Market evolution: Unwrought gallium and powders (CN 81129289) — 2015–2025

Introduction

Gallium is a critical input for semiconductors, optoelectronics, and defence applications. The European Union, which produces only a fraction of its own needs, has depended heavily on extra-EU suppliers throughout the period studied. Using trade data from 2015 to 2025, this report analyses the main dynamics that shaped the EU's trade in unwrought gallium and gallium powders (CN 81129289). Three themes stand out: a structural price appreciation that masks declining physical volumes; the deepening concentration of imports around China; and a set of trade shocks—from Brexit to export-control policies—that have intensified the EU's strategic vulnerability in this segment.

Overview dashboard

1. Rising unit values amid declining physical flows

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the divergence between trade values and trade volumes. While the EU's import bill grew modestly (+10.1 %), the quantity of gallium entering the Union fell sharply (−38.4 %). On the export side, the value more than doubled (+128.5 %) even as volumes declined by 30.5 %. In both flows, unit prices surged, signalling a tightening global market.

Import volumes contracted while unit prices nearly doubled

Import volumes peaked in 2017 at 50.9 tonnes before sliding back, while unit prices climbed from €126,210/t (the series minimum, in 2017) to €354,867/t (the series maximum, in 2024). This pattern is consistent with a global market in which supply growth has lagged behind demand from the semiconductor and defence sectors.

Export prices rose even faster, more than tripling

The EU's export unit price reached €692,106/t in 2025—roughly double the import price—suggesting that the Union exports higher-purity or more-processed gallium. The export volume spike in 2022 (29.4 tonnes, value €12.2 M) was an outlier, driven largely by a single massive shipment to China (€8.56 M).

The trade deficit narrowed but remained structural

The trade balance improved by 45.3 % over the period but never turned positive. The 2022 swing towards a smaller deficit was largely the China export spike; in subsequent years the deficit widened again, confirming the EU's persistent structural deficit in this material.

2. China's deepening dominance and partner reshuffling

China has been the overwhelmingly dominant source of EU gallium imports throughout the period, and its share has grown. Meanwhile, several formerly significant partners have faded, and new suppliers have emerged. On the export side, the EU's client base has diversified somewhat, with Japan rising to prominence.

China's import share increased and became more volatile

Import concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), rose from 4,574 in 2015 to 6,043 in 2025 (+32.1 %), with a peak of 9,381 in 2022. The 2022 spike reflected an extreme reliance on China at a time when Beijing was tightening export controls on gallium and germanium (announced in July 2023, effective August 2023). The 2022 import figure of €15.0 M from China likely represents anticipatory stockpiling.

Former European suppliers withdrew; Canada and Taiwan partially filled the gap

The UK's collapse as an import source coincides with Brexit: the UK was the second-largest supplier in 2015–2016, but volumes fell to near zero by 2022. Ukraine's decline reflects the disruption caused by the 2022 Russian invasion. Canada and Taiwan emerged as partial substitutes, but their combined 2025 share (€1.10 M, or 13.5 % of total imports) remains far below China's dominance.

Export markets diversified, with Japan emerging as the leading destination

Export concentration fell from an HHI of 4,518 (2015) to 2,920 (2025), a decline of 35.4 %. Japan's rise—from negligible in 2015 to the top EU export destination in 2023 (€2.95 M)—is consistent with Japan's own strategy to diversify semiconductor supply chains away from China.

3. Geopolitical shocks, supply concentration, and rising strategic vulnerability

The period 2019–2025 was punctuated by a series of external shocks that reshaped trade flows and exposed the EU's vulnerability. The data reveal pronounced price volatility on specific routes, a near-total dependence on a single supplier for imports, and declining EU domestic production capacity.

Detected shock events highlight extreme price and volume dislocations

The volatility analysis identified three significant shock events:

The 2022 UK export shock saw the unit price spike to €716,000/t while volumes fell to near zero—consistent with a near-total exit of UK-based trading. The 2019 Japan shock (unit price jumping to €556,130/t) preceded the rapid expansion of EU–Japan gallium trade from 2021 onwards.

The coefficient of variation of import volumes across partners confirms the extreme instability of non-Chinese supply: the UK (CV 2.04), the United States (CV 1.54), and Japan (CV 1.95) all exhibited high volatility, while China (CV 0.42) was by far the most stable source—making it simultaneously the most reliable and the most strategically risky partner.

EU domestic production is small and declining

According to Eurostat PRODCOM estimates, EU-27 production of unwrought gallium stood at:

Production fell by 24.0 % in volume and 10.6 % in value between 2023 and 2024. At approximately 12 tonnes, EU output covers barely half the Union's annual import requirement (~23 tonnes in 2025). Germany accounts for 91.8 % of reported EU production (specialisation data), giving it a Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) of +0.63—the only EU member with a positive RSCA for this product.

Net import reliance deepened to nearly 89 %

The net import reliance indicator, which measures the share of EU apparent consumption sourced from imports, rose from 73.8 % in 2023 to 88.7 % in 2024. This increase reflects both the decline in domestic production and the continued reliance on imported gallium for high-tech manufacturing. The export propensity fell from 549.3 % to 439.6 %, suggesting that the EU is retaining more of its gallium for domestic use—or that re-export opportunities are narrowing.

Conclusion

Over the decade to 2025, the EU's trade in unwrought gallium has been characterised by three converging trends: a near-doubling of unit prices, a deepening reliance on Chinese supply, and a decline in domestic production capacity. The Union's net import reliance now stands at close to 89 %, with China accounting for roughly three-quarters of imports by value. Efforts to diversify—through imports from Canada, Taiwan, or Russia—have yielded only marginal results and often introduced their own volatility.

The 2022–2023 period stands out as a structural turning point: China's announcement of gallium export controls, the UK's effective exit as a trading partner, and the collapse of Ukrainian supply all occurred within a compressed timeframe. The EU's response has been to export more to Japan and the United States at higher unit prices, but this does not address the underlying supply-side deficit.

Looking ahead, the data suggest that the EU faces a persistent strategic vulnerability in this critical raw material. Without a significant expansion of domestic refining capacity or the development of alternative non-Chinese supply chains, the Union's dependence on a single dominant supplier is likely to remain—and potentially worsen—as global demand for gallium continues to grow with the semiconductor and clean-energy transitions.