Market evolution: Crude soya-bean oil (CN 150710) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's extra-EU trade in crude soya-bean oil (CN 150710) over the period 2015–2025. The product covers crude soya-bean oil, whether or not degummed, including two sub-categories: food-grade oil (CN 15071090) and oil for technical or industrial uses (CN 15071010).

Over the decade, the EU's position in this market underwent a fundamental transformation. What was a market defined by substantial net exports in 2015 became one dominated by net imports by 2025. Three major dynamics drove this evolution: a structural reversal of the trade balance, a dramatic geographic reorientation of supply sources and export destinations, and a series of price shocks that reshaped the economics of the trade.

1. A Fundamental Reversal: From Net Exporter to Net Importer

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the complete reversal of the EU's trade position. In 2015, the EU exported more than three times as much crude soya-bean oil by volume as it imported; by 2025, imports substantially exceeded exports.

1.1 The EU's exports of crude soya-bean oil halved by volume while imports more than doubled

The scale of the structural shift is captured in the following summary:

Export volumes fell from 958,901 tonnes in 2015 to 455,248 tonnes in 2025 — a decline of 52.5% and the lowest level recorded during the decade. Over the same period, import volumes rose from 292,861 tonnes to 692,439 tonnes (+136.4%), reaching their decade peak. In value terms, exports fell by 30.3% (from €643 million to €448 million) while imports rose by 247.3% (from €196 million to €681 million). Both export and import unit prices increased by approximately 47% over the period, rising from around €670 per tonne to roughly €984 per tonne by 2025.

1.2 The trade balance shifted from a €447 million surplus to a €233 million deficit

The combined effect of declining exports and surging imports was a dramatic swing in the trade balance. In 2015, the EU recorded a surplus of €447 million in crude soya-bean oil. By 2025, this had become a deficit of €233 million — a reversal of nearly €680 million.

Despite this, the EU's net import reliance remained relatively stable at around 50% throughout the decade (49.7% in 2015, 50.1% in 2025, ranging between a minimum of 34.2% and a maximum of 57.3%). This apparent paradox is explained by the simultaneous expansion of EU domestic production, which grew from approximately 1,500,000 tonnes to 2,399,622 tonnes (+60.0%) in volume, and from €912 million to €1,278 million (+40.2%) in value. The growing scale of the overall market meant that even as the trade balance reversed, the ratio of imports to total supply remained broadly unchanged.

1.3 Export propensity and trade intensity both declined, signalling reduced outward orientation

The EU's export propensity — the share of domestic production that is exported — fell from 61.5% in 2015 to 47.4% in 2025, a decline of 22.9 percentage points. This indicates that the EU is increasingly retaining its domestic production for its own consumption rather than channelling it into export markets. The trade intensity — the combined share of trade relative to total supply — also declined from 85.2% to 78.8%.

These figures suggest that while the EU remains deeply engaged in international trade for this product, its role has shifted from that of a processing-and-re-exporting hub to one where rising domestic demand absorbs a growing share of both domestic output and imports.

2. A New Supply Map: Ukraine Replaces South America

The geographic composition of the EU's crude soya-bean oil trade underwent a radical restructuring between 2015 and 2025. Partners that were prominent at the start of the period had largely disappeared by its end, replaced by a highly concentrated set of new suppliers — above all, Ukraine.

2.1 Ukraine grew from a minor supplier to the EU's dominant source of crude soya-bean oil imports

Among the top import partners, Ukraine's rise is the single most dramatic development:

Ukraine's import value grew from €37.6 million in 2015 to €499.3 million in 2025 — an increase of nearly 1,228%. By 2025, Ukraine represented the vast majority of the EU's total import value in this product. This growth was facilitated by the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which entered into force provisionally in 2016, and was further accelerated by the EU's autonomous trade measures introduced following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. On the EU member-state side, Poland emerged as the dominant gateway, with import value surging from €31.5 million to €398.6 million (+1,165.5%), consistent with its shared border with Ukraine.

2.2 Traditional South American and Russian suppliers all but disappeared from the EU market

The mirror image of Ukraine's rise was the collapse of imports from traditional suppliers. Argentina — historically one of the world's largest soya-bean oil exporters — saw its exports to the EU fall from €162,000 to just €1,467, effectively vanishing from the market. Imports from Paraguay declined by 72.6%, from €23.8 million to €6.5 million. Russian imports, which stood at €26.3 million in 2015, were reduced to virtually zero by 2025, reflecting the impact of EU sanctions and trade disruption.

The volatility data confirms the instability of these supply relationships. Argentina's coefficient of variation in import value reached 1.06 — one of the highest among all partners — indicating highly erratic trade flows that eventually collapsed to near zero. The Russian Federation likewise showed high volatility (coefficient of variation of 0.70), again reflecting a supply relationship that disintegrated over the period.

2.3 EU export destinations narrowed, with most North African markets weakening while Morocco held firm

On the export side, the top destination landscape also shifted substantially:

Morocco remained the EU's largest export market and actually increased its share, reaching €268.5 million (+18.1%). The United Kingdom was also a stable destination, growing modestly to €67.0 million (+21.2%). However, exports to most other markets collapsed. Egypt fell by 86.0%, Algeria by 54.4%, and Tunisia by 73.8%. Exports to South Africa and India — which together accounted for €54.6 million in 2015 — effectively ceased. This narrowing of the export base means that the EU's outward trade in crude soya-bean oil has become heavily concentrated on a small number of nearby destinations.

