Market evolution: Seat parts (CN 940199) — 2015–2025
Introduction
Customs heading CN 940199 covers parts of seats, not of wood, n.e.s. ("not elsewhere specified"). As a residual sub-heading within heading 9401 (seats and parts thereof), it captures a heterogeneous set of components—metal frames, mechanisms, upholstered sub-assemblies, foam padding, and plastic mouldings—used across the automotive, aircraft, and general-furniture industries. Three CN sub-codes provide further granularity: 94019920 (parts for motor vehicles), 94019910 (parts for aircraft), and 94019980 (other seat parts, not of wood).
This report analyses the EU's extra-EU trade in CN 940199 over the period 2015–2025. Detailed trade statistics are available for the 2022–2025 window, while PRODCOM production data extends further back and is used where relevant. The analysis is organised around three main themes: the widening trade deficit, the geographic reshuffling of supply chains, and the EU's deepening structural dependence on imports.
1. Rising Imports and a Widening Trade Deficit
EU imports have grown far more rapidly than exports
Over the 2022–2025 period, EU imports of seat parts from non-EU countries grew by 25.5% in value, rising from €2.65 billion to €3.33 billion. By contrast, EU exports edged up only 6.4%, from €1.97 billion to €2.09 billion (trade overview). The result has been a sharp deterioration in the trade balance, which widened from −€687 million to −€1,236 million—an 80% increase in the deficit.
| Metric | 2022 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imports (value, €bn) | 2.65 | 3.33 | +25.5% |
| Exports (value, €bn) | 1.97 | 2.09 | +6.4% |
| Trade balance (€bn) | −0.69 | −1.24 | −80.0% |
| Imports (volume, kt) | 251.5 | 279.2 | +11.0% |
| Exports (volume, kt) | 206.0 | 193.8 | −5.9% |
| Import unit price (€/t) | 10,550 | 11,924 | +13.0% |
| Export unit price (€/t) | 9,549 | 10,798 | +13.1% |
Price increases mask divergent volume trends
Both imports and exports recorded similar price growth of around 13%, likely reflecting input-cost inflation (steel, plastics, energy) and a shift toward higher-value components. However, the volume trajectories diverged sharply: import volumes rose 11.0% while export volumes actually fell 5.9%. EU exporters are therefore shipping fewer tonnes at higher prices, while importers are absorbing both more volume and higher prices—a pattern consistent with growing offshoring of production.
Motor-vehicle parts dominate the import bill while aircraft parts show EU competitive strength
Breaking down by sub-segment reveals an important structural feature. In 2025, motor-vehicle seat parts (CN 94019920) accounted for roughly 69% of EU imports by value (€2.29 billion) and 59% of exports (€1.24 billion), generating a deficit of approximately €1.06 billion—the bulk of the overall gap (product segment breakdown).
By contrast, aircraft seat parts (CN 94019910) represent a small share by volume (≈2,400 t imported, ≈1,800 t exported in 2025) but carry extremely high unit values—over €119,000/t for imports and €238,000/t for exports. The EU runs a trade surplus in this niche segment (exports €423m vs. imports €288m in 2025), and the segment has grown rapidly: aircraft seat-part exports more than doubled from €181 million (2022) to €423 million (2025).
| Segment | Imports 2025 (€m) | Exports 2025 (€m) | Balance 2025 (€m) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motor vehicle parts (94019920) | 2,291 | 1,236 | −1,055 |
| Other seat parts (94019980) | 750 | 435 | −315 |
| Aircraft parts (94019910) | 288 | 423 | +135 |
2. Nearshoring Accelerates as Supply Chains Diversify
China's dominant role is eroding rapidly
China remained the EU's single largest source of seat-part imports in 2025, but its position has weakened substantially. Chinese shipments fell 18.0% in value over the period, from €722 million (2022) to €593 million (2025), reducing China's share of EU imports from approximately 27% to 18% (partner data). Import volatility from China remained low (coefficient of variation 0.08), indicating a gradual, structural decline rather than erratic swings.
Mediterranean and Western Balkan partners have surged
At the same time, four neighbouring suppliers have grown dramatically, collectively overtaking China:
| Partner | Imports 2022 (€m) | Imports 2025 (€m) | Change | Share of EU imports 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Morocco | 346 | 577 | +66.6% | 17.3% |
| Türkiye | 358 | 536 | +49.9% | 16.1% |
| Serbia | 232 | 356 | +53.6% | 10.7% |
| North Macedonia | 205 | 330 | +61.1% | 9.9% |
| China (reference) | 722 | 593 | −18.0% | 17.8% |
By 2025, these four "nearshore" partners supplied over 54% of EU seat-part imports combined. This pattern is consistent with broader EU nearshoring trends, supported by preferential trade agreements (EU–Morocco Association Agreement, EU–Turkey Customs Union, Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the Western Balkans) and the geographic proximity that shortens supply chains and reduces logistics risk.
