Slovakia (0.71), and Finland (0.64) are the most specialised EU exporters of military ordnance. These countries have a demonstrated comparative advantage in this sector relative to their overall export profile. In contrast, Poland — despite being the largest exporter in absolute terms — shows a negative RSCA (−0.74), indicating that its military ordnance exports are large in scale but not disproportionate to its overall trade profile. This suggests Poland functions more as a transit and logistics hub than as a specialised ordnance manufacturer, though its defence-industrial capacity is clearly expanding.
Price shocks and supply disruptions
The volatility analysis reveals significant price shocks in specific trade relationships. In 2020, imports from South Korea and Israel experienced extraordinary price spikes — South Korea's import price shifted by +3,031% with an abnormality score of 172.1, while Israel's shifted by +2,175% (abnormality: 111.2). These events occurred before the Ukraine war and likely reflect one-off procurement contracts for high-value systems (e.g., missile defence components or precision-guided munitions). A later shock in 2023 saw Saudi Arabia's export price jump by +554% (abnormality: 48.5), potentially linked to a specific high-value arms sale.
The export volatility data shows the highest coefficient of variation for Türkiye (2.64) and the United Kingdom (2.65), indicating that trade with these partners has been particularly erratic — likely reflecting episodic large contracts rather than steady-state flows.
Conclusion
EU trade in military ordnance (CN 93069010) over 2015–2025 tells the story of a market fundamentally reshaped by conflict. The Russia-Ukraine war from 2022 onward transformed what had been a relatively small and balanced trade sector into a multi-billion-euro market characterised by enormous growth, geographic concentration around Ukraine, and the rapid ascendancy of Eastern European member states — especially Poland — as the primary conduits for military supply.
The data reveals both opportunities and vulnerabilities. On the positive side, the EU's import base has diversified, reducing dependence on any single supplier. Defence-industrial capacity in countries like Spain, Romania, Slovakia, and Finland demonstrates genuine European specialisation. On the risk side, the extreme concentration of exports toward Ukraine (84% of total value) creates a structural dependency on a single geopolitical outcome. The sharp increase in import unit prices suggests a shift toward higher-value systems that may prove difficult to sustain without continued political commitment and industrial scaling.
Looking ahead, the sustainability of this elevated trade level will depend on the trajectory of the Ukraine conflict, the pace of European defence industrialisation under initiatives such as the European Defence Industrial Programme, and the ability of EU producers to scale capacity while maintaining interoperability with allied systems. The 2015–2025 period marks not merely a cyclical surge but a potential structural reorientation of the European defence-industrial landscape.