Market evolution: Gearbox parts (CN 87084099) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in gearbox parts for motor vehicles (customs code 87084099) over the period 2015–2025. The product covers a broad range of gearbox components used in passenger cars, commercial vehicles, buses, tractors, and special-purpose vehicles, excluding parts destined for specific industrial assembly lines and closed-die forged steel components.

The decade under review was marked by significant turbulence: the COVID-19 pandemic, semiconductor shortages, the war in Ukraine, and the reconfiguration of global supply chains. Against this backdrop, the EU's gearbox-parts trade underwent a structural transformation. While the bloc maintained a trade surplus throughout, that surplus narrowed dramatically—from nearly €1 billion in 2015 to just over €300 million in 2025. The erosion was driven not by collapsing exports, but by surging imports, particularly from China and India. At the same time, EU production volumes quadrupled, suggesting that the increase in imports served a rapidly expanding domestic manufacturing base rather than replacing local output.

The analysis is organised in three sections. The first focuses on the overall trajectory of EU exports and the contraction of the trade surplus. The second maps the geographic reorientation of both import and export flows. The third examines structural shifts in market concentration, production, and vulnerability indicators.

1. A Widening Gap: Export Decline Meets Import Surge

The trade surplus shrank by nearly 70% over the decade

Despite the EU remaining a net exporter of gearbox parts throughout the period, the trade balance deteriorated significantly. The surplus started at approximately €969 million in 2015 and fell to around €312 million by 2025—a decline of 67.9%. This was not a smooth decline; the surplus fluctuated over the period, peaking at around €1.46 billion before narrowing sharply.

EU export volumes fell while import volumes rose

The decline in export value was partly structural: export volumes fell by 21.1%, from about 89,200 tonnes to 70,400 tonnes. However, unit values rose by 11.3% (from €19,838/t to €22,072/t), partially offsetting the volume loss in value terms. This price increase may reflect a shift toward higher-value-added components or general cost inflation.

By contrast, imports surged in both volume and value. Import quantities grew by 26.6% (from 92,200 tonnes to 116,700 tonnes), while import unit values climbed by 22.6% (from €8,690/t to €10,651/t). The combined effect produced a 55.1% increase in import value.

The unit-value gap between exports and imports reveals a quality or complexity differential

A striking feature of the data is the persistent gap between EU export and import unit values. In 2025, the EU exported gearbox parts at an average price of approximately €22,072 per tonne, while importing them at €10,651 per tonne. This roughly 2:1 ratio persisted throughout the period and suggests that the EU specialises in higher-complexity, higher-value gearbox components (likely precision parts for premium vehicles), while importing lower-cost, higher-volume components from emerging economies.

2. Geographic Reorientation: From Transatlantic to Indo-Pacific

Imports from China grew more than fourfold, making it the dominant supplier

The most dramatic shift in the EU's import geography was the explosive growth of Chinese exports to the EU in this product category. EU imports from China rose from €93 million in 2015 to €420 million in 2025—an increase of 351%. China overtook the United States and Japan to become the EU's largest non-EU supplier of gearbox parts by value.

India's rise was equally spectacular, if from a smaller base: imports grew from €19 million to €160 million (+732%). South Korea also expanded its share significantly (+154%, from €30 million to €76 million). Together, these three Asian suppliers reshaped the EU's import dependency profile.

EU exports to the US collapsed, while Latin American markets gained ground

On the export side, the United States remained the largest single destination, but its share declined sharply. EU exports to the US fell from €514 million to €276 million (−46.4%), likely reflecting increased localisation of production by European automakers in North America and greater competition from Asian suppliers.

Meanwhile, exports to Brazil nearly tripled (from €55 million to €157 million, +185%), and Mexico grew by 46% (from €106 million to €155 million). These trends are consistent with European OEMs expanding manufacturing footprints in Latin America.

The most dramatic collapse was exports to Russia: from €59 million in 2015 to just €1.2 million in 2025, a 98% decline. This is almost certainly a consequence of EU sanctions following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the withdrawal of European automotive firms from the Russian market.

Within the EU, Belgium and Hungary saw massive import surges

Looking at which EU member states drove the import growth, Belgium stands out: imports surged from €10 million to €207 million (+1,922%), likely reflecting the role of Antwerp as a major logistics hub and Belgium's growing automotive parts re-export activity. Hungary's imports also grew dramatically (from €35 million to €172 million, +390%), consistent with the country's expanding role as a production base for Asian and European automakers.

