Explore live data

Market evolution: Plated steel wire coils (CN 72173050) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the trade dynamics of CN 72173050 — wire of iron or non-alloy steel in coils, containing 0.25–0.6% carbon, plated or coated with base metals (excluding zinc-coated products) — in the European Union's external trade from 2015 to 2025. The period under review reveals a dramatic structural transformation: the EU shifted from being a significant net exporter to a net importer of this product. Total trade flows underwent substantial reshaping, driven by the near-complete withdrawal of certain EU exporters, the reorientation of sourcing patterns, and geopolitical disruptions that reconfigured supply chains. Domestic production remained broadly stable in volume terms, but the trade profile of the EU in this niche steel segment changed fundamentally.


I. The collapse of EU exports and the swing to a trade deficit

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the near-total evaporation of EU exports of plated steel wire coils. In value terms, exports fell from €5.58 million in 2015 to just €89,000 in 2025 — a decline of 98.4%. In volume, exports contracted from 1,953 tonnes to 62 tonnes (–96.8%). This collapse reversed the EU's trade position entirely: the trade balance swung from a surplus of €4.13 million at the start of the period to a deficit of €1.02 million by the end.

The disappearance of Belgium as the dominant exporter

The export collapse was overwhelmingly concentrated in Belgium. In 2015, Belgian exports of this product amounted to €5.52 million, accounting for the overwhelming share of total EU exports. By 2025, Belgian exports had fallen to just €57 — effectively zero. This single-country withdrawal explains the bulk of the EU-wide export decline.

Metric 2015 2025 Change
EU exports (value, €) 5,581,249 88,775 –98.4%
EU exports (volume, t) 1,953 62 –96.8%
Belgium exports (value, €) 5,520,580 57 –100.0%

Sources: Trade overview, Top partners

The decline was broad-based across EU member states

Beyond Belgium, other EU member states also saw significant export declines. Czechia's exports fell from €14,178 to essentially zero (–100%), while Spain dropped from €60,280 to €25,604 (–57.5%) and Sweden from €485 to €91 (–81.3%). Only a handful of members bucked the trend: France grew from €535 to €11,014, Italy from €26,767 to €31,128, and the United Kingdom (now a third country) emerged as a destination with €21,197 in 2025 from virtually nothing in 2015.

EU Exporter 2015 (€) 2025 (€) Change
Belgium 5,520,580 57 –100.0%
Germany 29,118 26,135 –10.2%
Spain 60,280 25,604 –57.5%
Italy 26,767 31,128 +16.3%
Czechia 14,178 0 –100.0%
France 535 11,014 +1,958.7%

Source: Top reporters

Export market concentration collapsed

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU exports by destination fell from 9,362 in 2015 to 2,689 in 2025 (–71.3%), reflecting the fact that Belgian shipments to Brazil — which constituted the dominant trade flow — disappeared. The export concentration fell from highly concentrated levels to moderate levels, as the few remaining exports became more diversified among smaller destinations such as Malaysia, the UK, and the United States.


II. A shifting import landscape: new suppliers and geopolitical disruptions

While exports collapsed, EU imports proved more resilient, though they too declined. Total import value fell from €1.45 million to €1.11 million (–23.8%), and import volume from 1,086 tonnes to 684 tonnes (–37.0%). However, the composition of imports changed profoundly, reflecting geopolitical shocks and supplier reorientation.

Ukraine emerged as the dominant supplier

The most dramatic shift in the import side was Ukraine's rise from negligible supplier (€253 in 2015) to the EU's largest source of this product (€533,933 in 2025). This extraordinary growth of over 210,000% reflects a broader pattern of EU–Ukraine trade deepening, which accelerated following the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and further intensified after Russia's invasion in 2022, when Ukraine redirected trade westward.

Russia and Belarus: contrasting trajectories

Russia's role as a supplier followed a volatile path. Imports from Russia grew from a negligible €10 to €29,710 in 2025, having peaked at €208,447 at some point during the period — likely before EU sanctions constrained trade flows following 2022.

Belarus, which was the EU's single largest import source at the start of the period (€732,111 in 2015), declined to €533,835 by 2025 (–27.1%). A supply shock was detected in 2017, when Belarusian supply dropped abruptly (abnormality score: 5.3, representing a –100% shift in that year's data point). This shock coincided with the period of increased EU scrutiny of Belarus and sanctions-related developments, though Belarus ultimately remained a major supplier.

