Market evolution: Spark ignition engines (CN 84073410) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the EU's external trade in spark ignition reciprocating piston engines over 1,000 cm³ intended for the industrial assembly of passenger vehicles (heading 8703), light commercial vehicles (heading 8704 under 2,800 cm³), special-purpose vehicles (heading 8705), and pedestrian-controlled tractors (subheading 8701.10). The period under review — 2015 to 2025 — spans several transformative forces: the diesel-to-petrol shift in European automotive demand, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, tightening emission regulations, and the accelerating transition toward electric powertrains. As the data reveals, these forces have profoundly reshaped the EU's position in this product market, reversing its traditional trade surplus into a structural deficit, reorienting its geographic trade flows, and driving up unit prices even as physical volumes contract.
Product definition and data scope are detailed in the Trade Dashboard overview for CN 84073410.
1. The Great Reversal: From Net Exporter to Net Importer
The single most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the complete inversion of the EU's trade balance in this engine category. The EU moved from a healthy surplus of EUR 321 million in 2015 to a deficit of EUR 354 million by 2025.
1.1 Exports collapsed in both value and volume
EU exports of CN 84073410 engines fell dramatically over the decade:
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Value (EUR) | 688,196,501 | 133,641,157 | −80.6% |
| Volume (tonnes) | 64,239 | 8,158 | −87.3% |
| Units (pieces) | 561,296 | 69,498 | −87.6% |
Source: Trade overview
The near-identical percentage declines in mass (−87.3%) and unit count (−87.6%) indicate that the average weight per engine exported remained roughly constant — this was a genuine volume collapse, not a compositional shift toward lighter engines. The export trough in mass quantities was reached around 2020–2021 at approximately 6,800 tonnes, before a partial recovery to 8,158 tonnes by 2025, though this remains a fraction of the 2015 baseline.
1.2 Imports proved more resilient, though also declining
Import dynamics tell a more nuanced story:
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Value (EUR) | 367,546,490 | 487,238,058 | +32.6% |
| Volume (tonnes) | 32,782 | 26,968 | −17.7% |
| Units (pieces) | 406,077 | 275,265 | −32.2% |
Source: Trade overview
Import value actually rose by over a third despite a decline in physical volumes — a dynamic explored further in Section 3 below. The value peak occurred in 2021 at approximately EUR 792 million, suggesting that post-pandemic restocking and supply-chain reorganisation temporarily boosted inflows. By 2025, import volumes had contracted, but their value remained well above 2015 levels.
1.3 The balance flipped during 2019–2020
The trade balance passed through zero around 2019–2020. In 2015, the EU exported nearly twice the value it imported. By 2025, the EU was importing over 3.6 times the value it exported. This structural shift reflects both the decline of European engine manufacturing for export and the increasing reliance on engine imports — particularly from the United Kingdom and Turkey — to serve the remaining European vehicle assembly lines.
2. A Shifting Map: Dramatic Partner Reorientation
The geographic composition of both EU exports and imports has changed radically. Long-standing trade relationships have been disrupted, while new partnerships have emerged with striking speed.
2.1 The export side: China, Russia, and Morocco collapsed; Turkey surged
EU exports of these engines were once heavily oriented toward China, Russia, and Morocco. All three flows have essentially evaporated:
| Export Partner | 2015 (EUR) | 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 236,896,158 | 1,889 | −100.0% |
| Russian Federation | 131,604,407 | 10,657,137 | −91.9% |
| Morocco | 130,275,690 | 9,527,881 | −92.7% |
| United Kingdom | 47,962,966 | 819,680 | −98.3% |
| United States | 3,131,236 | 133,180 | −95.7% |
| Türkiye | 20,834,662 | 97,650,857 | +368.7% |
| Brazil | 6,820,213 | 8,326,317 | +22.1% |
Source: Top partners
The disappearance of exports to China is consistent with that country's rapid domestication of automotive component supply chains, including engine production. The collapse of exports to Russia, concentrated around 2022, aligns with the EU sanctions regime following the invasion of Ukraine. Morocco's decline — from the top single destination in 2015 to a marginal customer — likely reflects the reorganisation of assembly lines at Renault's Tangier plant, which has been shifting toward smaller-displacement or electric powertrains.