Germany remained the EU's largest importer (€368 million → €411 million) and overwhelmingly the largest exporter (€985 million → €1.0 billion), confirming its position as the hub of European gearbox-parts production and trade. Italy also grew its export role significantly (+45%), while French exports and imports both contracted by roughly half, suggesting a relative decline in France's position in this value chain.

3. Structural Shifts: Production Boom, Concentration, and Rising Vulnerability

EU production volumes quadrupled, signalling a major expansion of manufacturing capacity

Perhaps the most striking structural finding is the explosion of EU production. Production quantities rose from 60 million units in 2015 to 284 million units in 2025 (+374%), while production value grew from €8.5 billion to €18.6 billion (+118%). This suggests substantial new investment in gearbox-parts manufacturing within the EU, likely driven by the transition to electric vehicles (which require new types of transmission components) and reshoring incentives.

The fact that production value more than doubled while production volumes nearly quintupled indicates that unit production values actually declined—consistent with higher volumes of simpler or standardised components being produced alongside more complex ones.

Market concentration shifted: imports became more concentrated, exports less so

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value rose from 1,498 to 1,632 (+9%), indicating moderately increased concentration—driven largely by China's growing dominance as a supplier. By volume, import concentration nearly doubled (from 1,237 to 2,217), suggesting that a smaller number of countries now supply the bulk of the EU's import tonnage.

Export concentration moved in the opposite direction: the HHI fell from 1,579 to 1,047 (−34%), meaning that EU exports became more diversified across partner countries. This is consistent with the shift away from a few dominant destinations (US, China) toward a broader set of markets including Brazil, Mexico, and Türkiye.

Germany and Slovakia lead in export specialisation

The specialisation analysis confirms the concentration of gearbox-parts production in a handful of member states. In 2025, Germany and Slovakia showed the highest revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) scores, at 0.39 and 0.41 respectively. Germany alone accounted for nearly 48% of EU production value and 21% of total EU trade in this product. France, Austria, and Poland followed with more modest but positive specialisation indices.

At the other end, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Greece showed negligible or zero specialisation in this product, consistent with their limited automotive manufacturing bases.

The EU became more trade-intensive and more reliant on imports

Vulnerability indicators paint a picture of an increasingly open and exposed market. The trade intensity ratio (total trade as a share of production value) rose from 45% to 73%, while export propensity (exports as a share of production) climbed from 35% to 66%. These increases reflect an industry that is deeply integrated into global value chains.

The net import reliance indicator shifted from −22% to −64%. A negative value indicates that the EU remains a net exporter, but the deepening negativity means that imports have been growing faster than exports relative to production. The EU's self-sufficiency in gearbox parts, while still positive in absolute terms, has eroded in relative terms.

Import volatility was highest for China (coefficient of variation of 0.61) and the United States (0.60), indicating that trade flows with these partners were subject to significant year-to-year swings. On the export side, Canada (1.30) and Russia (0.72) showed the greatest instability, the latter reflecting the sharp sanctions-related collapse. One notable price shock was detected in EU exports to Argentina in 2022, where export prices surged by 50% above trend—possibly linked to Argentine import restrictions or currency instability.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU's trade in gearbox parts underwent a fundamental transformation. While the bloc remained a net exporter, its trade surplus narrowed by nearly 70% as imports—especially from China and India—grew far faster than exports. The geographic centre of gravity of EU imports shifted decisively toward Asia, while export destinations diversified beyond the traditional US market toward Latin America and the broader European neighbourhood.

These shifts occurred against a backdrop of massive expansion in EU production volumes, which quadrupled over the decade. This suggests that rising imports supplemented rather than displaced domestic output, meeting the needs of an expanding European automotive industry. However, the persistent and growing unit-value gap between EU exports and imports points to a structural division of labour: the EU continues to specialise in high-value components, while lower-cost imports fill volume demand.

Looking ahead, the data highlights both opportunities and vulnerabilities. The EU's deepening trade intensity and growing reliance on a small number of Asian suppliers—particularly China—create exposure to supply-chain disruptions and geopolitical risks. Policymakers and industry stakeholders would do well to monitor these trends as the automotive sector undergoes its electrification transition, which will reshape demand for gearbox components in ways not yet fully visible in the trade data.