Market evolution: Grey Portland cement (CN 252329) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in grey Portland cement (CN 252329) — the most common type of cement used in construction — over the period 2015–2025. The product scope covers all Portland cement excluding white cement and artificially coloured varieties. The EU has historically been a net exporter of this commodity, but the data reveal a dramatic transformation over the decade: a near-halving of export volumes, a fivefold increase in import values, and a fundamental reshaping of trade partnerships. This report identifies three overarching dynamics — a structural shift in trade balance driven by surging imports, the masking effect of unit price increases on declining physical volumes, and a rising concentration and volatility in supply sources — and discusses their likely causes and implications.

1. A structural trade reversal: the EU shifts from strong net exporter to import-dependent market

1.1 Export volumes have collapsed while import volumes have surged

The most striking feature of the decade is the divergence between export and import trajectories. According to the trade overview:

The EU's trade surplus in grey Portland cement has shrunk from €675 million to just €196 million — a 71% deterioration. While the EU remains a net exporter by value, its physical export footprint has been cut in half, and imports have grown to nearly five times their 2015 volume. The net import reliance metric confirms this trend: the EU was already a modest net exporter at the start of the period (−0.95%), and by 2025 this had deepened only slightly (−2.26%), but the ratio dipped as low as −9.24% in an intermediate year, before imports recovered faster than exports.

1.2 EU domestic production has declined in volume even as its value has risen

The production data tell a complementary story:

EU cement production fell by nearly a third in volume terms, yet its reported value rose by 31%, reflecting the sharp increase in cement prices over the period. This domestic production contraction partly explains why the EU has had to import more and export less: there is simply less grey Portland cement being produced within the bloc.

1.3 Geopolitical shifts have redirected import sources

The surge in imports is not geographically diffuse — it is concentrated among a few partner countries, as shown by the top import partners:

Three countries stand out: Türkiye, Ukraine, and Tunisia. Türkiye's cement industry has grown substantially over the past decade, leveraging proximity, competitive energy costs, and overcapacity to penetrate the EU market. Ukraine's extraordinary surge (from under €2 million to €139 million) likely reflects both pre-war industrial capacity and, more recently, EU trade facilitation measures following Russia's 2022 invasion — including temporary autonomous trade liberalisation. Tunisia, meanwhile, has gone from a negligible exporter to the EU to a €52 million supplier, suggesting growing North African production capacity oriented toward European demand.

On the export side, the most dramatic shift is the collapse of the Algeria relationship:

Algeria was the EU's single largest export destination in 2015 at €178 million; by 2025, exports had effectively ceased. Algeria's own domestic cement industry has expanded significantly, reducing import needs. The UK, by contrast, has become the EU's dominant export market, absorbing €287 million in 2025 — roughly 42% of all EU cement exports — likely driven by post-Brexit trade dynamics and the UK's own construction demand.

2. Rising unit prices mask a fundamental decline in trade volumes

2.1 Export prices have nearly doubled

One of the most important findings is that the apparent stability of EU export values (down only 10.3%) conceals a dramatic volume decline. Export prices rose by 77.5%, from €52.02/t to €92.33/t, as shown in the trade overview:

This price differential tells a story about EU competitiveness. In 2015, EU cement exports were priced below imports (€52 vs. €66 per tonne), suggesting the EU was competing on cost in international markets. By 2025, the situation has reversed: EU exports command a premium (€92 vs. €84 per tonne). This likely reflects higher production costs within the EU — driven by energy prices, carbon costs under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and labour costs — pushing EU producers to focus on higher-value or closer-to-home markets rather than competing with cheaper imports.

