Market evolution: Steel billets (CN 720711) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in CN 720711 — semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel (containing < 0.25% carbon, of square or rectangular cross-section, width < twice the thickness), commonly referred to as steel billets. The period 2015–2025 was marked by dramatic structural shifts: the EU's import bill nearly doubled while its own production volumes contracted, the supplier base was reshuffled by geopolitics and trade policy, and unit prices swung through multiple boom-bust cycles. The analysis below draws on Eurostat customs data compiled in the Trade Dashboard.

1. A Structural Widening of the EU's Billet Trade Deficit

The import bill nearly doubled while export revenues grew only modestly

Between 2015 and 2025, the EU's trade balance in CN 720711 deteriorated sharply, moving from −€377 million to −€810 million — a worsening of 114.8%. This was driven by a pronounced asymmetry between the two flows:

Imports grew in both volume (+46%) and price (+31%), compounding into a near-doubling of the value. Exports, by contrast, were essentially flat in volume; the modest value increase was entirely a price effect. The EU thus remained a heavy structural net importer of steel billets throughout the decade.

Domestic production volumes declined, reinforcing import dependence

EU production of CN 720711 fell from 10,039 kt in 2015 to 8,311 kt in 2025 (−17.2% in quantity). At the same time, the production value rose from €2.7 billion to €5.6 billion (+102.9%), reflecting the generalised price inflation that swept steel markets in the wake of capacity adjustments, decarbonisation costs, and the energy-price shock of 2021–2022. The combination of lower volumes and higher import penetration suggests that EU mills progressively lost ground to third-country suppliers in the billet segment.

The trade deficit was at its widest in 2022, driven by the global steel price spike

The deficit peaked around 2022 (the data shows a balance minimum of −€883 million), consistent with the post-pandemic surge in global steel prices and the energy crisis that followed Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Import prices reached a maximum of €675/t that year, while export prices hit €709/t — the highest in the series. The subsequent retreat of prices in 2023–2024 narrowed the deficit somewhat, before the 2025 import-volume surge pushed it wider again.

2. Geopolitical Re-Shuffling of the EU's Billet Supplier Base

Ukraine consolidated its position as the dominant supplier; Russia's share collapsed

The partner data reveals a profound re-orientation of the EU's import sources:

Ukraine was already the largest supplier in 2015 (€180 M) and more than doubled its share to €404 M by 2025, reflecting both its geographic proximity, competitive pricing, and — despite the war — continued capacity to serve EU customers. Russia, the second-largest supplier in 2015 (€84 M), saw its exports to the EU decline by 40.8% to €50 M; this is consistent with the progressive tightening of EU sanctions and safeguard measures targeting Russian steel products.

China and India emerged as fast-growing suppliers, but with very different stability profiles

China's import value surged from €85 M to €264 M (+208.8%), while India's exploded from a negligible €130 k to €102 M. However, the volatility data reveals starkly different risk profiles:

• China: coefficient of variation (CV) of 1.87 on import values — the highest among all partners. A major price shock was detected in 2017 (abnormality 21.8, +280% price shift). Chinese billet supply is thus highly episodic and price-sensitive, likely driven by swings in China's domestic overcapacity and export-tax policy.
• India: CV of 1.53, also very high, with the bulk of the value materialising in the most recent years. This suggests a nascent but still volatile supply relationship.

By contrast, Ukraine (CV 0.27) and Russia (CV 0.41) exhibited far more stable supply patterns over the period.

Import concentration increased, signalling growing dependence on a smaller set of suppliers

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import value rose from 2,049 in 2015 to 2,711 in 2025 (+32.3%). While the market remains below the "highly concentrated" threshold (typically 2,500+ for value-based HHI), the upward trend indicates that the diversification gains from earlier in the period were not sustained. Ukraine alone accounted for a growing share, and the rapid entry of China and India added further top-heaviness.

3. Export Destinations Shifted Toward Neighbouring and Emerging Markets

Traditional North-African and European outlets weakened; new Balkan and Turkish demand emerged

The export partner data shows considerable reshuffling:

Morocco remained the single largest destination (€68 M in 2025), benefiting from geographic proximity and long-standing supply agreements. However, two striking shifts occurred:

• Tunisia collapsed from €54 M to virtually zero — a complete withdrawal that may reflect both demand-side restructuring in the Tunisian steel industry and competitive displacement.
• North Macedonia surged from near-zero to €39 M, and Türkiye grew from €1.8 M to €13 M, indicating that EU billet producers found new outlets in the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea region.

EU export concentration moderated slightly

The export HHI edged down from 3,176 to 3,047 (−4.1% by value), reflecting the partial diversification away from a handful of North-African destinations toward a broader set of Balkan and Mediterranean buyers. Nonetheless, exports remained more concentrated than imports — consistent with the fact that only a few EU member states (notably Greece, Belgium, and Portugal) had meaningful outward flows.

France and Luxembourg held the strongest comparative advantages

The specialisation data for 2025 shows:

France had the highest revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA 0.61), with a production share of 32.2% of EU output but only 7.8% of exports — suggesting that much of France's billet output was consumed domestically or within the EU internal market. By contrast, smaller producers like Greece and Luxembourg exported a disproportionate share of their output, likely to nearby non-EU markets.

Conclusion

Over 2015–2025, the EU's steel billet market (CN 720711) underwent a fundamental transformation. The trade deficit more than doubled, driven by a 46% increase in import volumes against a backdrop of declining domestic production. The supplier landscape was redrawn by geopolitics: Ukraine consolidated its lead, Russia retreated under sanctions pressure, and China and India emerged as volatile but fast-growing alternative sources. On the export side, the EU's billet shipments remained modest in volume but shifted geographically — away from Tunisia and the UK, and toward North Macedonia and Türkiye. Unit prices experienced extreme swings (from around €300/t to nearly €700/t), with the 2022 energy crisis marking the peak. Going forward, the combination of rising import concentration, growing dependence on a small number of external suppliers, and continued domestic production decline points to increasing strategic vulnerability for the EU in this foundational steel segment.