Market evolution: Lithium ores (CN 25309040) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of European Union trade in lithium-bearing minerals — specifically spodumene, petalite, lepidolite, amblygonite, hectorite, jadarite, and similar ores suitable for lithium extraction (customs code 25309040) — over the period 2015–2025. These minerals form the upstream foundation of the lithium-ion battery value chain, a strategic input for electric vehicles, energy storage, and the broader green transition.

The available data covers a three-year window (2023–2025) with year-level frequency. This period coincides with the aftermath of the extraordinary lithium price spike of late 2022, which saw benchmark prices for lithium carbonate and hydroxide reach record highs before collapsing through 2023 and 2024. Against this backdrop, the data reveals a market undergoing a sharp contraction in both volumes and values, a notable reshuffling of trade partners, and a significant improvement in the EU's net import reliance — a dynamic with important implications for Europe's raw materials strategy.

The report is structured as follows: the first section analyses the macroeconomic contraction in EU lithium ore trade; the second examines the geographic realignment of supply and demand relationships; and the third assesses the structural and strategic consequences for European supply-chain resilience.

I. A Market in Retreat: The Scale and Depth of the Trade Contraction

Both imports and exports fell dramatically in value, volume, and price

The most striking feature of the 2023–2025 period is the simultaneous, severe contraction of EU lithium ore trade across all major indicators. Imports — which are overwhelmingly dominant — fell from a value of €72.0 million in 2023 to €10.7 million in 2025, a decline of 85.1%. Over the same period, import volumes dropped from 21,020 tonnes to 9,562 tonnes (−54.5%), while average import prices fell from €3,427/tonne to €1,120/tonne (−67.3%).

Exports followed a similar, though smaller-scale, trajectory. EU export values declined from €2.66 million to €0.45 million (−83.2%), with volumes falling from 910 tonnes to 325 tonnes (−64.3%) and prices from €2,923/tonne to €1,372/tonne (−53.1%).

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Overview

The price collapse was the primary driver of the value contraction

A striking feature of these figures is that the decline in value (−85.1% for imports) was substantially steeper than the decline in volume (−54.5%). This gap is explained by the dramatic fall in unit prices: the average import price dropped by 67.3% between 2023 and 2025. This pattern is consistent with the broader global lithium market, where spodumene concentrate prices (CIF China) fell from over $6,000/tonne in late 2022 to below $1,000/tonne by mid-2024, following the burst of speculative demand and the easing of supply bottlenecks that had characterised the post-COVID period. The EU, as a price-taker in this market, imported this global price correction almost entirely.

EU domestic production remained broadly stable, but its value eroded sharply

The EU's own production of lithium-bearing minerals (as captured by the PRODCOM mapping to code 08.91.19.19) shows a relatively stable volume, declining only marginally from 4.11 billion kg in 2023 to 4.00 billion kg in 2025 (−2.7%). However, production value fell much more sharply, from €1.08 billion to €630 million (−41.7%). This divergence underscores the extent to which the price collapse — rather than a structural shift in output — drove the contraction in value terms.

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Production volumes

II. A Reshuffling of Partners: Geographic Realignment of EU Lithium Ore Flows

Australia's dominance as a supplier persisted but its share delivered far less value

Australia remained overwhelmingly the EU's primary source of lithium ore imports, with a value of €65.2 million in 2023 — representing roughly 90% of total EU import value. By 2025, this figure had fallen to €10.4 million (−84.0%), though Australia's share of the remaining import value likely remained dominant. The decline reflects both the general volume and price contraction, rather than any loss of market share per se.

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Partners

Brazil and the United States effectively exited as EU suppliers, while new origin countries emerged

Brazil's exports to the EU collapsed from €3.09 million to €43,442 (−98.6%), and those of the United States fell from €707,346 to €22,409 (−96.8%). These steep declines suggest that in a low-price environment, these smaller or higher-cost suppliers could not maintain competitiveness.

Conversely, several new or previously negligible suppliers emerged. Hong Kong — likely acting as a trading intermediary — saw its shipments to the EU jump from just €70 to €97,673. Nigeria grew from virtually nothing (€2) to €43,419. These flows, while small in absolute terms, point to the emergence of new origin pathways, potentially reflecting Africa's growing role in the global lithium supply chain (e.g., Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria have all seen exploration activity in recent years, though the Nigeria flows may also reflect re-export intermediation).

Belgium was the dominant EU entry point, but its share collapsed alongside the overall market

On the EU reporter side, Belgium was by far the largest importer, handling €64.7 million in 2023 — nearly 90% of total EU imports. By 2025, this had fallen to €10.4 million (−83.9%). France, the second-largest importer in 2023 at €6.3 million, saw its imports virtually disappear to €50,598 (−99.2%), suggesting the end of a specific supply relationship or processing arrangement.

The Netherlands emerged as a rising hub for both imports and exports

One of the most notable shifts in the data is the rapid rise of the Netherlands. Dutch imports surged from €1,428 to €129,939 (+8,999%), while Dutch exports exploded from €2 to €183,750 — an extraordinary increase. This pattern suggests the Netherlands is positioning itself as a re-export or entrepôt hub for lithium ores, consistent with its well-established role as Europe's principal logistics gateway for bulk commodity flows. Germany also increased its export activity, rising from €56,450 to €119,466 (+111.6%), and Sweden's exports grew from negligible levels to €8,784, potentially reflecting nascent mining or processing activity in Scandinavia.

