Market evolution: Steering parts (CN 87089499) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the EU's extra-EU trade performance in steering parts for motor vehicles (Combined Nomenclature code 87089499) over the period 2015–2025. The product covers parts for steering wheels, steering columns and steering boxes destined for a wide range of vehicles — from passenger cars and tractors to buses, trucks and special-purpose vehicles — excluding parts used in the industrial assembly of certain vehicles under subheading 8708.94.20 and closed-die forged steel components. This is a residual six-digit code within the broader steering components heading (870894), which itself sits within the major chapter on vehicle parts and accessories.
Over the decade under review, the EU's trade in this product category underwent a profound structural transformation. What was a comfortable trade surplus with non-EU countries at the start of the period turned into a sizeable deficit by 2025. Exports contracted sharply while imports surged, reconfiguring the EU's position from net exporter to net importer in value terms. At the same time, EU domestic production grew substantially, trade intensity nearly doubled, and the geographic profile of both import and export flows shifted markedly. The following sections analyse these dynamics in detail.
1. A Structural Reversal: The EU Moves from Trade Surplus to Trade Deficit
Exports contracted significantly across the full period
EU exports of steering parts to non-EU countries declined from EUR 784.7 million in 2015 to EUR 488.7 million in 2025, a fall of 37.7% in value (trade overview). The decline was even more pronounced in volume terms: exported quantities fell from 53,640 tonnes to 35,484 tonnes (−33.8%), indicating that the contraction was driven primarily by lower physical shipments rather than by price erosion alone. Unit export prices edged down by 5.9%, from EUR 14,629/t to EUR 13,772/t, suggesting some competitive pressure but no collapse in pricing power.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (EUR M) | 784.7 | 488.7 | −37.7% |
| Export volume (t) | 53,640 | 35,484 | −33.8% |
| Export price (EUR/t) | 14,629 | 13,772 | −5.9% |
Imports grew relentlessly, reaching record levels by 2025
In parallel, EU imports rose from EUR 553.3 million to EUR 863.7 million (+56.1%) and from 67,805 tonnes to 93,456 tonnes (+37.8%). Import prices also climbed, from EUR 8,159/t to EUR 9,242/t (+13.3%), suggesting a combination of volume-driven demand growth and some inflationary or compositional effects. The import value in 2025 represented the maximum observed over the entire period, indicating that demand for externally sourced steering parts was still accelerating at the end of the window.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import value (EUR M) | 553.3 | 863.7 | +56.1% |
| Import volume (t) | 67,805 | 93,456 | +37.8% |
| Import price (EUR/t) | 8,159 | 9,242 | +13.3% |
The trade balance swung from a EUR 231 million surplus to a EUR 375 million deficit
The combined effect of falling exports and rising imports was a dramatic reversal in the EU's trade balance. In 2015, the EU enjoyed a surplus of EUR 231.5 million; by 2025, this had become a deficit of EUR 375.0 million — a swing of over EUR 600 million and a percentage change of −262% (trade overview). This inversion reflects a deeper structural change: the EU's steering parts industry increasingly serves its own domestic automotive assembly base through imports rather than exporting surplus production abroad.
The widening deficit is also consistent with the broader trend of global automotive supply chain restructuring. As vehicle production has expanded in Asia, Eastern Europe and North Africa, the demand for steering components has shifted accordingly — and much of that demand is now met by suppliers located outside the traditional EU manufacturing base.
2. Geographic Reorientation: New Import Champions and Eroding Export Markets
China emerged as the EU's dominant import source, quadrupling its share
The most striking geographic shift occurred on the import side, where China's exports of steering parts to the EU surged from EUR 56.2 million in 2015 to EUR 224.1 million in 2025 — an increase of 298.9% (top partners). By 2025, China was by far the EU's largest single extra-EU supplier, accounting for roughly one-quarter of total imports by value. India followed a similar trajectory, growing from EUR 9.5 million to EUR 39.2 million (+311.1%), and South Korea expanded from EUR 56.9 million to EUR 99.9 million (+75.4%). These three Asian suppliers collectively captured the lion's share of the EU's growing import demand.
| Import partner | 2015 (EUR M) | 2025 (EUR M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 56.2 | 224.1 | +298.9% |
| Liechtenstein | 160.5 | 147.5 | −8.1% |
| Korea, Republic of | 56.9 | 99.9 | +75.4% |
| Türkiye | 44.0 | 70.4 | +59.9% |
| India | 9.5 | 39.2 | +311.1% |
| Switzerland | 48.2 | 27.9 | −42.1% |
| United Kingdom | 39.3 | 13.6 | −65.3% |
Notably, Liechtenstein remained the second-largest supplier (EUR 147.5 million), a figure that reflects the country's role as a host for precision manufacturing firms operating under the EEA framework. However, its position was essentially flat (−8.1%), unlike the rapid growth seen from Asian suppliers. Switzerland and the United Kingdom both saw sharp declines in their share of EU imports (−42.1% and −65.3% respectively), likely reflecting post-Brexit trade friction for the UK and broader supply chain reorientation for both.
