Market evolution: Other ADP machine units (CN 847180) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of European Union external trade in Units for automatic data-processing machines (Combined Nomenclature code 847180) over the period 2015–2025. This residual category covers ADP machine components that fall outside the more specific headings for processing units (847150), input/output units (847160), and storage units (847170)—effectively capturing network communications equipment, expansion cards, and other peripheral or auxiliary computing units. The product corresponds to two PRODCOM codes: network communications equipment (26.12.20.00) and other ADP units (26.20.30.00).

The period under review has been shaped by rapid digitalisation, global semiconductor supply chain disruptions, the post-COVID recovery, and the geopolitical realignment triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As the data shows, the EU's trade position in this product category has shifted markedly, with the trade deficit widening substantially as imports have grown far more rapidly than exports.

1. A Widening Structural Deficit Fueled by Import Surge

1.1. Imports have grown four times faster than exports

The most striking feature of EU trade in CN 847180 is the dramatic divergence between import and export growth. Between 2015 and 2025, import values rose by 284.1%, from €2.73 billion to €10.50 billion, while export values increased by 72.4%, from €1.73 billion to €2.98 billion. This differential growth transformed a €1.0 billion trade deficit in 2015 into a €7.5 billion deficit in 2025—a sixfold increase.

1.2. Volume growth has been strong on the import side

The import volume surge was substantial: physical imports grew from 25,570 tonnes in 2015 to 43,694 tonnes in 2025 (+70.9%), while supplementary unit counts (number of items) more than doubled from 28.2 million to 67.6 million pieces (+139.4%). By contrast, export volumes in weight actually declined by 17.3% (from 10,455 to 8,643 tonnes), even as the number of exported items rose by 70.7% (from 8.2 million to 13.9 million). This divergence between weight and count metrics suggests that the average weight per item traded has decreased significantly—consistent with the trend towards smaller, lighter, more integrated components such as network interface cards and wireless modules.

1.3. EU production grew in quantity but stagnated in value

EU domestic production increased from 11.0 million items to 19.1 million units (+73.6%), yet the production value barely moved—from €1.72 billion to €1.78 billion (+3.3%). This indicates a sharp decline in the average unit value of domestically produced items, suggesting that EU manufacturers have shifted towards producing higher volumes of lower-value components rather than competing in higher-margin segments. Meanwhile, the volume of imports now dwarfs domestic output: by 2025, imports stood at 67.6 million items compared to 19.1 million produced locally.

2. Shifting Trade Partners Reflect Global Supply Chain Restructuring

2.1. Taiwan has become the EU's dominant import source

The most dramatic shift in partner composition has been the rise of Taiwan as the EU's single largest import origin. EU imports from Taiwan surged from €212 million in 2015 to €3.72 billion in 2025—an extraordinary increase of 1,654.7%. Taiwan overtook China and the United States to become the top supplier by value, likely reflecting the country's dominant position in semiconductor and advanced component manufacturing, as well as EU data-centre and cloud infrastructure expansion driving demand for networking equipment.

2.2. China remains a massive supplier but has been overtaken by Taiwan

China was the EU's leading import source in 2015 at €1.36 billion and continued to grow strongly (+169.9% to €3.67 billion). However, it was surpassed by Taiwan in absolute value terms. Combined, China and Taiwan accounted for approximately 70% of all EU extra-EU imports in this product category in 2025. The strong growth from both countries underscores the continued concentration of global electronics manufacturing in East Asia.

2.3. Mexico and Thailand emerged as fast-growing alternative sources

Beyond the two Asian giants, Mexico (+1,488.0%) and Thailand (+2,843.0%) have emerged as rapidly growing suppliers. This is consistent with the broader trend of electronics supply chain diversification away from China—so-called "China+1" or "friend-shoring" strategies—where companies have expanded production capacity in Southeast Asia and North America. Mexico's rise may also reflect its role in serving both the North American and European markets from nearby production bases.

