Market evolution: Small petrol cars (CN 87032110) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in new passenger cars with spark-ignition engines of 1,000 cm³ or less (Combined Nomenclature code 87032110) over the period 2015–2025. This product category covers small city cars and superminis powered by small-capacity petrol engines — a segment that was once a mainstay of European automotive manufacturing. Over the past decade, this market has undergone a dramatic transformation: the EU has shifted from being a modest net exporter to a significant net importer in value terms, with the extra-EU trade balance swinging from a surplus of €1.69 billion in 2015 to a deficit of €3.48 billion in 2025. This structural reversal reflects a confluence of factors — the offshoring of small-car production to nearby low-cost countries, the reshaping of supply chains after Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic, and a gradual pivot of the European industry toward higher-value electrified vehicles.

Overview dashboard

1. From surplus to deficit: the collapse of the EU's trade balance

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the complete reversal of the EU's extra-EU trade balance for small petrol cars. While EU export revenues grew moderately, import values surged more than fourfold, turning the EU from a net exporter into a substantial net importer.

1.1. Import values quadrupled while export values grew by only a third

Over the full period, extra-EU import values rose from €1.91 billion to €8.37 billion — an increase of 337%. In the same interval, extra-EU export values grew from €3.60 billion to €4.89 billion (+35.8%). The import surge was driven by both higher volumes and higher unit prices: import quantities in tonnes grew 177%, while import prices per tonne rose 58%.

Source: Trade overview

1.2. Export volumes stagnated despite rising unit values

EU export volumes in tonnes fell slightly (−3.7%) and the number of vehicles shipped extra-EU declined by 15.4% (from 369,130 to 312,333 units). The increase in export value was therefore almost entirely driven by rising prices: the average export price per unit climbed from €9,757 to €15,657 (+60.5%). This suggests that what the EU continued to export in this segment shifted toward higher-specification or higher-priced models, while the bulk of small-car production for export was increasingly located outside the EU.

1.3. The import price premium narrowed but volumes dominated

The average price per imported vehicle was €5,913 in 2015 and rose to €11,046 in 2025 (+86.8%). This convergence toward EU export prices suggests that imported vehicles have moved upmarket over the decade. Nevertheless, the sheer scale of the volume increase was the primary driver of the import bill's growth. By 2025, the EU was importing more than twice as many small petrol cars (by unit count) as it was exporting extra-EU.

2. A geographic reshuffling of suppliers and customers

Behind the aggregate trade figures lies a profound reshaping of the EU's trade geography. New supplier countries — especially in North Africa and Turkey — have displaced traditional sources, while the United Kingdom has become a dominant market for EU exports after Brexit.

2.1. Morocco and Türkiye became the dominant import suppliers

The two fastest-growing and now largest import origins are Morocco and Türkiye, which together accounted for €5.50 billion of the €8.37 billion total import bill in 2025.

Source: Partners

Morocco's rise to become the EU's single largest extra-EU supplier of small petrol cars (€3.05 billion, peaking at €3.53 billion) is closely linked to the expansion of manufacturing capacity at the Renault–Nissan Tangier plant, which produces popular models such as the Dacia Sandero — consistently one of Europe's best-selling cars. Türkiye's growth reflects the role of Stellantis (Fiat/Tofaş) and other manufacturers producing small cars for the European market from Turkish plants.

2.2. Traditional Asian suppliers lost ground; the UK emerged as a new import source

Thailand, once a significant supplier (€198 million in 2015), saw its exports to the EU collapse to just €1.3 million by 2025 (−99.3%), likely reflecting production model changes and the end of certain vehicle lines. South Africa, by contrast, grew from €185 million to €1.19 billion, driven by BMW's Rosslyn plant and other OEMs using the country as an export platform.

The United Kingdom's emergence as a major import source (from €25 million to €591 million, +2,295%) is a clear post-Brexit effect: vehicles produced in the UK for the European market now cross an external customs border and are recorded as extra-EU imports.

2.3. The UK remained the anchor market for EU exports, while Türkiye surged

The United Kingdom has consistently been the EU's largest extra-EU export destination for small petrol cars, with export values ranging from €1.56 billion to €3.38 billion over the period (2025: €2.59 billion, +3.7% versus 2015). Its dominance reflects geographic proximity, shared driving conventions, and deep integration of EU–UK automotive supply chains.

