Market evolution: Crude oil tankers (CN 890120) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU external trade in tankers (customs code 890120) over the period 2015–2025. The code covers both sea-going tankers (CN 89012010) and non-seagoing tankers (CN 89012090), with sea-going vessels overwhelmingly dominating by trade value. The Scope & Definitions page provides full product hierarchy and coverage details.

Over the past decade, the EU's tanker trade has undergone a dramatic structural transformation. The Union has shifted from near-balance to a pronounced trade deficit, imports of sea-going tankers have surged in both value and ship count, while exports have halved. Geographic trade patterns have been reshaped, with China emerging as the dominant import partner and several traditional EU exporters losing ground. The sections below analyse these dynamics in detail.

1. From trade balance to deepening deficit: the EU's growing import dependence

1.1. Import value has climbed while export value has collapsed

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the divergence between EU import and export trajectories. According to the General Overview:

The trade balance swung from a modest deficit of €95 million in 2015 to a record deficit of €2.29 billion in 2025, representing the most extreme imbalance in the entire period. At its peak, the EU achieved a positive trade balance of approximately €1.42 billion, notably around 2023 when export value briefly surged past €3.1 billion (driven almost entirely by sea-going tanker deliveries), but this proved short-lived. By 2025 the deficit had widened to its worst level on record.

1.2. Sea-going tanker imports drive the value growth

The Product Segment Breakdown shows that virtually all of the trade value in CN 890120 resides in sea-going tankers (CN 89012010). Non-seagoing tankers (CN 89012090) remain a marginal share of value, though they show interesting volume dynamics.

Sea-going tanker imports grew steadily, rising from €2.34 billion in 2015 to €3.11 billion in 2025. Non-seagoing tanker imports surged from a negligible €1.8 million to €159 million, though this remained a fraction of sea-going trade. On the export side, sea-going tanker exports fell from €2.24 billion to €972 million, reflecting a structural decline in the EU's role as a tanker exporter.

1.3. The number of imported ships has nearly doubled while exported ships have halved

The supplementary unit data (measured in number of ships) provides an even clearer picture of the structural shift:

In 2015, the EU exported nearly twice as many sea-going tankers as it imported. By 2025, the ratio had reversed: the EU imported more than twice as many tankers as it exported. This is the clearest indicator that EU shipyards have lost competitiveness or capacity in the tanker segment, while demand for tankers—likely driven by fleet renewal and energy logistics—has continued to grow.

1.4. Import unit prices have converged with export prices

The primary-unit price data reveals a notable convergence. In 2015, the reported export price for non-seagoing tankers was €1,453 per tonne (likely reflecting very small volumes), while by 2025 it had risen to €2,359 per tonne. Similarly, non-seagoing tanker import prices stabilised around €2,300–2,400/tonne in 2024–2025. The sea-going tanker segment does not report primary-unit prices (as tonnage is recorded as zero in the primary field), so price analysis is limited to the non-seagoing sub-segment. However, the supplementary unit data allows us to compute approximate per-ship values:

Imported tankers command significantly higher per-ship values than exported ones, which may reflect different vessel sizes, specifications, or the EU importing larger, more complex vessels from Asian yards while exporting smaller or older tonnage.

2. Geographic realignment: China's rise and the reshaping of EU trade corridors

2.1. China has become the EU's dominant tanker import partner by value

The top partners by value data reveals a dramatic reorientation of EU tanker imports toward China:

China's rise from a minor supplier (€36 million, 2015) to the single largest import source (€831 million, 2025) mirrors the broader global shift in shipbuilding dominance toward Chinese yards. Meanwhile, the Marshall Islands—historically the largest source of tanker imports, likely reflecting ship registries rather than actual construction—saw its share decline sharply. Serbia emerged as a notable new supplier, though from a low base.

2.2. EU export markets have contracted across most partners

On the export side, most major destination markets contracted:

The decline across African and European export destinations suggests that EU-built tankers are losing market share to lower-cost competitors, particularly from Asian shipyards. The UK, despite being a major maritime nation, reduced its intake from EU builders by nearly 60%.

