Market evolution: Portable automatic data processing machines (CN 847130) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of EU external trade in portable automatic data-processing machines — a product category (CN 847130) that encompasses laptops, notebooks, and similar devices weighing up to 10 kg. Over the 2015–2025 period, this market underwent a dramatic structural transformation. While trade values grew overall, underlying volumes declined significantly, prices nearly doubled, and the EU's domestic production collapsed by over 94%. The result is a Union that has become almost entirely dependent on imports — primarily from China — with its trade deficit widening by more than 35%. The following sections analyse these dynamics in detail, examining the value-volume-price divergence, the geographic reconfiguration of supply chains, and the EU's deepening vulnerability to external shocks.
For the full overview dashboard.
1. The Great Divergence: Rising Values Amid Collapsing Volumes
The most striking feature of EU trade in CN 847130 over the past decade is the persistent divergence between nominal trade values — which grew substantially — and physical volumes, which declined sharply. This pattern reflects both a global shift toward higher-value devices (premium laptops, ultrabooks, gaming machines) and the near-total relocation of manufacturing outside the EU.
1.1. Export volumes fell by 38% while values barely grew
EU exports to non-EU countries tell a paradoxical story. In nominal terms, export value edged up by just 2.1%, from €4.03 billion in 2015 to €4.12 billion in 2025. Beneath that surface stability, however, the physical picture is one of contraction: export quantity by weight dropped by 38.1%, from 27,947 tonnes to 17,298 tonnes, and the number of items shipped fell by 16.0%, from 11.8 million to 9.9 million units.
This can only be explained by a sharp rise in unit prices. The average export price per tonne increased by 65.0%, from €144,249 to €237,948, and the average price per item rose by 21.6%, from €341 to €415. The EU appears to have shifted its export profile toward fewer but more expensive devices.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (EUR) | 4.03 B | 4.12 B | +2.1% |
| Export quantity (tonnes) | 27,947 | 17,298 | −38.1% |
| Export items (units) | 11.8 M | 9.9 M | −16.0% |
| Export price per tonne (EUR) | 144,249 | 237,948 | +65.0% |
| Export price per unit (EUR) | 341 | 415 | +21.6% |
See trade overview.
1.2. Import values grew 30% but volumes declined even faster
EU imports followed the same pattern but at a much larger scale. Import value grew by 30.0%, rising from €23.5 billion to €30.6 billion. Yet import quantity by weight fell by 34.0%, from 181,312 tonnes to 119,609 tonnes. The number of items imported declined more modestly, by 4.0% (from 72.1 million to 69.2 million units), suggesting a shift toward lighter, thinner devices — consistent with the rise of ultrabooks and fanless designs.
Import prices per tonne nearly doubled (+97.1%), climbing from €129,726 to €255,640, while the price per unit rose by 35.4%, from €326 to €442. The sharper rise in per-tonne prices compared to per-unit prices confirms that the average device became lighter even as it became more expensive.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import value (EUR) | 23.5 B | 30.6 B | +30.0% |
| Import quantity (tonnes) | 181,312 | 119,609 | −34.0% |
| Import items (units) | 72.1 M | 69.2 M | −4.0% |
| Import price per tonne (EUR) | 129,726 | 255,640 | +97.1% |
| Import price per unit (EUR) | 326 | 442 | +35.4% |
See trade overview.
1.3. The EU trade deficit widened by 36% to over €26 billion
The combination of modest export growth and robust import growth pushed the EU's trade deficit from −€19.5 billion in 2015 to −€26.5 billion in 2025, a deterioration of 35.8%. Net import reliance — the share of domestic consumption satisfied by imports — surged from 56.6% to 98.4%, indicating that virtually all devices consumed in the EU are now sourced from outside the bloc. This represents a 74 percentage-point increase in external dependency over the decade.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trade balance (EUR) | −19.5 B | −26.5 B | −35.8% |
| Net import reliance (%) | 56.6% | 98.4% | +74.0% |
See net import reliance.