Import Partner 2015 (€) 2025 (€) Change
Belarus 732,111 533,835 –27.1%
Ukraine 253 533,933 +210,648%
China 300,191 93,115 –69.0%
United States 190,691 96,235 –49.5%
Korea, Republic of 165,412 67,120 –59.4%
Türkiye 39,330 29,179 –25.8%
Russian Federation 10 29,710 +297,745%

Source: Top partners

Import volatility remained elevated

The coefficient of variation for imports was high across most partners. The United Kingdom (CV: 2.29), Ukraine (CV: 1.90), Switzerland (CV: 1.65), Japan (CV: 1.51), and Russia (CV: 1.44) all exhibited significant volatility, indicating that EU importers lacked stable, predictable supply relationships. Import prices also rose: the average unit price of imports increased from €1,338/t in 2015 to €1,620/t in 2025 (+21.0%), peaking at €5,580/t at some point during the period — suggesting episodes of tight supply or higher-cost sourcing.

EU importers diversified but concentration remained moderate

The import HHI by value declined slightly from 3,274 to 3,038 (–7.2%), remaining in the moderately concentrated range. Germany was the largest EU importer throughout (€233,399 → €314,422, +34.7%), followed by France (€123,279 → €163,123, +32.3%). Notable shifts occurred within the EU: Austria's imports collapsed from €732,111 to €224 (–100%), while Poland surged from €4,194 to €242,659 and Spain from €4 to €96,235. These intra-EU shifts suggest redistribution of procurement functions and logistics hubs.

EU Importer 2015 (€) 2025 (€) Change
Germany 233,399 314,422 +34.7%
France 123,279 163,123 +32.3%
Poland 4,194 242,659 +5,686%
Spain 4 96,235 +2,405,775%
Italy 5,911 13,723 +132.2%
Austria 732,111 224 –100.0%

Source: Top reporters


III. Stable domestic production but declining trade openness

Despite the dramatic shifts in trade flows, EU domestic production of plated steel wire coils remained remarkably stable. Output stood at 567,544 tonnes in 2015 and 575,000 tonnes in 2025 (+1.3%), with a trough of 465,091 tonnes and a peak of 674,987 tonnes during the intervening years. Production value, however, grew much more substantially, from €344 million to €666 million (+93.8%), indicating a significant increase in unit values — likely reflecting inflation, higher raw material costs, and a possible shift toward higher-value product specifications.

Belgium remained the most specialised producer

In terms of revealed comparative advantage, Belgium (RCA: 8.91, RSCA: 0.80) and Spain (RCA: 3.02, RSCA: 0.50) were the most specialised EU producers in 2025, meaning they had a comparative advantage in this product relative to their overall trade profiles. However, Belgium's production represented only 7.5% of total EU production value, while its share of total Belgian exports was just 8.5% — suggesting this is a niche product even for its most specialised producer. By contrast, Germany, despite being the largest importer, had an RCA of only 0.10, confirming it is a net consumer rather than a competitive producer of this wire product.

EU Member RSCA (2025) RCA (2025) Production share
Belgium 0.80 8.91 7.5%
Spain 0.50 3.02 17.5%
Italy –0.43 0.40 3.2%
Czechia –0.52 0.31 1.5%
Germany –0.81 0.10 2.2%

Source: Specialisation

Trade openness and export propensity declined

The EU's trade intensity — the ratio of extra-EU trade to production — fell from 12.7% to 11.6% (–9.3%), while export propensity declined more sharply, from 9.1% to 7.9% (–12.7%). Export propensity registered the highest salience score (54.8) among vulnerability indicators, confirming that the declining export orientation was the defining vulnerability feature of this market. Meanwhile, net import reliance improved slightly from –5.1% to –4.0% (the negative sign indicates the EU was a net exporter), but the trajectory toward a balanced or import-reliant position was unmistakable.

Indicator 2015 2025 Change
Trade intensity (%) 12.7 11.6 –9.3%
Export propensity (%) 9.1 7.9 –12.7%
Net import reliance (%) –5.1 –4.0 +22.5%

Sources: Trade intensity, Export propensity, Net import reliance


Conclusion

The EU market for plated steel wire coils (CN 72173050) underwent a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. The most consequential change was the collapse of EU exports — driven almost entirely by the withdrawal of Belgium from this trade — which converted the EU from a net exporter with a €4.1 million surplus into a net importer with a €1.0 million deficit. On the import side, the most notable development was Ukraine's emergence as the leading supplier, displacing the previously dominant role of Belarus and China, in a pattern consistent with broader EU trade reorientation toward Ukraine. Domestic production proved resilient in volume terms, but its value nearly doubled, suggesting inflationary pressures and possible quality upgrading. The overall picture is one of an increasingly inward-looking EU market for this product: production sustained at home, but export capacity eroded and import dependency gradually rising. For policymakers concerned with supply chain resilience, the data suggests that while the EU retains productive capacity, its exposure to geopolitical disruptions in Eastern Europe — both Belarus and Ukraine — warrants close monitoring.

Generated on 2026-08-07. Figures reflect Eurostat data at generation time and do not include later revisions.

Auto-generated: this report is meant to accelerate, but not to replace, human analysis.

If you need advice on European trade policy, or representation for your interests in Brussels, please contact me at support@tradedashboard.eu. You can find my CV at this address.