2.3. Within the EU, France has surged as the primary importer while Poland has declined

The top EU reporters data shows a dramatic reshuffling of intra-EU import roles:

France's transformation is the most remarkable: from a marginal importer (€75.5 million) in 2015, it became the EU's single largest tanker importer in 2025 (€1.86 billion), accounting for over half of total EU imports by value. This likely reflects orders placed by French shipping companies or tanker operators at Asian yards. Poland, which was the largest importer in 2015, saw its share collapse by 74.7%. Greece and Cyprus—traditional maritime nations with large tanker fleets—also saw steep declines in reported imports, possibly reflecting shifts in registration or reporting patterns.

2.4. EU export leadership has shifted from Poland and Germany to Belgium and Denmark

Among EU exporters, the composition has changed markedly:

Belgium's explosive growth—from virtually zero to over €1 billion in tanker exports—is the most dramatic shift among EU exporters, suggesting the emergence of Belgium as a major tanker delivery hub (possibly through the Port of Antwerp or affiliated shipyards). Denmark also gained significantly. Meanwhile, Poland, Germany, and Romania all experienced steep declines, reinforcing the narrative of a redistribution of EU shipbuilding activity.

3. Rising import concentration and persistent trade volatility

3.1. Import market concentration has increased sharply

The concentration analysis shows that EU tanker imports have become significantly more concentrated by value:

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import value rose from 1,011 to 4,292, crossing well above the 2,500 threshold that typically indicates a highly concentrated market. This reflects China's emergence as a dominant single-source supplier. By contrast, export concentration remained broadly stable (HHI ~1,393), indicating that EU exports, while declining overall, remained distributed across multiple destination markets.

3.2. EU member states display sharply different degrees of trade specialisation

The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals a clear hierarchy:

Cyprus and Denmark stand out as the only EU members with strong revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in tankers, while France is a pure net importer with effectively no domestic tanker production (product share of 0.001%). Germany and Belgium, despite their large absolute trade volumes, are net importers by comparative advantage. This pattern underscores the specialisation divide: a few small maritime states retain export capacity, while the EU's largest economies are primarily tanker buyers.

3.3. Trade with key partners is highly volatile

The volatility analysis reveals extreme year-to-year fluctuations in bilateral trade:

A CV above 1.0 indicates that the standard deviation exceeds the mean—a hallmark of erratic, order-driven trade. Tanker trade is inherently lumpy: individual vessels cost tens of millions of euros, so a single order can distort annual figures. This explains the very high volatility with partners like Serbia and the UK.

3.4. Anomalous events include extreme price shocks and supply disruptions

The shock detection module identified several notable events:

• Serbia, imports, 2017 (price shock): A 26,953% price shift with an abnormality score of 252.3, representing 0.6% of total import value. This likely reflects a one-off acquisition of a small vessel or barge at an anomalously high unit price.
• Serbia, exports, 2018 (price shock): A 202% shift in export price, representing 0.2% of export value.
• Anguilla, imports, 2017 (supply shock): A −100% supply disruption, indicating that tanker imports from Anguilla ceased entirely after 2016 (from €18,655 in 2015).

These events, while statistically significant, involve very small trade values and do not materially alter the overall market picture. They do, however, illustrate the inherent volatility of a market characterised by infrequent, high-value transactions.

Conclusion

The EU tanker trade (CN 890120) has undergone a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. The Union has shifted from approximate trade balance to a €2.29 billion deficit, driven by a 78% increase in the number of sea-going tankers imported (from 67 to 119 ships) and a 59% decline in ships exported (from 130 to 53). China has emerged as the dominant supplier, with import value growing from €36 million to €831 million, making the import market significantly more concentrated (HHI rising from 1,011 to 4,292). Within the EU, France has become the dominant importing nation (€1.86 billion in 2025, up from €75.5 million), while Belgium has emerged as a surprising export powerhouse (€1.06 billion, up from €2.6 million). These shifts reflect the broader global restructuring of the shipbuilding industry toward East Asia, the consolidation of EU maritime activity in a small number of specialised member states (notably Cyprus and Denmark), and the growing tanker fleet requirements of EU-based shipping companies. The market remains highly volatile by nature, given the lumpy character of individual vessel transactions, but the long-term trajectory is clear: the EU has become structurally dependent on non-EU sources for tanker supply.