2. The Collapse of European Production and the Reconfiguration of Supply Chains
The EU's deepening import dependence is inseparable from the near-complete disappearance of its own laptop manufacturing base. Production data reveals a collapse of historic proportions, while import geography shows a significant reorientation — with China consolidating its dominance even as several emerging Asian suppliers gain ground and traditional partners like the UK, Hong Kong, and Japan fade from relevance.
2.1. EU production fell by over 94% in both volume and value
Between 2015 and 2025, EU production of portable data-processing machines plunged from 12.8 million units to just 758,260 units — a decline of 94.1%. In value terms, production fell from €8.26 billion to €411 million, a drop of 95.0%. This collapse effectively eliminates the EU as a manufacturing base for laptops and positions the bloc as an almost entirely import-dependent market.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Production quantity (units) | 12,788,596 | 758,260 | −94.1% |
| Production value (EUR) | 8.26 B | 0.41 B | −95.0% |
See production volumes.
2.2. China consolidated its dominance, reaching 87% of import value
China remained the overwhelmingly dominant supplier throughout the period. Chinese imports grew by 31.0%, from €20.3 billion to €26.6 billion, representing 86.9% of total EU imports by value in 2025. This concentration is reflected in a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import value that remained elevated at around 7,650 — a level indicating highly concentrated supply.
However, several other Asian economies gained ground as alternative sourcing destinations:
| Partner | 2015 (EUR) | 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 20.3 B | 26.6 B | +31.0% |
| Viet Nam | 1.1 B | 2.4 B | +118.7% |
| Taiwan | 115 M | 404 M | +252.4% |
| Thailand | 0.2 M | 684 M | +354,987% |
These shifts are consistent with a broader trend in global electronics manufacturing: as labour costs in China have risen and trade tensions have intensified, companies have diversified assembly operations to Southeast Asia, particularly to Viet Nam and Thailand. Taiwan's growth likely reflects its role in semiconductor and component supply chains that are integrated into final laptop assembly.
See top partners.
2.3. Traditional partners saw dramatic declines
In stark contrast, several historically important trade partners experienced steep declines in their share of EU laptop imports:
| Partner | 2015 (EUR) | 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 548 M | 118 M | −78.4% |
| Hong Kong | 741 M | 53 M | −92.8% |
| Japan | 288 M | 8 M | −97.3% |
The UK's decline is particularly noteworthy and is almost certainly linked to Brexit, which introduced customs friction, rules-of-origin requirements, and regulatory divergence. Hong Kong's fall may reflect the ongoing shift of transhipment and re-export functions to mainland China and other Asian hubs. Japan's near-disappearance as a supplier is consistent with the country's broader exit from consumer electronics manufacturing over the past decade.
See top partners.
2.4. Within the EU, the Netherlands became the dominant gateway
Among EU Member States, the Netherlands emerged as the principal import hub, with import value rising 55.3% from €10.4 billion to €16.1 billion — accounting for over half of all EU imports. This reflects the Netherlands' role as a logistics gateway through the Port of Rotterdam and Schiphol Airport, as well as its favourable regulatory environment for re-export. Czechia also gained significance, with imports rising 76.2% to €3.4 billion, likely reflecting its role in Central European distribution and assembly.
Germany, by contrast, saw its imports decline by 18.1% (to €5.2 billion) and its exports collapse by 48.1% (to €615 million), consistent with a broader erosion of its electronics manufacturing base.
| EU Member | Imports 2015 | Imports 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Netherlands | 10.4 B | 16.1 B | +55.3% |
| Germany | 6.4 B | 5.2 B | −18.1% |
| Czechia | 1.9 B | 3.4 B | +76.2% |
| Italy | 1.3 B | 1.6 B | +27.0% |
See top reporters.
3. Shocks, Concentration, and Growing Vulnerability
The structural changes described above — declining production, rising import dependence, and geographic concentration — have left the EU increasingly exposed to supply-side disruptions. The 2020–2022 period was marked by significant price shocks, and the broader volatility profile of the market underscores the risks inherent in the current configuration.