EU exports to Türkiye collapsed, while Mexico and Morocco gained ground
On the export side, the most dramatic change was the near-collapse of EU exports to Türkiye, which fell from EUR 259.7 million in 2015 to EUR 49.0 million in 2025 (−81.1%) (top partners). Türkiye had been the EU's single largest export destination, and its contraction accounts for the majority of the overall export decline. This likely reflects the maturation and import-substitution capacity of Türkiye's own automotive components industry, which has grown rapidly under the country's customs union with the EU and its own domestic vehicle production.
| Export partner | 2015 (EUR M) | 2025 (EUR M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Türkiye | 259.7 | 49.0 | −81.1% |
| United States | 97.7 | 79.4 | −18.7% |
| China | 121.9 | 76.1 | −37.5% |
| Mexico | 32.4 | 72.7 | +124.0% |
| United Kingdom | 97.1 | 45.5 | −53.2% |
| Morocco | 10.9 | 33.3 | +205.0% |
| Brazil | 24.1 | 22.7 | −6.0% |
Mexico (+124.0%) and Morocco (+205.0%) stand out as the two bright spots in the EU's export portfolio. Both countries have become major automotive production hubs — Mexico as part of North American integrated supply chains and Morocco as an increasingly important low-cost manufacturing base serving both European and African markets. The growth of EU exports to these destinations suggests that European steering parts suppliers are finding new opportunities as vehicle assembly shifts to these platforms.
Export concentration fell sharply, signalling diversification
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU exports by value dropped from 1,701 to 1,008 (−40.7%) over the period (concentration). This decline reflects the shift away from heavy reliance on a few large markets (notably Türkiye) towards a more dispersed set of destinations. Import concentration by value was more stable, falling only marginally from 1,371 to 1,345 (−1.9%), though import concentration by volume actually increased from 1,386 to 1,792 (+29.3%), suggesting that physical import flows became more concentrated even as the value distribution remained relatively balanced.
Volatility was highest in the most politically and economically exposed partnerships
Trade volatility analysis reveals that the most unstable partnerships were also those most exposed to geopolitical or structural shifts (volatility). EU exports to Türkiye had a coefficient of variation (CV) of 0.92 — the highest among all major export partners — consistent with the dramatic swing from EUR 260 million to EUR 49 million. Exports to the Russian Federation (CV 0.60) and South Africa (CV 0.56) were also highly volatile. On the import side, flows from the United Kingdom (CV 0.75) and China (CV 0.43) showed the most pronounced fluctuations, with the UK figure likely reflecting post-Brexit adjustment effects.
3. EU Internal Rebalancing: Production Growth, Rising Trade Intensity and Shifting Member State Roles
EU production grew strongly, far outpacing trade dynamics
Despite the deterioration in the EU's external trade balance, domestic production of steering parts expanded substantially. Production volume rose from 383,501 kg to 635,815 kg (+65.8%), and production value increased from EUR 5.57 billion to EUR 7.87 billion (+41.4%) (production volumes). Production peaked at approximately EUR 9.3 billion in value and 809,089 kg in volume at some point during the period, indicating that the 2025 figures represent a slight retreat from peak output — possibly reflecting the broader automotive sector slowdown or transition pressures related to electrification.
The substantial growth in production, combined with the growing import deficit, implies that the EU's own vehicle manufacturing sector absorbed a rising share of both domestic and imported steering components. The EU's automotive industry scaled up, but it increasingly relied on non-EU suppliers to meet incremental demand.
Trade intensity and export propensity both more than doubled
Two key structural indicators underscore the EU's deepening integration into global steering parts trade. Trade intensity — the ratio of extra-EU trade (imports plus exports) to production — rose from 20.5% to 47.2% (+130.5%) (trade intensity). Export propensity — the ratio of exports to production — climbed from 14.6% to 34.1% (+132.6%) (export propensity). These figures indicate that while the EU's steering parts sector remained large in absolute terms, its orientation shifted significantly towards global markets — both as a buyer and a seller. The sector became considerably more open and exposed to international competitive dynamics.
The net import reliance indicator remained negative throughout the period (moving from −7.9% to −10.2%), indicating that the EU remained a net exporter relative to its production base, even as the absolute trade balance turned negative (net import reliance). This apparent paradox is explained by the massive size of EU production (EUR 7.9 billion in 2025) relative to the trade balance deficit (EUR 375 million): in the context of overall output, the deficit remains modest. However, the trend is towards increasing import reliance, and the net import reliance metric reached its least negative (i.e. most vulnerable) level of −7.9% at the start of the period, suggesting that the overall trajectory is one of rising external dependency.