2.4. Russian exports collapsed following geopolitical disruption

On the export side, the most dramatic development has been the near-total collapse of EU exports to Russia. From €80 million in 2015, shipments to Russia fell to just €0.12 million in 2025—a decline of 99.8%. This reflects the progressive tightening of EU export controls on technology products to Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The supply shock data confirms this as a major structural break: a price shock was detected in 2022 (abnormality score 6.8, shift +95.7%), followed by a near-total supply cutoff in 2024 (shift −99.9%).

2.5. The United States remains the EU's top export destination

EU exports to the United States grew by 123.0% to €927 million in 2025, making it the largest non-EU export market—surpassing the United Kingdom (+24.2% to €501 million). Türkiye (+129.8%) and Norway (+108.4%) also showed robust growth. The Russian market's disappearance has been more than offset by gains elsewhere, though overall export growth has been modest relative to imports.

3. Rising Unit Values and Shifting Internal EU Dynamics

3.1. Price per item has diverged sharply between imports and exports

A notable feature of the data is the evolution of unit values. The import price per item nearly doubled from €97 to €155 (+60.4%), while the export price per item was essentially flat at €212–€214 (+1.0%). This divergence suggests that the EU has been importing increasingly sophisticated (or expensive) components—potentially reflecting a shift from basic peripherals towards higher-value networking and communications equipment—while export pricing has remained stable, implying a consistent product mix or competitive constraints.

The tonne-based price metrics show even stronger increases on both sides (+108.5% for exports, +124.7% for imports), reflecting both genuine price inflation in the electronics sector and the compositional shift towards lighter-weight, higher-value items.

3.2. The Netherlands and Poland have emerged as the EU's primary trade hubs

Among EU Member States, the Netherlands and Poland have become the dominant players. The Netherlands' extra-EU imports grew by 264.3% to €4.24 billion—representing 40% of all EU imports—consistent with its role as a major logistics and distribution hub (particularly via the Port of Rotterdam and Schiphol Airport). Poland's imports surged even more dramatically (+652.0% to €1.35 billion), suggesting the growth of assembly and integration operations in Central Europe.

On the export side, the Netherlands leads with €1.06 billion (+156.4%), while Poland recorded the most spectacular growth from a low base (+2,404.2% to €362 million), overtaking Hungary, which saw a 46.3% decline to €313 million. The growth in Polish and Czech exports (+207.0% to €279 million) underscores the rising importance of Central European countries in the EU's electronics value chain.

3.3. The Netherlands dominates specialised production while import concentration has slightly decreased

The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals that the Netherlands has the highest revealed comparative advantage (RCA of 3.82) in this product category, accounting for 55.5% of EU production despite representing only 14.5% of total EU trade. Czechia (RCA 2.21) and Hungary (RCA 1.10) are also specialised producers. The import-side Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) fell from 2,925 to 2,680, indicating a modest reduction in supplier concentration—consistent with the diversification towards Mexico, Thailand, and other new sources alongside the continued dominance of Taiwan and China.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in CN 847180 over 2015–2025 tells a story of rapidly growing dependency on imports for computing peripherals and network communications equipment. The trade deficit expanded sixfold as imports surged by 284% while exports grew by a more modest 72%. Taiwan has emerged as the single most important import source, reflecting the island's critical role in the global semiconductor and networking equipment supply chain, alongside continued dominance by China. Supply chain diversification is visible in the rapid growth of imports from Mexico and Thailand.

Within the EU, the Netherlands has consolidated its position as both the primary import gateway and the leading producer and exporter, while Poland has emerged as a fast-growing manufacturing and logistics hub in Central Europe. The geopolitical shock of Russia's invasion of Ukraine resulted in a near-complete cutoff of exports to Russia, a structural shift clearly visible in the shock detection data. Rising unit values for imports suggest increasing sophistication of the components flowing into the EU, potentially reflecting the growing importance of high-speed networking infrastructure for data centres, 5G, and cloud computing.

Looking at the broader picture, the EU's growing reliance on a concentrated set of Asian suppliers for critical digital infrastructure components raises important questions about supply chain resilience—a concern that has gained prominence in the context of the EU's strategic autonomy agenda and the European Chips Act.