Market evolution: Other fungicides (CN 38089290) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the EU's external trade in "other fungicides" under CN 38089290 — a residual category covering fungicidal preparations excluding inorganic fungicides, dithiocarbamates, benzimidazoles, diazoles, triazoles, diazines, morpholines, and goods of subheading 3808.59. Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU has remained a consistent net exporter in this segment. However, the aggregate picture masks dramatic shifts: export values nearly halved while volumes stayed broadly stable, major trading partners were reshuffled by geopolitical and regulatory forces, and the internal production landscape underwent significant consolidation. The following sections unpack these dynamics.
For full product definitions and trade dashboard, see the product overview.
1. Price Erosion Undermines Export Value Despite Resilient Volumes
The most striking macroeconomic feature of EU trade in CN 38089290 over the decade is a pronounced divergence between volumes and values. While the physical quantities traded remained relatively stable, the monetary value of both exports and imports contracted sharply — a pattern consistent with global price erosion in the agrochemical sector.
1.1 Export values nearly halved while volumes barely moved
Between 2015 and 2025, EU export value fell by 47.3%, from €983 million to €518 million. Over the same period, export volume declined by only 4.0% (from 58,021 tonnes to 55,688 tonnes). This translates into a 45.1% collapse in the average unit export price, from €16,943/t to €9,304/t. In other words, the EU continued to ship broadly the same quantity of "other fungicides" abroad but at roughly half the price.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (€ million) | 983 | 518 | −47.3% |
| Export volume (t) | 58,021 | 55,688 | −4.0% |
| Average export price (€/t) | 16,943 | 9,304 | −45.1% |
Source: General Overview
This pattern is consistent with a broader trend of off-patent active ingredients, generic competition from Asian producers, and overcapacity in certain fungicide molecules driving prices downward in global agrochemical markets.
1.2 Import prices followed a parallel downward trajectory
EU imports showed a similar price squeeze. Import value declined by 29.4% (from €393 million to €277 million), while import volume rose marginally by 1.9% (from 34,378 t to 35,021 t). The unit import price therefore fell by 30.7%, from €11,429/t to €7,916/t. Notably, imports grew in volume even as their unit cost dropped, suggesting that non-EU suppliers — particularly from Asia — are increasingly competitive on price.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import value (€ million) | 393 | 277 | −29.4% |
| Import volume (t) | 34,378 | 35,021 | +1.9% |
| Average import price (€/t) | 11,429 | 7,916 | −30.7% |
Source: General Overview
1.3 The EU trade surplus halved but the bloc remained a net exporter
The EU's trade surplus in this product category shrank from €590 million in 2015 to €241 million in 2025 — a contraction of 59.2%. The net import reliance remained negative throughout (indicating net export status), improving modestly from −29.3% to −23.5%. The decline in the surplus reflects the faster erosion of export values relative to import values — export prices simply fell faster than import prices.
2. A Tectonic Reorientation of EU Trade Partners
Behind the aggregate numbers lies a dramatic restructuring of the EU's trading relationships. Some partners saw their share collapse, while others — especially in Asia — surged. Geopolitical events such as Brexit, the Russia–Ukraine conflict, and shifting South American market dynamics all left clear imprints on the data.
2.1 Exports: Brazil's collapse reshaped the destination landscape
Brazil was by far the EU's largest export market in 2015, absorbing €375 million — over 38% of total exports. By 2025, this had cratered by 89.8% to just €38 million. This is the single most consequential shift in the dataset and likely reflects a combination of Brazil's own expanding domestic agrochemical production capacity, regulatory changes, and competitive pressure from Chinese generic manufacturers.
The table below shows the evolution of the EU's top seven export partners:
| Partner | 2015 (€ million) | 2025 (€ million) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 375 | 38 | −89.8% |
| United Kingdom | 82 | 56 | −32.1% |
| Russian Federation | 40 | 37 | −8.5% |
| Ukraine | 44 | 43 | −3.3% |
| Türkiye | 29 | 26 | −10.5% |
| United States | 47 | 24 | −48.9% |
| China | 26 | 9 | −64.5% |
Source: Top partners by value
With Brazil's collapse, the export portfolio became far more diversified. The export concentration HHI fell by 73.4%, from 1,654 to 439 — moving the export market from moderate concentration into a highly diversified structure. This reduces single-market dependency risk but also reflects the EU's inability to maintain dominant positions in any single large market.
2.2 Imports: China and India surged; UK imports collapsed after Brexit
On the import side, the most dramatic shifts involved the United Kingdom and Asia. In 2015, the UK was the EU's largest import source for this product at €222 million, accounting for over 56% of all imports. By 2025, UK imports had fallen by 81.0% to €42 million — almost certainly a direct consequence of Brexit, which reclassified UK-to-EU flows as extra-EU trade subject to customs procedures, regulatory divergence, and new market dynamics.