Against this backdrop, Turkey stands out as the sole major growth market for EU engine exports, increasing from EUR 21 million to EUR 98 million (+369%). This is consistent with Turkey's role as a growing vehicle production hub that still relies on imported engine blocks.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for export concentration rose from 2,024 in 2015 to 5,579 by 2025 — indicating that the EU's remaining export base has become far more concentrated among fewer partners, making it structurally more vulnerable.
2.2 The import side: UK and Turkey surged as Japan and Korea receded
On the import side, the composition has been equally transformed:
| Import Partner | 2015 (EUR) | 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 247,823,647 | 111,202,180 | −55.1% |
| United Kingdom | 34,504,970 | 235,299,198 | +582% |
| Türkiye | 1,687,825 | 118,211,498 | +6,904% |
| Korea, Republic of | 70,904,751 | 87,301 | −99.9% |
| China | 2,434,361 | 15,980,412 | +556.5% |
| Russian Federation | 660,813 | 461,250 | −30.2% |
| Mexico | 3,914,358 | 1,774,528 | −54.7% |
Source: Top partners
The most dramatic shift is the emergence of Turkey as the EU's second-largest engine supplier (EUR 118 million in 2025, from under EUR 2 million in 2015) and the rise of the United Kingdom to become the top supplier (EUR 235 million). Turkey's ascent likely reflects Tofaş (Stellantis-Fiat JV) and Ford Otosan's engine production for European-bound vehicles. The UK's trajectory is consistent with Jaguar Land Rover, Toyota, and other UK-based manufacturers exporting engines back into EU assembly lines — a flow that was reclassified post-Brexit from intra-EU to extra-EU trade, partly accounting for the magnitude of the apparent increase.
Korea's near-complete disappearance from imports (−99.9%) is notable. Hyundai-Kia's engine sourcing appears to have shifted to either intra-EU production (e.g., in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) or other non-EU locations.
Import concentration, measured by HHI, fell from 5,012 to 3,541 — meaning imports have diversified, even as the UK and Turkey now dominate.
2.3 Within the EU, production hubs shifted eastward
The data on EU Member State reporters reveals a significant internal redistribution:
Exporting Member States:
- Spain remained the most consistent exporter, with export value declining modestly from EUR 143 million to EUR 131 million (−8.7%).
- Hungary, Germany, Romania, Czechia, and Sweden all saw their exports collapse to near zero by 2025 — in some cases from over EUR 100 million.
- Germany's decline from EUR 265 million (a peak year) to EUR 1.3 million is particularly striking for the EU's largest automotive economy.
Importing Member States:
- Slovakia's imports surged from EUR 59 million to EUR 235 million (+298%), reflecting its role as a major vehicle assembly country (Volkswagen, Kia, Stellantis, Jaguar Land Rover).
- Spain's imports rose from EUR 16 million to EUR 123 million (+671%), indicating increased reliance on imported engines for its assembly plants.
- France's imports collapsed from EUR 149 million to essentially zero — consistent with the closure or reorientation of engine plants (e.g., Stellantis's Trémery plant transitioning to e-motor production).
- Czechia emerged as a significant importer (from negligible levels to EUR 12.8 million).
The specialisation data for 2025 confirms this picture: France (RSCA = 0.79) and Spain (RSCA = 0.69) are the most specialised in this product among EU members, while Hungary, Czechia, and Poland have near-zero specialisation — confirming the westward concentration of remaining engine production in the EU.
