Market evolution: Crude oil (CN 27090090) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of the European Union's external trade in crude petroleum oil (customs code 27090090) over the period 2015–2025. As the EU is overwhelmingly a net importer of crude oil — with an import bill of over €209 billion in 2025 against negligible exports — the dynamics of this market are primarily shaped by the import side. The decade under review was marked by three major disruptions: the COVID-19 demand shock of 2020, the sharp oil-price spike of 2022, and most consequentially, the geopolitical reconfiguration of EU energy supply chains following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These events left lasting imprints on supplier composition, trade volumes, and the degree of concentration in the EU's crude oil sourcing.

1. A Structural Trade Deficit Widening Despite Falling Volumes

The EU's crude oil trade balance is structurally and deeply negative, reflecting the bloc's near-total dependence on external suppliers for refinery feedstock. Between 2015 and 2025, this deficit widened from –€170.8 billion to –€209.1 billion — a deterioration of 22.4%. This widening occurred even though import volumes actually declined, underscoring the dominant role of price dynamics.

1.1 Import volumes peaked mid-decade and have since receded

EU crude oil imports fell from 492.8 million tonnes in 2015 to 430.9 million tonnes in 2025 — a decline of 12.6%. The peak volume during the period reached 510.8 million tonnes, and the 2025 figure represents the minimum of the entire decade. This trajectory likely reflects a combination of the COVID-19 demand collapse in 2020, improving energy efficiency, accelerating renewable energy deployment, and the structural decline in European refining capacity over the long term.

1.2 Prices surged, more than offsetting the volume decline

Average import prices rose from €347.6/t in 2015 to €475.8/t in 2025 — a 36.9% increase. Prices hit a trough of €277.9/t (likely in 2020, during the pandemic demand shock) and a peak of €693.9/t (almost certainly in 2022, coinciding with the energy price crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine). The net effect of lower volumes but higher prices was a growing import bill, rising from €171.3 billion to €209.4 billion (+22.2%).

1.3 EU crude oil exports remain marginal and declining

The EU exports very little crude oil — a reflection of its limited domestic production (primarily from the North Sea). Exports fell from 1.31 million tonnes (€466.8 million) in 2015 to 0.81 million tonnes (€314.5 million) in 2025, a 38.1% volume decline. These flows — directed mainly to Türkiye, and historically to the United Kingdom and the United States — are negligible relative to imports and contribute almost nothing to offsetting the trade deficit.

Source: General Overview

2. Russia's Collapse and the Great Supply Reorientation

The most dramatic structural shift in EU crude oil trade over this decade was the near-total elimination of Russian supply and its replacement by a more geographically diversified set of suppliers. This reorientation was driven by EU sanctions adopted in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

2.1 Russian crude imports fell by 92% — from dominant supplier to marginal source

In 2015, the Russian Federation was by far the EU's largest crude oil supplier, accounting for €50.2 billion in imports. By 2025, this figure had collapsed to €4.0 billion — a decline of 92.0%. The 2025 figure represents the minimum of the entire period. This drop materialised rapidly after mid-2022, when the EU's sixth sanctions package prohibited the purchase, import, or transfer of Russian crude oil (with a limited pipeline exception) and was followed by the G7 price cap.

2.2 The United States emerged as a top-tier supplier almost from zero

The most spectacular beneficiary of Russia's exit was the United States. EU imports of US crude surged from a mere €77.3 million in 2015 to €31.5 billion in 2025 — a 40,596% increase. This extraordinary growth reflects the surge in US shale oil production over the decade, the lifting of the US crude export ban in December 2015, and the EU's urgent need for alternative barrels after 2022. By 2025, the US had become the EU's single largest crude supplier by value, a position Russia had held just three years earlier.

2.3 Norway and Kazakhstan roughly doubled their deliveries

Other established suppliers absorbed significant market share. Norwegian crude imports grew from €14.0 billion to €29.6 billion (+111.2%), and Kazakh imports rose from €13.4 billion to €27.0 billion (+101.3%). Both countries are geographically proximate to the EU and transported their crude via pipeline or short-sea routes, offering logistical advantages. Saudi Arabia (+14.5%) and Iraq (–7.1%) remained relatively stable suppliers over the period, while Nigeria (–12.9%) saw a modest decline.

Source: Top partners by value

3. Diversification on the Import Side, Concentration on the Export Side

The restructuring of EU crude oil supply chains is also visible in concentration metrics and market structure indicators. The picture is asymmetric: imports became more diversified while exports — already small in volume — became more concentrated.

3.1 Import supplier concentration declined significantly

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU crude oil imports by value fell from 1,274.5 in 2015 to 873.7 in 2025, a decline of 31.4%. The index reached a minimum of 818.5 during the period (likely in 2023 or 2024, as the new supply patterns consolidated). An HHI below 1,000 is generally considered to indicate an unconcentrated market. This reduction in concentration is a direct consequence of the shift away from Russia's dominant position toward a more balanced portfolio of suppliers including the US, Norway, Kazakhstan, and the Gulf states.

3.2 EU member states exhibit very different specialisation profiles

Analysis of revealed comparative advantage in 2025 shows a sharp divide. The Netherlands stands out with an RCA of 6.5 and a normalised RSCA of 0.73, reflecting its role as the EU's primary crude oil entry point — anchored by the Port of Rotterdam and its vast refining complex. Croatia also shows strong specialisation (RCA 4.9). By contrast, large economies such as Italy (RCA 0.14), Spain (RCA 0.12), and Sweden (RCA 0.0) show negative or near-zero specialisation, indicating that while they import substantial volumes of crude oil, this activity is not disproportionately large relative to their overall trade profile. Countries like Poland, Czechia, and Bulgaria record an RCA of exactly zero, reflecting the absence of meaningful crude oil re-exports.

3.3 Netherlands, Germany, and Spain dominate intra-EU import entry

Among EU member states, the Netherlands was the largest single importer of crude oil, with its import bill rising from €28.6 billion in 2015 to €40.7 billion in 2025 (+42.1%). Germany (€27.8B → €29.4B, +5.7%) and Spain (€21.6B → €27.9B, +29.4%) were the next-largest importers. France and Italy also recorded significant import values. The dominance of the Netherlands reflects Rotterdam's status as the main maritime gateway for crude oil entering the EU, where tankers discharge before onward distribution via pipelines or coastal shipping.

Source: Top reporters by value

Conclusion

The EU's crude oil trade over 2015–2025 tells a story of geopolitical disruption and forced adaptation. The most consequential development was the elimination of Russian supply, which dropped by 92% in value terms — transforming Russia from the EU's dominant crude oil supplier into a marginal source. This void was filled primarily by the United States (+40,596%), Norway (+111%), and Kazakhstan (+101%), resulting in a significantly more diversified import portfolio as reflected in the HHI falling from 1,275 to 874.

At the aggregate level, the EU's structural dependence on crude oil imports persists. Import volumes declined modestly (–12.6%), but higher average prices (+36.9%) drove the import bill upward, widening the trade deficit to –€209 billion by 2025. The trade balance deterioration was most acute in 2022, when oil prices spiked to a period maximum of nearly €694/t amid the energy crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Looking forward, the EU's crude oil demand faces continued structural pressure from electrification of transport and the broader energy transition. However, in the near term, the bloc's supply security has improved through diversification, even as its exposure to global oil price volatility — and to geopolitical risks in the Middle East and the Caspian region — remains significant.