Market evolution: Large petrol cars (CN 87032410) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's extra-EU trade in large petrol-engine passenger vehicles (cylinder capacity > 3,000 cm³) over the 2015–2025 period. The analysis draws on trade flow data from the EU Trade Dashboard and reveals a market undergoing profound structural transformation. The EU remains a dominant net exporter, but trade volumes have contracted sharply, prices have nearly doubled, and the traditional centres of large-car production—above all Germany—have seen their dominance erode in favour of smaller EU producers. The story is one of a segment in long-term decline, buffeted by tightening emissions regulations, shifting consumer preferences, and geopolitical shocks.

1. The Great Contraction: Falling Volumes Masked by Rising Values

1.1 Export volumes have collapsed while import volumes have also declined

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the dramatic contraction in EU export volumes of large petrol cars. In supplementary-unit terms (number of vehicles), exports fell from 315,354 vehicles in 2015 to 92,893 in 2025—a decline of 70.5%. By mass, the drop was 67.0%, from 636,053 tonnes to 209,920 tonnes (General Overview).

Imports tell a parallel, if more moderate, story. The EU imported 26,269 vehicles in 2015 but only 14,717 in 2025 (−44.0%), with mass falling from 49,302 tonnes to 34,204 tonnes (−30.6%).

1.2 Rising unit prices have partially offset the volume decline in value terms

Despite the collapse in physical volumes, the value of exports declined less steeply (−43.9%) because of a dramatic increase in unit prices. The average export price per vehicle rose from €65,563 in 2015 to €124,767 in 2025—an increase of 90.3%. Import prices followed a similar trajectory, doubling from €50,185 to €101,715 per vehicle (+102.7%).

This price escalation reflects several factors: a shift in the surviving product mix toward higher-end, luxury-segment vehicles (as mass-market large petrol cars are phased out); inflation; and the premiumisation strategy adopted by European OEMs in this shrinking niche.

Source: General Overview

1.3 EU production of large petrol cars has halved

The contraction in trade mirrors a broader collapse in EU production. Domestic output fell from 6,977,372 vehicles in 2015 to 2,753,606 in 2025 (−60.5%). Production value declined by 26.7%, from €124.2 billion to €91.0 billion—again, the smaller decline in value relative to volume confirms the sector's shift toward higher-value, lower-volume output (Production volumes).

2. Shifting Geographies: Partner Markets and EU Internal Dynamics

2.1 The United States remains the dominant export market but has lost its former scale

The United States was by far the EU's largest export destination throughout the period, absorbing €10.39 billion in 2015—roughly half of all extra-EU exports. By 2025, however, this had fallen to €5.08 billion (−51.1%). This decline likely reflects tightening US fuel-economy standards, increased competition from domestic EVs, and the segment's shrinking appeal even in the traditionally SUV-friendly US market.

2.2 China has undergone the steepest decline among major partners

EU exports to China fell from €1.33 billion to €296 million—a drop of 77.7%. A notable price shock was detected in 2018, when export prices to China surged by 62.9% (with an abnormality score of 6.5), coinciding with the introduction of retaliatory tariffs during the US–China trade war that indirectly affected the automotive sector. The subsequent acceleration of China's domestic EV policy further marginalised imported large-engined petrol vehicles.

2.3 The UK has gained in relative importance as an import source

Among import partners, the United Kingdom stands out. EU imports from the UK rose from €571 million to €825 million (+44.5%), making the UK the largest import source by 2025—overtaking the United States (which was roughly flat at €545 million, −1.9%). This likely reflects post-Brexit trade dynamics, where vehicles manufactured in the UK for brands with EU production networks must now clear customs. Meanwhile, imports from Japan and South Korea collapsed (−85.2% and −91.1% respectively), suggesting a withdrawal of these producers from the large petrol segment in Europe.

Source: Partners

2.4 Germany's dominance has eroded within the EU, while Austria, France, and Italy have gained ground

Among EU member states, Germany remains the largest exporter, but its share has been severely reduced. German exports fell from €16.22 billion to €5.74 billion (−64.6%), accounting for a smaller share of the EU total. By contrast:

• Italy grew from €2.56 billion to €2.88 billion (+12.5%), reflecting the resilience of its luxury sports-car segment (Ferrari, Lamborghini, Maserati).
• Austria surged from €581 million to €1.45 billion (+149.7%), likely driven by Magna Steyr contract manufacturing.
• France saw the most dramatic proportional increase: from €53 million to €482 million (+812.7%), suggesting a repositioning of certain French OEM production or assembly operations.

This redistribution is consistent with the specialisation analysis, which identifies Slovakia (RSCA = 0.73), Austria (RSCA = 0.55), and Italy (RSCA = 0.48) as the most specialised producers in 2025—while Germany, though still showing revealed comparative advantage (RSCA = 0.20), has lost ground relative to these competitors.

Source: Reporters

3. Structural Vulnerabilities and the Evolving Risk Profile

3.1 The EU's net exporter position has strengthened in relative terms

Despite the absolute decline in trade, the EU's net import reliance moved from −52.5% in 2015 to −189.5% in 2025. The negative values indicate a persistent trade surplus, and the deepening negativity reflects the fact that exports—though declining—still far exceed imports in value. The EU trade balance stood at €10.09 billion in 2025, down from €19.36 billion in 2015 (−47.9%), but still overwhelmingly positive.

3.2 Trade intensity and export propensity have surged

Paradoxically, as absolute volumes have fallen, the trade intensity of this segment has risen from 48.0% to 75.8%, and export propensity from 43.4% to 73.8%. This indicates that the remaining production of large petrol cars in the EU is increasingly oriented toward export markets rather than domestic consumption—a logical consequence of stricter EU emissions regulations depressing domestic demand while premium and luxury segments retain appeal in certain third-country markets (Gulf states, parts of Asia, and the US).

3.3 Export diversification has improved, but import sources have concentrated

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for export destination concentration fell from 2,767 to 2,175 (−21.4%), indicating that the EU has diversified its export markets somewhat—though the US still accounts for nearly half of value. On the import side, concentration rose from 3,748 to 4,398 (+17.4%), meaning that the EU has become more reliant on a narrower set of import partners, principally the UK and the US.

Source: Concentration

3.4 Volatility varies sharply across partners

The coefficient of variation in bilateral trade flows reveals that some partnerships are far more unstable than others. On the export side, the United States (CV = 0.58) and China (CV = 0.60) show moderate-to-high volatility, reflecting their susceptibility to policy shocks and tariff actions. On the import side, Japan (CV = 0.94), South Korea (CV = 0.81), and South Africa (CV = 1.74) exhibit the highest volatility—consistent with these partners' near-total withdrawal from the large petrol segment over the period.

Conclusion

The EU market for large petrol cars with engines exceeding 3,000 cm³ has undergone a decade of structural decline, with export volumes falling by over two-thirds and production volumes by 60%. Yet the segment has not simply shrunk—it has transformed. The surviving trade is increasingly premium, with per-vehicle values nearly doubling, and the export base has shifted away from Germany toward Italy, Austria, and France, where luxury marques and contract manufacturers have found resilience. The EU remains a formidable net exporter, but the surplus is narrowing, and the growing concentration of imports on fewer partners introduces new vulnerabilities.

Looking forward, the trajectory is clear: regulatory pressure (Euro 7, the 2035 CO₂ targets), electrification mandates, and shifting consumer tastes will continue to erode the large-engined petrol segment. The trade data for 2015–2025 already captures the early and middle stages of this transition. What remains is a niche—but a highly profitable one—dominated by European luxury brands whose global appeal ensures continued, if diminished, export flows.