Market evolution: Polysulphides and polysulphones (CN 391190) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report analyses the trade dynamics of CN 391190 — a residual heading encompassing polysulphides, polysulphones, polyphenylene sulphide (PPS), polyethersulphone (PES), and other specialty polymers produced by chemical synthesis in primary forms. These are high-performance engineering polymers used in automotive, electronics, aerospace, and energy applications. The period 2015–2025 saw the EU transition from a moderately import-dependent market to one that is increasingly export-oriented, while simultaneously absorbing a surge of imports from Asia. The analysis draws on EU-27 trade data at annual frequency with non-EU partner countries. For the full dataset, see the trade overview.

1. Volume-driven growth masks a structural price decline

The headline story of 2015–2025 is one of diverging trends between physical volumes and unit values. Both EU exports and imports grew strongly in quantity terms, but unit prices moved in opposite directions at different points in the cycle, creating a pattern where the EU exported substantially more material at progressively lower margins.

1.1 Export volumes surged while unit values eroded

EU exports grew from 146,650 tonnes in 2015 to 236,500 tonnes in 2025, a gain of 61.3%. Over the same period, the average export price fell from €4,578/t to €3,231/t, a decline of 29.4%. The result is that export value grew by only 13.8% — from €671 million to €764 million — despite the near-doubling of physical volume. Export prices peaked at €6,381/t in 2022 (a year of global energy and materials cost inflation) before falling sharply through 2023–2025. This pattern suggests that EU producers expanded output but increasingly competed on price rather than premium positioning.

1.2 Import prices declined less steeply, compressing the trade surplus

EU imports rose from 58,963 tonnes to 94,427 tonnes (+60.1%), while import prices fell only 7.0% — from €6,957/t to €6,467/t. The asymmetric price erosion between exports (−29.4%) and imports (−7.0%) eroded the EU's traditional terms-of-trade advantage. Import value consequently rose by 48.9%, reaching €611 million by 2025.

1.3 The EU trade surplus shrank despite higher export volumes

The trade balance peaked at €268 million around 2017–2018 before declining. While the EU remains a net exporter in value terms, the surplus narrowed substantially. Net import reliance (a measure combining trade flows with domestic production) fell from 16.1% to 6.5%, reflecting both higher export volumes and a structural shift in EU production toward higher-value output — domestic production value rose by 50.7% to an estimated €1.5 billion, even as production quantity declined by 21.0% to 400 million kg.

2. A fundamental reconfiguration of the EU's trade partners

The decade saw a dramatic reshuffling of both the EU's supplier base and its export destinations. The most consequential shifts involve China's emergence as a major import source, the collapse of trade with Russia, and the repositioning of several EU member states within the bloc.

2.1 China transformed from a marginal supplier to a top-tier source

The single most striking development in the EU's import profile is the rise of China. EU imports from China grew from €12.3 million in 2015 to €110.4 million in 2025 — an increase of 800.4%. China's share of total EU imports thus rose from roughly 3% to approximately 18%, making it the second-largest supplier behind the United States (€265.7 million). South Korea (+202.4%, to €47.3 million) and Japan (+59.2%, to €84.5 million) also gained ground, reflecting a broader Asian-centric restructuring of the supply chain. By contrast, imports from India fell by 51.4%, from €14.7 million to €7.1 million.

2.2 Import diversification reduced supplier concentration

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value declined from 4,236 to 2,538 (−40.1%), moving from a moderately concentrated market to a more competitive one. This reflects the diversification away from US dominance toward a more balanced import base that includes China, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.

For the full partner breakdown, see top partners by value.

2.3 Export markets reconfigured: Russia collapsed, Türkiye and China grew

On the export side, the most dramatic change was the near-total disappearance of Russia as a destination. EU exports to Russia fell from €22.4 million to €0.6 million (−97.4%), almost certainly reflecting the impact of EU sanctions imposed after 2022. The United Kingdom, the EU's largest single-country export market in 2015 (€86.9 million), saw a 21.9% decline to €67.8 million — a development consistent with post-Brexit trade frictions.

Conversely, several emerging and Asian markets absorbed more EU product:

• Türkiye: +81.0% (from €31.2 million to €56.5 million)
• China: +47.6% (from €73.4 million to €108.3 million)
• Japan: +37.3% (from €47.7 million to €65.6 million)
• United States: +29.9% (from €113.8 million to €147.8 million)

Export HHI rose modestly by 11.9% (from 785 to 878), reflecting the loss of Russia and the growing concentration among a smaller set of large buyers.

2.4 Within the EU, production shifted southward and to Italy

The EU's member-state specialisation data reveals a notable restructuring. Germany remained the dominant exporter (€461 million in 2025, +13.4%), but Italy's exports grew by 228.1% — from €23.9 million to €78.3 million — making it the EU's fourth-largest exporter. Belgium also grew strongly (+43.0%), while France (−26.2%), the Netherlands (−56.0%), and Spain (−45.9%) all saw significant export declines. On the import side, the Netherlands (+137.3%), France (+206.9%), and Italy (+260.3%) experienced the largest growth, suggesting these countries became key entry points for Asian product into the EU.