3.1. A major price shock hit EU imports from China in 2022
The most significant shock event detected in the data occurred in 2022, when EU import prices from China surged by 101.7% relative to the expected trend, with an abnormality score of 665.2 — far exceeding the threshold for statistical significance. This spike is likely attributable to a combination of factors: post-COVID supply chain disruptions, global semiconductor shortages, elevated shipping costs, and perhaps early effects of new trade restrictions.
A secondary price shock of +158.9% was also detected in EU exports to China in the same year, though this was smaller in absolute terms (value share: 3.8%).
See supply shocks.
3.2. Import concentration remained stubbornly high
The HHI for EU laptop imports remained elevated throughout the period, moving from 7,501 to 7,650 (by value) — a modest increase of 2.0%. In volume terms, concentration was even higher, rising from 7,643 to 8,048 (+5.3%). These levels indicate a market dominated by a single supplier (China), with limited effective competition.
Export concentration, by contrast, declined significantly — from 1,991 to 1,079 by value (−45.8%) — suggesting that EU export destinations became more diversified over the decade. This may partly reflect the UK's exit from the EU customs territory, which reclassified what were previously internal flows as external exports to a new partner.
| HHI (Imports, value) | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7,501 | 7,650 | +2.0% |
| HHI (Exports, value) | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1,991 | 1,079 | −45.8% |
3.3. The Netherlands and Czechia emerged as the EU's most specialised exporters
Specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals that the Netherlands (RSCA: 0.541) and Czechia (RSCA: 0.517) are the only EU Member States with a clear revealed comparative advantage in CN 847130. Both countries combine large import volumes (as distribution hubs) with significant re-export activity, positioning them as the primary conduits for laptop trade flowing through the EU.
By contrast, large economies like Germany (RSCA: −0.120) and France display no specialisation, consistent with the broader narrative of manufacturing decline. Smaller Member States such as Malta (RSCA: −0.966) and Croatia (RSCA: −0.954) show the least specialisation, as expected for economies without significant electronics trade infrastructure.
| EU Member | RSCA (2025) | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Netherlands | 0.541 | Major re-export hub |
| Czechia | 0.517 | Central European hub |
| Sweden | 0.016 | Marginal |
| Germany | −0.120 | Net importer, declining exporter |
| France | — | Net importer |
See specialisation.
3.4. Ukraine emerged as a fast-growing export destination
Among the EU's export partners, Ukraine stands out with a remarkable 442.8% increase in export value, rising from €42 million in 2015 to €229 million in 2025. This growth accelerated particularly in recent years and may reflect both increasing digitalisation in Ukraine and the EU's broader geopolitical and economic support for the country. The United Arab Emirates also grew substantially (+57.0%), reinforcing Dubai's role as a regional technology distribution hub.
| Export Partner | 2015 (EUR) | 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | 42 M | 229 M | +442.8% |
| United Arab Emirates | 180 M | 282 M | +57.0% |
| Norway | 470 M | 612 M | +30.2% |
| Switzerland | 723 M | 828 M | +14.6% |
Conclusion
The EU trade landscape for portable automatic data-processing machines (CN 847130) has been fundamentally reshaped over the 2015–2025 decade. The most consequential development has been the collapse of EU domestic production — down by over 94% in volume — which has transformed the bloc from a partially self-sufficient market into one almost entirely dependent on imports (98.4% net import reliance in 2025). China has consolidated its position as the dominant supplier, accounting for nearly 87% of import value, though emerging alternatives in Viet Nam, Thailand, and Taiwan suggest early-stage supply chain diversification.
At the same time, the market has undergone a pronounced quality upgrade: physical volumes have declined while values have risen, reflecting a shift toward premium, higher-specification devices. This "trading up" has partially masked the scale of import dependence in nominal terms, but the underlying vulnerability remains acute. The 2022 price shock from China demonstrated how exposed the EU is to supply-side disruptions in a concentrated market.
Looking ahead, the key question for EU trade policy is whether the current trajectory — near-total import dependence, concentrated supply, and minimal domestic production — is sustainable, or whether initiatives aimed at reshoring semiconductor and electronics manufacturing can begin to reverse the trends documented here.