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Reporters

Export destinations contracted broadly, with Korea and Türkiye remaining the main markets

On the export partner side, the EU's shipments to all major destinations fell. Exports to South Korea dropped from €1.15 million to €132,928 (−88.4%), and those to Türkiye fell from €528,689 to €222,425 (−57.9%). Shipments to the United States effectively ceased (from €443,952 to €100, −100%). Korea and Türkiye, however, remained the two largest destination markets, suggesting a degree of structural continuity in end-user relationships even as volumes contracted.

III. Structural Shifts: Rising Concentration and Changing Vulnerability

Import concentration intensified, making the EU more reliant on fewer sources

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU import concentration by value rose from 8,238 in 2023 to 9,502 in 2025 (+15.3%), with a peak of nearly 9,984 observed within the period. An HHI above 2,500 is generally considered to indicate a highly concentrated market; the EU's lithium ore imports are thus deeply concentrated by any standard. By volume, the HHI followed a similar trajectory, increasing from 8,536 to 9,461 (+10.8%).

Export concentration, while lower, also rose modestly (HHI by value from 2,788 to 3,005, +7.8%), reflecting the narrowing of export destinations alongside the contraction in trade volumes.

The intensification of import concentration is a potentially concerning development for supply-chain resilience. With fewer suppliers commanding an even larger share of a diminished market, the EU's exposure to disruptions — whether from geopolitical events, export restrictions, or logistical bottlenecks — is, in principle, heightened.

Net import reliance improved markedly, though for largely cyclical reasons

Paradoxically, even as concentration rose, the EU's net import reliance — the ratio of net imports to apparent consumption — fell sharply from 5.0% in 2023 to 1.7% in 2025, a decline of 66.6%. The peak within the period reached 10.5%, meaning reliance on external supply varied substantially. This improvement is largely explained by the fact that imports (both value and volume) contracted faster than domestic production, thereby increasing the relative share of domestically produced lithium ore in total supply.

Source: EU Trade Dashboard — Net import reliance

Trade openness paradoxically increased even as volumes declined

The trade intensity of the EU's lithium ore market — the share of trade (imports + exports) in total domestic production — rose from 37.9% to 43.8% (+15.4%), while export propensity increased from 21.4% to 27.4% (+28.2%). The salience analysis identifies export propensity as the dominant vulnerability signal (score: 50.8 versus 21.6 for trade intensity). This suggests that while the EU's import dependence has diminished, its overall market remains deeply embedded in international trade, with a growing share of domestic production oriented towards export markets — a pattern that leaves the sector exposed to shifts in global demand.

Belgian and Dutch specialisation points to a dual-track European market

The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals a stark division within the EU. Belgium (RSCA: 0.71, RCA: 5.80) and the Netherlands (RSCA: 0.50, RCA: 3.03) are highly specialised in lithium ore trade, with production shares of 49.1% and 43.9% respectively — despite these countries having no known lithium mining activity of their own. This indicates that their "production" figures reflect processing, blending, or warehousing activities rather than primary extraction.

By contrast, larger economies such as Germany (RSCA: −0.95), France (RSCA: −0.99), and Spain (RSCA: −0.99) show deep negative specialisation, meaning lithium ore trade is negligible relative to their overall trade profiles. This dual structure — a small number of specialised trading/processing hubs alongside large, largely absent major economies — is a defining feature of the EU's lithium ore market.

Volatility was elevated but no systemic shocks were detected

The volatility analysis shows high coefficient of variation (CV) values for many trade partners, particularly on the import side: Brazil (CV: 1.40), the United States (CV: 1.51), China (CV: 1.45), and Mexico (CV: 1.73) all exhibit extreme volatility. On the export side, Norway (CV: 1.73) and Mexico (CV: 1.51) stand out. Australia's import volatility was relatively lower (CV: 0.37), consistent with its role as a stable, large-scale supplier.

Despite these high volatility measures, no discrete shocks were formally detected in the dataset. The contraction appears to have been gradual and market-driven rather than the result of a single disruptive event — consistent with a global lithium market correction rather than a supply-side crisis.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in lithium ores (CN 25309040) underwent a profound transformation between 2023 and 2025. What the data reveals is not a story of supply disruption, but rather the reverberations of a global market correction that followed the speculative lithium price bubble of 2021–2022. Import values fell by 85%, driven primarily by a two-thirds collapse in unit prices, while volumes contracted by a more modest 55%. Domestic production held relatively steady in volume terms, but its value declined by 42%.

This contraction reshaped the geographic landscape of EU lithium ore trade. Australia consolidated its dominance in a smaller market; traditional secondary suppliers like Brazil and the United States effectively disappeared; and new, smaller origin countries — including Nigeria and Hong Kong — emerged at the margins. Within the EU, the Netherlands rose sharply as a trading hub, while France's import and export activity all but ceased.

From a strategic perspective, the period delivered a mixed picture. Net import reliance improved substantially, but this was largely a statistical artefact of the import contraction rather than a reflection of genuine supply-chain diversification or reshoring. Import concentration actually intensified, meaning the EU is more dependent than ever on a narrow set of suppliers — principally Australia — for what remains a critical raw material. The lithium market may have corrected, but the structural vulnerabilities it exposed remain firmly in place.

Data source: EU Trade Dashboard. Product: CN 25309040. Period: 2015–2025 (year frequency; incomplete periods excluded).