Market evolution: Processing units (CN 847150) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the European Union's trade in processing units for automatic data-processing machines (Customs code 847150) over the period 2015–2025. This product category covers computing units — essentially the core processors, servers, and embedded computing boxes — whether or not they incorporate a storage, input, or output unit within the same housing. Over the past decade, the EU's external trade in this segment has undergone a dramatic transformation: total trade values have roughly quadrupled, unit prices have surged, and the EU's position has shifted from net exporter to net importer. The following analysis is structured around three main dynamics: the explosive growth in trade value driven by rising unit prices, the geographic restructuring of supply chains away from China toward emerging manufacturing hubs, and the EU's changing strategic vulnerability as import reliance has deepened.

1. Surging Trade Values Mask a Divergence Between Price and Volume

The headline growth figures are extraordinary

Over the 2015–2025 period, EU exports of processing units rose from €4.16 billion to €16.64 billion (+299.7%), while imports grew from €5.27 billion to €19.85 billion (+276.8%). At face value, both flows expanded at comparable rates. However, the underlying composition of this growth tells a more nuanced story.

Price appreciation has been the dominant value driver

A striking feature of this period is the surge in unit prices. The average export price per tonne rose from €114,614 to €316,673 (+176.3%), while the average import price per tonne climbed from €63,739 to €347,537 (+445.3%). Measured per piece, export values rose from €951 to €2,602 (+173.8%) and import values from €495 to €1,260 (+154.8%).

This price inflation reflects the broader technology shift over the decade: the growing demand for high-performance computing (HPC) equipment, AI-optimised server infrastructure, and data-centre hardware has pushed the product mix toward higher-value units. Global semiconductor supply constraints — particularly acute during 2021–2022 — further amplified price pressures.

Physical volumes tell a different story for imports

While piece counts grew on both sides (+46.0% for exports to 6.39 million items; +47.9% for imports to 15.75 million items), the mass-based import volume actually declined by 30.9%, from 82,654 tonnes to 57,117 tonnes. Export mass grew more modestly at +44.7% (36,315 to 52,545 tonnes). The divergence between rising piece counts and falling import tonnage is consistent with a shift toward lighter, more compact, and higher-value processing units — a hallmark of the transition from bulk server racks to denser blade and micro-server architectures, as well as edge-computing devices.

2. A Geographic Rebalancing: From China-Centric to a Broader Supply Web

China remains dominant, but its share growth has slowed

China was the EU's largest import partner by value in both 2015 and 2025, with imports rising from €2.21 billion to €4.22 billion (+91.4%). While still significant, this growth rate is modest compared to several other partners, indicating a relative loss of market share.

Taiwan, Thailand, and Mexico have emerged as fast-growing suppliers

The most dramatic shifts in the EU's import geography occurred among partners that were marginal in 2015:

Thailand's growth from €12 million to €1.36 billion is the single most striking shift. Taiwan's surge — from €186 million to €2.93 billion — reflects the country's central role in advanced semiconductor packaging and server assembly. Mexico's rise to €4.3 billion suggests a near-shoring effect, with major manufacturers establishing assembly capacity closer to the North American market and, through integrated supply chains, feeding EU-bound flows as well.

The United States has become the EU's single largest import source

By 2025, the United States displaced China as the top import partner by value, with imports reaching €5.01 billion — a 331.4% increase from 2015. This is likely linked to the EU's surging demand for US-designed, Taiwan- or Mexico-assembled high-performance server platforms (e.g., for hyperscale data centres and AI workloads), as well as direct exports from US-based assembly operations.

EU import concentration has declined

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value fell from 2,462 to 1,847 (−25.0%), indicating that the EU's import base has become meaningfully more diversified. This reduced concentration lowers the risk of single-point supply disruption — though it also reflects the fact that several of the new fast-growing suppliers are themselves dependent on a narrow set of upstream semiconductor inputs.

EU export partners show a collapse in Russia and growth in the UK and US

On the export side, the most notable shift is the near-total collapse of exports to Russia — from €303 million in 2015 to less than €1 million in 2025 (−99.7%), a direct consequence of EU sanctions following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, exports to the United Kingdom (+312.3%, to €4.38 billion) and the United States (+777.4%, to €3.52 billion) surged, reflecting both post-Brexit trade normalisation and strong transatlantic demand for EU-assembled processing units.