For the full EU member-state picture, see top reporters by value.

3. Product composition, supply shocks, and vulnerability signals

Beyond aggregate flows, the data reveals a specific product-level structure within CN 391190, a series of discrete price shocks, and a shift in the EU's structural position toward greater export orientation.

3.1 Condensation polymers and residual specialty plastics dominate both trade flows

CN 391190 is a residual heading bundling five subcategories. The two largest by trade value are:

• 39119019 — Condensation or rearrangement polymerization products (which includes PPS and PES): this segment accounted for the largest share of exports (€439 million in 2025) and a large share of imports (€191 million).
• 39119099 — Other specialty synthetic polymers and prepolymers (the residual within the residual): this was the largest import category by volume (34,993 tonnes in 2025) and the second-largest export category (€276 million).

The full product segment breakdown shows that export volumes for 39119099 jumped from 52,548 tonnes in 2024 to 146,972 tonnes in 2025 — a near-tripling — while the unit price collapsed from €5,610/t to €1,880/t. This appears to reflect a surge in lower-priced specialty polymer exports, possibly from a single large-scale producer or a reclassification event.

Meanwhile, 39119013 (polyphenylene sulphide, PPS) — a high-performance engineering polymer — maintained relatively stable export prices (€6,437/t in 2015 to €7,320/t in 2025), suggesting continued pricing power in this niche segment. PPS import volumes also grew strongly (from 15,926 to 21,799 tonnes), consistent with rising demand from the automotive and electronics sectors.

3.2 Three distinct supply shocks disrupted trade flows

The volatility analysis identifies three major shock events:

1. China import price shock (2022): The most severe disruption, with an abnormality score of 8.0 and an 89.5% price shift. This aligns with the 2022 global energy crisis and raw material cost inflation, which disproportionately affected Chinese producers. China's share of EU import value reached 16.3% in that year.

2. United Kingdom import price shock (2017): An abnormality of 6.5 and a 60.2% price shift, likely reflecting the initial post-Brexit referendum currency depreciation of the pound sterling, which raised the euro-denominated cost of UK-origin product.

3. Russia export price shock (2022): An abnormality of 3.9 and a 54.7% price shift, coinciding with the onset of sanctions and the disruption of the EU–Russia trade relationship. Russia's coefficient of variation for exports (0.487) was among the highest of any partner, reflecting the abruptness of the trade collapse.

Several partner relationships also exhibited persistently high volatility: Singapore (CV 1.50) and Taiwan (CV 0.98) on the import side, and the United Kingdom (CV 0.996) on the export side. See the supply shocks and volatility dashboards for details.

3.3 The EU shifted from a semi-closed to a highly trade-intensive market

Three structural indicators all point in the same direction: the EU's CN 391190 sector became dramatically more export-oriented over the decade.

Export propensity — the ratio of exports to domestic production — tripled from 18.3% to 62.3%, meaning that by 2025, nearly two-thirds of EU-manufactured CN 391190 product was destined for export. Trade intensity (the combined share of exports and imports relative to production plus imports) nearly doubled. Combined with a declining net import reliance (and a brief period of negative values around 2018–2019, indicating the EU was a net exporter even in volume terms), these figures describe a sector that evolved from import-dependent to export-driven within a decade.

This structural shift is underpinned by the production data: EU production quantity fell by 21.0% (from 506 million kg to 400 million kg), while production value rose by 50.7% (from €996 million to €1.5 billion). This implies a shift toward higher-value, more specialised product within the same heading — consistent with EU producers moving up the value chain in specialty polymers.

Conclusion

Over 2015–2025, the EU's CN 391190 market underwent three interconnected transformations. First, physical trade volumes grew dramatically on both sides, but asymmetric price declines — steep for exports, modest for imports — compressed the EU's trade surplus by 41.3%. Second, the geographic structure of trade was reshuffled: China rose from a marginal supplier to the EU's second-largest import source (+800%), while Russia was effectively removed from the trade map by sanctions (−97.4% in exports). Within the EU, Italy emerged as a fast-growing production and export hub, while the Netherlands and France became major import gateways. Third, the sector became far more export-oriented, with export propensity rising from 18% to 62% of domestic production, even as production volumes declined — pointing to a strategic shift toward higher-value, trade-intensive manufacturing.

These trends carry two main implications. The growing reliance on Asian — and particularly Chinese — suppliers for intermediate and specialty polymers introduces supply-chain concentration risks, even as the overall import HHI has fallen. At the same time, the EU's increasing export orientation means that any sustained decline in unit prices (as observed in 2023–2025) could erode the margin base that sustains continued investment in European specialty polymer production.