Market evolution: Aluminium castings (CN 76169910) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in articles of aluminium, cast, n.e.s. (Combined Nomenclature code 76169910) over the period 2015–2025. The product belongs to the broader category of aluminium articles (chapter 76) and corresponds to PRODCOM code 25.99.29.55 ("Articles of aluminium, n.e.c."). Over the decade under review, the EU aluminium casting market underwent a significant structural transformation: the bloc shifted from a comfortable net exporter position to marginal net import dependence, driven by a surge in imports—particularly from China—that outpaced the growth in export values. This report identifies three principal dynamics that shaped the market: the erosion of the trade surplus, the reorientation of trade partnerships, and the EU's transition toward greater external vulnerability.

1. From Surplus to Dependence: The Steepening Import Trajectory

EU import values nearly doubled while exports grew modestly

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the asymmetry between import and export growth. EU imports of aluminium castings rose by 86.7% in value, from €234.6 million in 2015 to €438.1 million in 2025. By contrast, EU exports increased by only 23.1%, from €434.4 million to €534.8 million over the same window. In volume terms, the gap was even more pronounced: import quantities grew by 38.6% (from 32,721 tonnes to 45,336 tonnes), whereas export quantities actually fell by 16.8% (from 56,325 tonnes to 46,835 tonnes).

Rising unit prices amplified the value shift on the import side

Unit prices increased on both sides of the ledger, but the combination of price inflation and volume growth was far more consequential for imports. EU import prices rose 34.7% (from €7,170/t to €9,661/t), while export prices climbed 48.0% (from €7,713/t to €11,415/t). The faster price rise on the export side partially cushioned the erosion of the trade surplus—without it, the deterioration would have been even steeper. Nevertheless, the sheer volume and price growth on the import side drove the trade surplus down by 51.6%, from €199.8 million to €96.7 million.

The EU crossed the threshold from net exporter to net importer

Perhaps the most consequential structural shift is captured by the net import reliance indicator. In 2015, the EU was a net exporter of aluminium castings with a net import reliance of −10.4%. By 2025, this figure had flipped to +2.5%, meaning the bloc became a modest net importer. The shift was gradual: the indicator troughed at −16.3% before climbing steadily through the 2020s. Meanwhile, trade intensity rose from 42.0% to 58.1%, indicating that the EU economy became substantially more intertwined with global aluminium casting supply chains over the decade.

2. A Partnership Realignment: China's Dominance and the Decline of Traditional Routes

China emerged as the overwhelmingly dominant import supplier

The single most dramatic partner-level development was China's rise from a significant but not dominant supplier to the EU's largest import origin by a wide margin. Chinese imports surged 212.2% over the period, from €73.7 million to €230.2 million—accounting for more than half of all EU import value by 2025. This explosive growth concentrated import sourcing: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports nearly doubled from 1,614 to 3,196, crossing the threshold commonly associated with moderate concentration. Türkiye also expanded its share (+85.4%, from €41.8 million to €77.5 million), while India (+31.6%) and Tunisia (+38.8%) contributed smaller but sustained growth.

EU export destinations underwent a geographic rotation

On the export side, the most notable shifts involved a pivot away from the United Kingdom and Russia, and toward the United States, Algeria, and Serbia. The UK remained the largest single destination but saw its share fall from €159.6 million to €98.4 million (−38.3%). Exports to Russia collapsed by 90.0%, from €20.5 million to just €2.1 million—a decline almost certainly linked to EU sanctions imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, exports to the United States grew by 77.6% (from €64.8 million to €115.0 million), making the US the EU's second-largest export market by 2025. Algeria (+165.5%) and Serbia (+162.8%) also emerged as rapidly growing outlets. The corresponding export HHI fell from 1,837 to 1,074, reflecting a diversification of the EU's export base.

Germany anchored intra-EU demand and supply

Among EU member states, Germany remained the largest importer (€74.2M → €102.3M, +37.8%) and the largest exporter (€90.4M → €116.2M, +28.5%). France stood out for an exceptionally large import increase (+185.0%, from €22.7M to €64.7M), as did Hungary (+433.4%, from €6.1M to €32.3M). On the export side, Czechia (+127.3%) and Italy (+43.3%) posted the strongest growth among major exporters, suggesting Central and Southern European producers expanded their international reach.

3. Market Resilience Tested: Price Shocks, Volatility, and Specialisation Patterns

Price shocks hit key export corridors in 2019 and 2022

The data reveals several abnormal price shock events. In 2019, EU export prices to the United Kingdom spiked by 37.3% with an abnormality score of 7.5—remarkable given that the UK accounted for 35.2% of export value at the time. This coincided with pre-Brexit stockpiling and supply-chain uncertainty. In 2022, two further price shocks occurred in export markets: a 23.1% jump in prices to Mexico (abnormality score of 117.9, the most extreme event detected) and a 49.2% surge to Algeria. Both likely reflected the global aluminium price spike following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the resulting energy-cost inflation that rippled through European metals markets.

Partner-level volatility varied widely

The coefficient of variation (CV) of trade flows reveals pronounced differences in stability across partners. On the import side, Morocco exhibited extreme volatility (CV of 2.79), followed by Switzerland (0.68) and the UK (0.61). On the export side, India (0.77) and Ukraine (0.60) showed the highest instability, while Switzerland (0.18) and Serbia (0.19) were among the most stable partners. The high volatility of UK trade flows on both the import and export sides underscores the disruptive effect of Brexit on established aluminium casting supply chains.

EU production grew substantially, but the bloc's competitive edge narrowed in select members

EU production of aluminium articles (chapter 76, which includes CN 76169910) showed a dramatic increase in reported quantities—from 541.8 million kg to 14.7 billion kg (+2,620%, though this likely reflects improved coverage rather than pure output growth). Production value rose more modestly by 129.5% (from €2.5 billion to €5.7 billion). In terms of specialisation, Austria (RSCA 0.53), Italy (0.50), and Croatia (0.39) were the most specialised EU producers in 2025, while Ireland, Greece, and Malta showed negligible specialisation. This concentration of comparative advantage in a handful of member states suggests that the EU's production base for aluminium castings, while substantial, is geographically uneven.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU's trade in aluminium castings shifted from a position of comfortable net export surplus to one of marginal net import dependence. This transformation was driven primarily by the rapid expansion of imports from China, whose share of EU import value more than tripled, concentrating supply risk and nearly doubling the import HHI. At the same time, EU exports diversified geographically—the collapse in Russian trade and the post-Brexit decline in UK-bound shipments were offset by growth in US, Algerian, and Serbian markets—but export volumes declined even as values rose on the back of higher unit prices. The period was punctuated by notable price shocks, particularly in 2019 (UK/Brexit) and 2022 (Ukraine-related energy and commodity inflation). Looking ahead, the data suggests that the EU's growing reliance on Chinese aluminium castings, combined with the concentration of domestic production specialisation in a small number of member states, presents a structural vulnerability that merits close monitoring by policymakers.