3. From Net Exporter to Net Importer: The EU's Deepening Strategic Exposure

The trade balance has swung from surplus to deficit

Perhaps the most structurally significant development is the EU's shift in net import reliance. In 2015, the indicator stood at −93.3%, meaning the EU was a substantial net exporter (in value terms, exports far exceeded domestic production relative to total supply). By 2025, it had flipped to +30.1%, indicating the EU now relies on imports for nearly a third of its net supply. This represents a structural change in the EU's position in the global value chain for processing hardware.

EU domestic production has grown, but not enough to keep pace

EU production volumes (measured in pieces) expanded from 565,622 to 1,500,000 units (+165.2%), and production value rose from €1.64 billion to €2.59 billion (+58.1%). While this is positive growth, the pace lags far behind the expansion of import values (+276.8%), suggesting that EU-based manufacturing has not captured the AI and cloud-computing demand boom to the same degree as Asian and North American suppliers.

Central European members have become the EU's specialised producers

The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals a pronounced Central European concentration in processing-unit manufacturing:

Czechia and Hungary exhibit the highest Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA), indicating strong specialisation in this product. The Netherlands holds the largest share of EU production (37.0%), likely reflecting the role of Rotterdam as an entry point and the presence of major data-centre hardware integrators. Germany, despite being the largest EU economy, shows a negative RSCA (−0.12), indicating it is not specialised in this product relative to its overall export profile — though it still accounts for 16.7% of EU production.

Volatility and shock events highlight supply-chain fragility

The volatility analysis identifies several partners with high coefficient of variation (CV) in import flows — notably Hong Kong (CV = 2.28), Thailand (CV = 1.99), and Korea (CV = 1.90). The most significant supply shock detected was a price spike in imports from Korea in 2022 (abnormality score of 497.4, with an 11,148.8% year-on-year price shift), coinciding with the global semiconductor supply crunch. A UK import price shock in 2019 (abnormality 91.5) and a China export-price shock in 2018 were also flagged. These events underscore the sensitivity of the processing-unit market to disruptions in the semiconductor supply chain and to geopolitical shifts.

Export propensity has risen, but so has import dependence

The export propensity — exports as a share of production — increased from 314.2% to 409.7% (+30.4%), indicating that the EU is exporting an increasing share of what it produces. This may reflect the integration of EU assembly plants into global supply chains that re-export finished units. Meanwhile, trade intensity (total trade as a share of apparent consumption) remained high but edged down from 169.2% to 156.0% (−7.8%), suggesting a slight reduction in the EU's overall openness to trade in this product — though it remains extremely trade-intensive by any standard.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in processing units (CN 847150) has been transformed over the 2015–2025 decade. What was once a market dominated by China-centric imports and modest unit values has evolved into a high-value, geographically diversified trade segment worth nearly €20 billion in annual imports and €17 billion in exports. Three key takeaways emerge:

1. Value growth has been overwhelmingly price-driven. The shift toward high-performance, AI-capable, and data-centre-grade hardware has pushed unit prices up by 150–445%, depending on the metric, while physical volumes have grown far more modestly — or even declined in the case of import tonnage.

2. Supply chains have diversified, but new concentrations have emerged. Taiwan, Thailand, and Mexico have become major suppliers, reducing dependence on China. However, many of these new suppliers are themselves embedded in the same upstream semiconductor ecosystems, so diversification at the customs-code level may not fully mitigate deeper supply-chain risks.

3. The EU's strategic position has weakened. The swing from net exporter to net importer, combined with production growth that lags behind import growth, signals a growing reliance on external sources for a critical category of digital infrastructure hardware. This has direct implications for the EU's digital sovereignty ambitions and for policy initiatives such as the European Chips Act.

The period ahead will be shaped by the continued expansion of AI infrastructure, the geopolitical realignment of semiconductor supply chains, and the EU's ability to scale domestic production capacity for high-value processing units.