Market evolution: Stainless steel sheet (CN 721924) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report analyses the EU's extra-EU trade in CN 721924 — flat-rolled stainless steel products of a width ≥ 600 mm, hot-rolled, not in coils, of a thickness < 3 mm — over the period 2015–2025. Corresponding to PRODCOM code 24.10.33.30 ("Plates and sheets produced by cutting from hot-rolled wide strip of a width of 600 mm or more, of stainless steel"), this product sits within the broader flat-rolled stainless steel category (CN 7219). Over the decade, the EU experienced a dramatic structural transformation in its trade profile for this product: a once-positive trade balance turned decisively negative, exports collapsed in volume, import sources shifted sharply toward East Asia, and supply concentration intensified. These dynamics point to a loss of European competitiveness in a niche but strategically relevant stainless-steel segment.

1. The Erosion of the EU's Trade Surplus

1.1 From net exporter to net importer

The most consequential shift over 2015–2025 is the reversal of the EU's trade balance. In 2015, the EU recorded a positive balance of +€913K. By 2025, this had swung to −€1.85 million, marking a cumulative deterioration of over 300%. The deficit reached its widest point at −€2.71 million, while the peak surplus was +€3.74 million — illustrating the magnitude of the structural reversal.

1.2 A collapse in export volumes, not merely value

The trade deficit is not simply a price effect. EU export volumes plummeted from 2,762 tonnes in 2015 to just 496 tonnes in 2025 (−82.0%), hitting a low of only 286 tonnes during the period. Meanwhile, import volumes remained broadly stable, moving from 1,233 tonnes to 1,298 tonnes (+5.3%). The EU's export base for this product has therefore essentially eroded, while its appetite for imported supply has held firm.

1.3 Diverging price trajectories

Price trends further underscore the competitive divergence. Export unit values rose from €1,709/t to €3,640/t (+113%), peaking at €6,552/t — likely reflecting a survivorship effect whereby only higher-value niche shipments persisted. Import prices, by contrast, fell from €3,089/t to €2,817/t (−8.8%). The widening price gap suggests that foreign suppliers have been able to undercut European producers on cost, making imports increasingly attractive for EU buyers.

2. Geographic Reorientation: East Asia Rises as Traditional Partners Recede

2.1 South Korea's dominance of the EU import market

The most striking partner-level development is the explosive growth of imports from South Korea. Korean shipments surged from just €39,723 in 2015 to €2.09 million in 2025 — an increase of 5,167%. At their peak, they reached €3.02 million. By 2025, South Korea alone accounted for a dominant share of the EU's total import value, reflecting the capacity and cost competitiveness of Korean stainless-steel producers (such as POSCO). Belgium — a key EU entry point for Korean steel — saw its imports balloon from €60,358 to €2.09 million (reporters data), strongly suggesting that Antwerp serves as a primary gateway for Korean material.

2.2 The Brexit effect on EU–UK flows

Trade with the United Kingdom — historically the EU's largest partner for this product on both the import and export side — has contracted sharply. Imports from the UK fell from €1.70 million to €594K (−65.0%), while exports to the UK collapsed from €1.37 million to €238K (−82.6%). UK trade was at its peak around 2018–2019 and then declined steeply — a pattern consistent with the disruption introduced by Brexit (customs formalities, rules-of-origin requirements, and sterling depreciation). At the same time, UK flows were also characterised by very high volatility (coefficient of variation of 1.36 for exports to the UK, volatility data).

2.3 Decline of other traditional suppliers and the rise of niche markets

Beyond South Korea, the broader pattern is one of retreating traditional partners. Taiwan (−93.1%), Türkiye (−95.6%), and to a lesser degree China (−25.9%) and India (−14.9%) all saw import declines over the period. On the export side, shipments to Russia collapsed from €343K to €6K (−98.2%), almost certainly reflecting EU sanctions following 2022. Exports to Serbia also fell by 95.9%. Conversely, exports to Egypt surged by 2,476% (from €8,494 to €218,827), and exports to Türkiye recovered somewhat (+34.3%), suggesting a partial redirection of the EU's diminishing export flows toward Middle Eastern and North African markets.

3. Concentration, Vulnerability, and the Reshaping of the EU's Industrial Base

3.1 Rising import concentration and supply-side risk

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value rose from 2,582 in 2015 to 3,752 in 2025 (+45.3%), peaking at 5,288. This places import supply firmly in "moderately concentrated" territory, driven largely by South Korea's growing dominance. Import concentration by volume increased even more (+64.9%, from 3,069 to 5,060). A high and rising HHI implies that the EU is increasingly dependent on a small number of foreign suppliers — a vulnerability that could materialise in the event of trade disputes, shipping disruptions, or policy shifts in exporting countries. The coefficient of variation for Korean imports stood at 2.07 — extremely high — confirming the erratic, burst-like nature of Korean shipments.

By contrast, export concentration declined (HHI fell 25.2%), reflecting a more fragmented — and perhaps opportunistic — pattern of destination markets as the overall export volume shrank.

3.2 Domestic production held steady, yet failed to sustain exports

EU production volumes grew modestly from 399,252 tonnes to 416,014 tonnes (+4.2%), while production value increased from €643 million to €703 million (+9.3%). This indicates that European mills maintained or slightly expanded their capacity. However, the simultaneous collapse in exports means that this production was increasingly absorbed by the intra-EU market or domestic consumption, rather than being shipped to third countries. The EU's export propensity did rise from 29.5% to 38.7%, but this is likely an artefact of the shrinking export denominator rather than genuine gains in outward competitiveness.

3.3 Specialisation is confined to a handful of member states

In 2025, revealed comparative advantage in CN 721924 was heavily concentrated in Finland (RSCA: 0.94, RCA: 32.2) and Austria (RSCA: 0.74, RCA: 6.7). These two countries alone account for the bulk of the EU's competitive edge in this product. Most other large member states — including Germany, France, Italy, and Spain — displayed negative RSCA values, indicating net import specialisation. The geographic narrowness of the EU's production advantage implies that supply-chain disruptions affecting Finnish or Austrian mills could have outsized consequences for the bloc's overall position.

3.4 Price shocks underscore market fragility

The shock analysis identified several notable events. The most significant was a Korean import price shock in 2020 (abnormality score: 100.2, shift: +203%), coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic and representing 21.5% of import value — suggesting that Korean suppliers dramatically repriced shipments during a period of supply disruption. An export price shock to the UAE in 2021 (abnormality: 87.0, shift: +551.8%) and a Russian export price shock in 2020 (abnormality: 46.6, shift: +278.1%) further illustrate the turbulence in this market, though their smaller value shares limited their aggregate impact.

Conclusion

Over 2015–2025, the EU's position in CN 721924 has fundamentally weakened on the external trade front. Despite stable domestic production, the bloc has transitioned from a net exporter to a net importer, with export volumes declining by 82% and the trade balance swinging by more than €2.7 million. South Korea has emerged as the overwhelmingly dominant supplier, driving a sharp increase in import concentration and introducing new supply-chain vulnerabilities. The collapse of UK trade flows — a likely Brexit casualty — removed the EU's single largest bilateral partner, while geopolitical events curtailed exports to Russia. Looking ahead, the EU's reliance on a narrow set of import sources and the geographic concentration of its remaining competitive capacity in just two member states (Finland and Austria) suggest that this segment warrants attention from a strategic autonomy perspective. While the net import reliance ratio remains modestly negative at −28.9% (the EU still produces more than it consumes in absolute terms), the trajectory — and the growing trade intensity of 47.3% — indicates that the EU's exposure to global market dynamics in this niche is deepening rather than receding.