Source: Partners

The most remarkable shift on the export side is the surge in EU exports to Türkiye (from €36 million to €1.09 billion), likely reflecting re-exports, parts-kit shipments, or the role of Turkey as a re-export hub. Conversely, EU exports to China effectively vanished (from €179 million to near zero), consistent with the rapid electrification of the Chinese market and the declining competitiveness of small European petrol cars there.

2.4. Import concentration rose while export markets diversified

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value increased from 1,642 to 2,560 (+56%), indicating that the EU's import supply became more concentrated — essentially dominated by Morocco and Türkiye. For exports, the HHI fell from 4,937 to 3,360 (−32%), reflecting a diversification away from near-total reliance on the United Kingdom toward a broader set of destinations.

Source: Concentration

3. Structural transformation of EU production and export specialisation

Beyond trade flows, the data reveal a fundamental restructuring of where small petrol cars are produced within the EU and which Member States have emerged as export champions.

3.1. Production volumes declined but values rose sharply

EU domestic production of vehicles in this subheading fell from approximately 4.35 million units in 2015 to 4.0 million units in 2025 (−8%), with the trough reaching as low as 3.6 million units in the intervening years. Production values, however, rose from €33.6 billion to €56.0 billion (+67%), implying a substantial increase in the average value per vehicle produced. This reflects both general price inflation and a likely compositional shift toward higher-margin variants as basic small-car models were increasingly offshored to Morocco, Turkey, and other locations.

Source: Production volumes

3.2. Germany's export dominance collapsed; Spain, Czechia, and the Netherlands surged

The most dramatic shift among EU Member States is the near-disappearance of Germany from extra-EU exports of small petrol cars. Germany's export value fell from €1.65 billion in 2015 to just €256 million in 2025 (−84.5%), a decline that likely reflects the reorientation of German OEMs toward electric and premium vehicles, and the offshoring of small-car production.

Source: Reporters

Spain rose to become the EU's largest exporter of small petrol cars (€1.71 billion), reflecting the role of SEAT/CUPRA and Stellantis plants. Czechia (€1.16 billion) benefits from Škoda's production base. The Netherlands' extraordinary rise (from €4 million to €850 million) likely reflects its role as a trade and logistics hub rather than a manufacturing base per se, with vehicles flowing through Dutch ports and distribution centres.

3.3. Southern and Central European producers gained comparative advantage

Revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) data for 2025 confirm that the EU's strongest specialisation in this product lies in Romania (RSCA 0.79), Slovenia (0.74), Czechia (0.67), and Spain (0.62). These countries host major assembly plants for small cars — Dacia in Romania, Revoz (Renault) in Slovenia, Škoda in Czechia, and SEAT/Stellantis in Spain. By contrast, traditional automotive powerhouses such as Austria and Germany show low or negative specialisation in this segment, consistent with their shift toward higher-value vehicle categories.

Source: Specialisation

3.4. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain absorbed the bulk of import growth

On the import side, the four largest EU economies accounted for the lion's share of the increase. France's imports grew from €377 million to €1.51 billion (+301%), Germany from €339 million to €1.70 billion (+403%), Italy from €278 million to €1.38 billion (+396%), and Spain from €170 million to €959 million (+463%). These figures underscore that the surge in imports from Morocco and Turkey is not concentrated in transit countries but reflects genuine demand absorption in the EU's largest consumer markets.

Source: Reporters

Conclusion

The EU's trade in small petrol cars (CN 87032110) over 2015–2025 tells a clear story of structural transformation. A decade ago, the EU was a modest net exporter in this segment, anchored by German production and UK-bound exports. By 2025, the picture has fundamentally changed: imports have quadrupled in value to €8.4 billion — driven overwhelmingly by Morocco and Türkiye — while export growth has been modest and volumes have actually declined. The trade balance has swung from a €1.7 billion surplus to a €3.5 billion deficit.

This transformation reflects deliberate industrial strategy by European OEMs: small, low-margin petrol cars have been progressively offshored to nearby countries offering lower labour costs and preferential trade arrangements, while EU-based production has shifted toward higher-value vehicles. Within the EU, export leadership has migrated from Germany to Spain, Czechia, and Romania — countries where small-car platforms remain competitive. Looking ahead, the tightening EU CO₂ regulations and the accelerating transition to electric vehicles are likely to further erode the relevance of this specific subheading, as both production and demand shift toward battery-electric powertrains classified under different CN codes.