Central and Eastern European members became the main import gateways
The distribution of imports across EU member states shifted markedly towards Central and Eastern Europe (top reporters):
| EU Member State | Imports 2015 (EUR M) | Imports 2025 (EUR M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 156.4 | 173.8 | +11.1% |
| Poland | 86.5 | 166.0 | +91.8% |
| Germany | 173.6 | 150.3 | −13.5% |
| Hungary | 6.2 | 90.8 | +1,361.7% |
| Spain | 31.7 | 87.1 | +174.9% |
| Czechia | 36.4 | 51.9 | +42.6% |
| Slovakia | 11.5 | 22.8 | +97.7% |
Hungary's import growth was extraordinary: from EUR 6.2 million to EUR 90.8 million (+1,361.7%). Spain (+174.9%) and Poland (+91.8%) also expanded rapidly. These countries have become major automotive production hubs — Hungary hosts significant OEM and tier-1 operations, Poland's role in European supply chains has expanded, and Spain remains one of Europe's largest vehicle producers. By contrast, Germany's imports actually declined (−13.5%), possibly reflecting reshoring or supplier substitution within its own manufacturing base.
Hungary and France experienced the sharpest export reversals among EU members
Among EU exporters, the contrast between Germany's resilience and the collapse elsewhere is striking (top reporters):
| EU Member State | Exports 2015 (EUR M) | Exports 2025 (EUR M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | 235.1 | 264.5 | +12.5% |
| France | 151.7 | 27.2 | −82.1% |
| Hungary | 227.5 | 12.7 | −94.4% |
| Poland | 57.2 | 37.7 | −34.2% |
| Czechia | 30.8 | 29.2 | −5.2% |
| Romania | 19.4 | 25.5 | +31.3% |
| Italy | 21.0 | 18.0 | −14.0% |
Germany was the only major exporter to grow over the period (+12.5%), consolidating its position as the EU's dominant supplier of steering parts to non-EU markets. Hungary's export collapse (−94.4%, from EUR 227.5 million to EUR 12.7 million) was the single most dramatic internal shift, likely reflecting the realignment of Hungary from an export platform to an import-processing hub — consistent with the simultaneous explosion in Hungarian imports noted above. France experienced a similarly steep decline (−82.1%), potentially linked to restructuring within the French automotive supplier base. Romania (+31.3%) bucked the trend, consistent with its growing role as a low-cost manufacturing base within the EU.
The EU's central European production corridor displays clear specialisation patterns
Revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) data for 2025 confirms that the EU's steering parts production is heavily concentrated in Central and Eastern European member states (specialisation):
| Member State | RSCA | RCA | Production share | Export share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hungary | 0.75 | 7.08 | 19.1% | 2.7% |
| Slovenia | 0.58 | 3.78 | 3.8% | 1.0% |
| Slovakia | 0.49 | 2.93 | 6.2% | 2.1% |
| Bulgaria | 0.33 | 1.98 | 1.2% | 0.6% |
| Czechia | 0.29 | 1.82 | 8.8% | 4.8% |
Hungary stands out with an RCA of 7.08 and a production share of 19.1% of the EU total, yet its export share in extra-EU trade was only 2.7% — confirming that Hungary's steering parts output is overwhelmingly directed towards intra-EU supply chains rather than external markets. At the opposite end, Ireland (RSCA −0.95), Greece (RSCA −0.94) and the Netherlands (RSCA −0.91) have virtually no specialised role in this product category.
Conclusion
Over the decade 2015–2025, the EU's trade in steering parts (CN 87089499) underwent a fundamental transformation. The EU shifted from a comfortable trade surplus to a substantial deficit, as imports grew by 56% while exports fell by 38%. China emerged as the dominant import source, quadrupling its shipments to the EU, while the collapse of exports to Türkiye — once the EU's largest single export market — drove the overall export decline. Within the EU, production grew strongly (+41% in value), and the sector became far more trade-intensive, with trade intensity rising from 20% to 47% of production. However, this openness came with growing external dependency: Central and Eastern European members, particularly Hungary, Poland and Spain, became major import gateways serving their expanding domestic vehicle assembly operations.
The structural picture is one of a sector that remains large and productive but is increasingly integrated into global — and especially Asian — supply chains on the import side, while finding new export niches in emerging automotive hubs such as Mexico and Morocco. Germany stands out as the sole major EU member state to have grown its export base, while Hungary's dramatic pivot from export platform to import-processing hub encapsulates the broader rebalancing of the European automotive components landscape. The EU's vulnerability indicator, though still negative (indicating a net exporter status relative to production), has been trending towards zero, warranting attention from policymakers concerned with strategic autonomy in the automotive supply chain.