EU export markets remain anchored in mature economies
On the export side, the United Kingdom (€461m, −1.0%) and the United States (€343m, −2.3%) remained the EU's top two destinations, together absorbing nearly 39% of exports. The most dynamic growth, however, came from Türkiye (+73.5% to €182m) and Morocco (+40.2% to €97m), reflecting deepening bilateral industrial integration in both directions (partner data).
Market concentration has modestly declined on both sides
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports fell from 1,305 to 1,194 (−8.5%) by value, while export concentration also declined from 1,130 to 1,027 (−9.1%) (concentration data). Both levels remain in the moderate-concentration range, but the downward trend signals ongoing diversification of the EU's trade network on both the import and export sides.
3. Deepening Integration and Growing Import Dependence
The EU has shifted from slight net exporter to significant net importer
The EU's net import reliance in seat parts has undergone a fundamental transformation. The metric, which measures the net trade balance as a share of apparent consumption, moved from −6.5% in 2022 (a slight net export surplus) to +16.5% in 2025 (substantial net import dependence). Over the broader period, net import reliance reached a low of −20.2%, suggesting the EU was once a more significant net exporter—a position that has been completely reversed.
Trade intensity and export propensity have both climbed sharply
Two complementary metrics confirm the EU's deepening integration into global seat-parts value chains:
| Metric | 2022 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trade intensity (%) | 49.8 | 69.2 | +39.0% |
| Export propensity (%) | 35.2 | 48.3 | +37.2% |
Trade intensity—total extra-EU trade as a share of production—rose from about 50% to nearly 70%, meaning that the EU's seat-parts industry is now significantly more dependent on cross-border flows than it was just a few years ago. Export propensity also increased, indicating that EU producers are selling a larger share of their output abroad, even as the overall trade balance has worsened.
EU production has grown but the import gap continues to widen
PRODCOM data shows that EU production value of seat parts increased by 24.5% from the first to the last available year (from approximately €3.9 billion to €4.9 billion), having peaked at around €5.2 billion in an intermediate year. This growth, while substantial, has not kept pace with the 25.5% rise in imports, meaning the gap between domestic supply and demand has continued to widen.
Central and Eastern European economies dominate seat-part specialisation
The EU's specialisation map for seat parts in 2025 is dominated by Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states with large automotive manufacturing bases:
| Member State | RCA | RSCA | Share of EU production |
|---|---|---|---|
| Czechia | 6.20 | 0.72 | 29.8% |
| Romania | 4.95 | 0.66 | 8.3% |
| Portugal | 3.91 | 0.59 | 5.4% |
| Poland | 3.25 | 0.53 | 21.6% |
Czechia stands out with a revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of 6.2 and the largest single-country production share (29.8% of EU output), reflecting its role as a major automotive-components hub hosting Škoda, Hyundai, and Toyota plants. Poland follows with 21.6% of production and a strong RCA of 3.25. Together, these four most-specialised countries account for nearly two-thirds of EU seat-parts production.
Growing import dependence carries supply-chain risks
The convergence of several trends—rising import reliance, growing trade intensity, and the concentration of production in a handful of CEE economies—creates a structural vulnerability for the EU. While diversification away from China toward nearer partners reduces some geopolitical risk, the sheer growth in import volumes means the EU is increasingly dependent on external suppliers for a critical input to its automotive and aerospace industries. The volatility data shows that some key partners—particularly the United Kingdom (CV 0.45 for imports) and Serbia (CV 0.26)—exhibit relatively high import volatility, which could amplify the impact of any supply disruption.
Conclusion
The EU's trade in seat parts (CN 940199) has undergone significant structural change over the 2015–2025 period. Most notably, the EU has shifted from a position of near self-sufficiency to one of substantial net import dependence, with the trade deficit widening to over €1.2 billion by 2025. This shift has been driven by the combination of strong import growth (+25.5% in value) and sluggish export performance (+6.4%), with falling export volumes suggesting that some production capacity has relocated abroad.
Geographically, the most striking development is the rapid rise of Morocco, Türkiye, Serbia, and North Macedonia as EU suppliers, collectively overtaking China's share of the import market. This nearshoring trend reflects both cost competitiveness and the pull of EU trade agreements and proximity. At the same time, the EU maintains a competitive edge in the high-value aircraft seat-parts niche, where it runs a healthy trade surplus.
Looking ahead, the deepening of trade intensity (now approaching 70%) and the concentration of EU production in a handful of CEE member states suggest that the sector's exposure to external shocks—whether from trade policy changes, logistics disruptions, or geopolitical tensions—will remain a key concern for policymakers and industry alike.