3. Rising Unit Values Amid Volume Contraction: A Structural Shift
3.1 Unit prices rose sharply on both sides of the trade flow
While volumes declined, unit values rose substantially:
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export price per tonne | EUR 10,713 | EUR 16,383 | +52.9% |
| Export price per piece | EUR 1,226 | EUR 1,923 | +56.8% |
| Import price per tonne | EUR 11,212 | EUR 18,067 | +61.1% |
| Import price per piece | EUR 905 | EUR 1,770 | +95.6% |
Source: Trade overview
Several factors likely contribute to this price inflation:
- General inflation and input cost pressures, particularly in metals and semiconductors, especially acute in the 2021–2023 period.
- Compositional effects: as total volumes shrink, the remaining engines traded may skew toward higher-displacement, more technologically complex units (e.g., turbocharged engines), which carry higher unit values.
- Tariff and compliance costs that have been passed through in unit prices.
- The import price per piece nearly doubling (+95.6%) is particularly noteworthy and suggests that the engines being imported have become more expensive on average — possibly because lower-value, mass-market imports from Korea have been replaced by higher-value engines from the UK and Turkey.
3.2 Price shocks signalled structural disruptions
The volatility analysis detected several significant price shock events in EU exports:
| Partner | Year | Flow | Price Shift | Abnormality Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| China | 2018 | Exports | +270.3% | 73.9 |
| United Kingdom | 2021 | Exports | +145.6% | 84.9 |
| Brazil | 2017 | Exports | +684.7% | 26.0 |
Source: Supply shocks
The 2018 China price shock (270% shift) coincides with the period when EU engine exports to China were beginning their collapse — suggesting that the last engines shipped may have been premium or specialised units. The 2021 UK shock (146% shift) aligns with the post-Brexit transition period and pandemic-era supply disruptions. The volatility coefficients for several import and export partners exceed 1.0, indicating that trade flows in this product are inherently unstable.
3.3 Production volumes fell, but their value increased
EU production data confirms the structural nature of the transition:
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Production (units) | 6,155,178 | 4,000,320 | −35.0% |
| Production value (EUR) | 9,800,523,794 | 12,001,200,000 | +22.5% |
Source: Production volumes
EU domestic production of these engines declined by over a third in unit terms, yet total production value rose by nearly a quarter. The implied average unit value of production increased from approximately EUR 1,592 per engine in 2015 to EUR 3,000 per engine in 2025 — an 88% increase. This aligns with the industry's move toward fewer but more technologically sophisticated and expensive petrol engines — many of which are turbocharged, mild-hybrid compatible, or destined for niche applications — as mass-market production shifts toward electric powertrains.
Conclusion
The EU's trade in spark ignition engines over 1,000 cm³ (CN 84073410) has undergone a profound structural transformation between 2015 and 2025. The EU has shifted from a position of net exporter (EUR +321 million surplus) to that of a net importer (EUR −354 million deficit), with export volumes declining by 87% while import values grew by 33%. This reversal reflects the combined impact of Brexit (which reclassified UK–EU engine trade), the EU's accelerating electrification agenda (reducing demand for and investment in combustion engines), and the geopolitics of the 2020s (sanctions on Russia, supply-chain localisation in China and elsewhere).
The geographic map of trade has been redrawn. Turkey has emerged as the EU's most dynamic bilateral partner on both the import and export sides, while traditional flows to and from China, Korea, Russia, and Morocco have collapsed. Within the EU, engine production and trade have concentrated in a smaller number of Member States — notably Spain, Slovakia, and Hungary — while former major players like Germany, France, Romania, and Sweden have seen their engine export activity vanish.
Finally, unit values have risen dramatically across all flows — by over 50% on exports and nearly doubling on the import price-per-piece basis — confirming that what remains of this trade consists of increasingly specialised, higher-value engines. With EU engine production volumes down 35% but production values up 22.5%, the data points to an industry in managed decline, producing fewer, more expensive combustion engines as the transition to electric vehicles reshapes the automotive value chain.