2.2 Domestic production value has risen even as volumes fell

The production volumes data confirm the same price-driven dynamic at the domestic level. Production volume dropped 30.4% while production value rose 31.2%, implying an effective unit price increase of roughly 89% over the decade. This is consistent with the broader inflation in energy and raw material costs that has affected the European cement sector since 2021, compounded by the 2022 energy crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

2.3 The trade intensity of the EU cement sector has increased despite volume declines

The vulnerability indicators reveal an interesting paradox:

Trade intensity (the share of production that is traded internationally) and export propensity (exports as a share of production) have both risen significantly. This means that although the EU produces less cement overall, a larger fraction of what it does produce crosses borders. This suggests growing specialisation: the EU is increasingly producing cement for specific export markets (notably the UK) while importing basic grey cement to meet domestic demand — a pattern consistent with differentiated product quality and proximity-based logistics.

3. Growing concentration and volatility heighten supply chain risk

3.1 Import and export markets have become more concentrated

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures market concentration, where higher values indicate greater dependence on fewer partners:

Both import and export concentration have risen sharply. On the import side, the dominance of Türkiye (€187M) and Ukraine (€139M) means that the EU's cement import supply is now heavily reliant on just two partners. On the export side, the UK's share (€287M out of €679M) means that nearly 42% of EU cement exports depend on a single market. An HHI above 2,500 is generally considered to indicate a highly concentrated market, and the import side is now approaching that threshold.

3.2 Key trading relationships exhibit high volatility

The volatility analysis — measured by the coefficient of variation (CV) of annual trade values — highlights which relationships are most unstable:

Most volatile import partners:

Most volatile export partners:

Algeria's export CV of 2.09 reflects the near-total collapse of trade from €178 million to virtually zero — an extreme shock. Among imports, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Moldova all exhibit high volatility (CV > 0.8), indicating that the EU's newer supply relationships are considerably less stable than its traditional ones.

3.3 Specific shock events have reshaped trade patterns

The supply shock analysis identifies three notable shock events:

The Algeria shock in 2018 — a 305% price spike coinciding with the near-disappearance of trade — is the most extreme event in the dataset. The 2022 shocks affecting Israel (exports) and Tunisia (imports) both occurred during the year of the energy crisis, suggesting that cost pressures were transmitted across multiple trade relationships simultaneously.

3.4 Intra-EU specialisation is uneven

The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals that cement export capacity within the EU is concentrated in a few member states:

Most specialised EU exporters (highest RSCA):

Least specialised (most import-dependent):

Smaller EU economies (Latvia, Croatia, Luxembourg) show the strongest export specialisation in cement, while larger economies like France and the Netherlands are net importers. The top EU exporters by absolute value are Greece (€119M), Ireland (€127M), Spain (€94M), and Croatia (€107M), while the top EU importers are Italy (€131M), Romania (€80M), Poland (€78M), and Bulgaria (€55M). Several of these importing countries — notably Italy, Romania, and Poland — have seen explosive import growth (over 1,000%), likely reflecting construction booms, domestic production shortfalls, or cost-driven sourcing from neighbouring non-EU suppliers.

Conclusion

The EU grey Portland cement market has undergone a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. The bloc has moved from a position of comfortable net export dominance to one of rising import dependency, driven by a combination of declining domestic production (−30% in volume), surging demand from new import partners — especially Türkiye, Ukraine, and Tunisia — and a collapse in traditional export markets like Algeria. Rising unit prices have partially masked the severity of the volume decline, but the underlying structural shift is clear: the EU now trades a smaller physical volume of cement at higher prices, with greater geographic concentration on both the import and export sides.

This evolution carries meaningful policy implications. The growing reliance on a small number of import partners — particularly those with high trade volatility like Ukraine and Tunisia — introduces supply chain risk. The concentration of EU exports in the UK market creates demand-side vulnerability. And the combination of declining production volumes with rising prices suggests that the EU cement sector is under structural cost pressure, likely linked to energy costs and carbon pricing. Policymakers monitoring the EU's industrial resilience in construction materials should pay close attention to these trends, particularly as the EU's carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and ongoing energy transition continue to reshape the competitive landscape for carbon-intensive industries like cement.