2.4 Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration indices surged on both the import and export sides

The geographic restructuring is captured quantitatively by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI):

On the import side, the HHI rose from 1,806 (moderately concentrated) to 5,553 (highly concentrated), driven almost entirely by the dominance of Ukraine. An HHI above 2,500 is generally considered to indicate a highly concentrated market; at 5,553, the EU's import structure for crude soya-bean oil approaches the level associated with near-monopoly supply conditions. The volume-based HHI tells a similar story, rising from 1,810 to 5,611.

The export-side HHI also rose significantly, from 2,274 to 4,111, reflecting the growing weight of Morocco and the disappearance of formerly diversified export destinations.

3. Price Shocks, Internal Reconfiguration, and Evolving Demand

Behind the headline trade figures, the period 2015–2025 was characterised by pronounced price volatility, a dramatic reshuffling of the EU's internal processing geography, and a shift in the composition of demand towards industrial applications.

3.1 The 2021–2022 global commodity price spike generated severe price shocks across key trade partners

Both export and import unit prices approximately doubled between their trough and their peak during the decade. Import prices ranged from a minimum of €628 per tonne to a maximum of €1,334 per tonne; export prices ranged from €611 to €1,452 per tonne. The peak occurred around 2021–2022, coinciding with the global commodity price surge driven by post-pandemic demand recovery, supply-chain disruptions, and the energy price shock triggered by the war in Ukraine.

The shock detection analysis identifies three major price shock events, all centred on 2021:

Argentina's import price shock registered the highest abnormality score (19.2), reflecting an extremely unusual price movement — consistent with the collapse and then brief resurgence of trade with this partner. Ukraine, which by 2021 already represented over half of import value, saw a price increase of 68.5%. On the export side, Algeria's shock of 68.9% affected 31.0% of the EU's export value, illustrating the vulnerability of the EU's North African trade relationships to commodity price movements.

3.2 Within the EU, export leadership shifted from Germany and the Netherlands to Italy and Portugal

The internal geography of the EU's crude soya-bean oil trade was fundamentally reconfigured during the decade. The member states driving exports changed dramatically:

In 2015, Germany was the EU's largest exporter of crude soya-bean oil at €236.5 million, followed by Spain (€213.3 million) and the Netherlands (€131.6 million). By 2025, Germany had almost entirely exited the export market (−97.6%), and the Netherlands had lost over two-thirds of its export value (−71.1%). Meanwhile, Italy surged from €12.8 million to €140.7 million, Portugal from €4.4 million to €39.1 million, and Belgium from €0.2 million to €11.2 million.

This reconfiguration suggests a significant relocation of processing and export capacity within the EU, or a fundamental shift in how member states participate in the value chain. The collapse of Germany's role — from the single largest exporter to a marginal one — is particularly noteworthy and may reflect changes in crushing capacity, sourcing strategies, or the economics of processing whole soya beans versus importing crude oil directly. The specialisation data for 2025 confirms that the EU members most specialised in this product are Portugal (RSCA 0.67), Poland (RSCA 0.59), and the Netherlands (RSCA 0.39).

3.3 Domestic production expanded by 60%, while the technical-grade import segment grew much faster than the food-grade segment

EU domestic production of crude soya-bean oil increased substantially, from approximately 1,500,000 tonnes in 2015 to 2,399,622 tonnes in 2025 (+60.0%). Production value rose from €912 million to €1,278 million (+40.2%). Despite this expansion, growing domestic demand required increased imports.

The product segment breakdown reveals that the growth in imports was not uniform across sub-categories:

While the food-grade segment remained the larger of the two in absolute terms, the technical/industrial segment grew nearly three and a half times faster. In value terms, industrial-grade imports rose from €51.0 million to €259.1 million, while food-grade imports grew from €145.1 million to €421.9 million. This rapid growth in industrial-use crude soya-bean oil is consistent with the EU's expanding biofuel and oleochemical sectors, which require vegetable oils as feedstock.

This demand driver helps explain why the EU simultaneously expanded domestic production and increased imports: the growth in industrial consumption outstripped the capacity of domestic supply to keep pace. As long as this demand trajectory continues — particularly under the EU's renewable energy and biofuel blending mandates — the structural reliance on imports is likely to persist and potentially deepen.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in crude soya-bean oil (CN 150710) underwent a profound transformation between 2015 and 2025. The decade opened with the EU as a significant net exporter, running a €447 million trade surplus; it closed with the EU as a net importer carrying a €233 million deficit. This reversal was driven by three interconnected dynamics.

First, exports halved by volume while imports more than doubled, reflecting a structural shift in the EU's role — from a processing-and-re-exporting hub to a market increasingly oriented towards satisfying domestic demand. EU domestic production expanded by 60%, but this was insufficient to meet the growth in consumption, particularly from the industrial and biofuel sectors.

Second, the geographic landscape was redrawn almost entirely. Ukraine emerged as the overwhelmingly dominant supplier, growing its exports to the EU from €38 million to €499 million, while South American and Russian sources collapsed. On the export side, Morocco consolidated its position as the primary destination, but most other markets weakened or disappeared. This concentration — reflected in the import HHI rising to 5,553, well above the threshold for a highly concentrated market — carries inherent supply-chain risks.

Third, the 2021–2022 commodity price shock exposed the vulnerability of these concentrated trade relationships, with price abnormality scores reaching extreme levels for key partners. Internally, the EU's processing geography was reconfigured, with Germany and the Netherlands losing their former export dominance to Italy, Portugal, and Belgium.

The fundamental question for the coming years is whether the EU can diversify its supply base to mitigate the concentration risks that have built up over this decade, or whether the combination of geographic proximity, trade agreements, and rising industrial demand will further entrench the current structure.