Meanwhile, China and India emerged as major suppliers:
| Partner | 2015 (€ million) | 2025 (€ million) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel | 61 | 105 | +71.9% |
| United Kingdom | 222 | 42 | −81.0% |
| India | 10 | 34 | +234.2% |
| China | 9 | 48 | +416.7% |
| United States | 24 | 25 | +5.0% |
| Mexico | 3 | 4 | +68.5% |
Source: Top partners by value
China's imports grew by 416.7% and India's by 234.2%, collectively rising from less than €20 million to over €82 million. Israel also consolidated its position, growing 71.9% to become the largest single import source by 2025. This shift towards Asian suppliers mirrors the broader pattern in global agrochemical trade, where Chinese and Indian generic manufacturers have gained market share through cost-competitive production.
2.3 Brexit's imprint on EU-UK fungicide trade
Brexit appears as a structural break in both directions. UK imports into the EU collapsed by 81% (€222M → €42M), while EU exports to the UK declined by 32% (€82M → €56M). The asymmetry — a much steeper fall in UK→EU flows — suggests that fungicide formulations previously manufactured or packaged in the UK for the EU market lost their intra-EU regulatory and logistical advantages. The UK's own production data (visible in the specialisation rankings) shows it is among the least specialised members in this product, reinforcing the view that the UK served mainly as a transhipment and formulation hub rather than a major producer.
3. Internal EU Restructuring: Fewer Products, More Diversified Trade, Southern European Gains
The external trade shifts were accompanied by a profound transformation in the EU's internal production landscape and the distribution of trade activity among member states.
3.1 Production volumes collapsed while value held steady — a move upmarket
EU production quantity plummeted by 63.9%, from 311 million units to 112 million units. Yet production value declined by only 2.3%, from €1.71 billion to €1.67 billion. This implies that the EU is producing far fewer tonnes of "other fungicides" but at a much higher value per unit — a pattern consistent with a strategic shift towards proprietary, higher-margin active ingredients and formulations, while commodity-grade generics have been ceded to Asian competitors.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Production quantity (units, millions) | 311 | 112 | −63.9% |
| Production value (€ million) | 1,710 | 1,671 | −2.3% |
3.2 France dominated exports but saw the steepest decline; Spain and Italy gained ground
Among EU member states, France was the dominant exporter throughout the period — but its decline was staggering. French exports fell by 74.5%, from €669 million to €171 million, driven by the collapse of the Brazilian market (which was a primary destination for French-origin fungicides). Germany also saw significant declines (−45.7%).
By contrast, Spain increased exports by 66.9% (€50M → €84M) and Italy by 72.8% (€21M → €37M), suggesting a geographical rebalancing of EU export capacity towards Southern Europe. This is consistent with the specialisation data, which shows France (RSCA 0.61), Greece (0.60), Portugal (0.36), and Spain (0.31) as the most specialised EU members in this product, suggesting that Southern European countries have strong comparative advantages linked to their large horticultural and agricultural sectors.
| EU Member | 2015 Exports (€ million) | 2025 Exports (€ million) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 669 | 171 | −74.5% |
| Germany | 109 | 59 | −45.7% |
| Spain | 50 | 84 | +66.9% |
| Belgium | 42 | 37 | −13.1% |
| Netherlands | 40 | 34 | −15.8% |
| Italy | 21 | 37 | +72.8% |
Source: Top reporters by value
3.3 Trade became less intense but more diversified
The EU's trade intensity (total trade as a share of production) declined from 48.1% to 40.5%, and export propensity (exports as a share of production) fell from 39.4% to 32.5%. Both indicators suggest that the EU's fungicide sector is becoming somewhat less export-oriented, possibly reflecting stronger domestic demand for crop protection products (driven partly by climate-related disease pressure in European agriculture) and the loss of major export markets.
Meanwhile, concentration metrics fell sharply in both directions. The import HHI declined by 38.7% (from 3,600 to 2,206) and the export HHI by 73.4% (from 1,654 to 439). On the import side, the shift away from a UK-dominated supply base towards multiple Asian and Middle Eastern suppliers has created a more balanced — and arguably more resilient — sourcing structure.
3.4 Supply shocks and price volatility highlight ongoing fragility
Despite the trend towards diversification, the data reveals notable price shocks in recent years:
- A US export price shock in 2021 (abnormality score 7.8, +66.3% price shift) — likely linked to post-pandemic supply chain disruptions and acute demand in US agriculture.
- An India import price shock in 2022 (abnormality 3.7, +105.7% shift) — coinciding with global raw material cost surges and Indian export restrictions on certain chemicals.
- A China export price shock in 2023 (abnormality 3.7, +67.5% shift) — potentially reflecting Chinese policy shifts and tightening environmental regulations affecting production.
These shocks underscore that even as the EU diversifies its trade partners, price volatility remains a feature of the market — particularly when supply is increasingly concentrated in a handful of Asian manufacturing hubs.
Conclusion
Over the 2015–2025 decade, the EU's trade in "other fungicides" (CN 38089290) has undergone a fundamental transformation. The bloc remains a net exporter with a €241 million trade surplus, but this figure is 59% smaller than a decade ago. The primary driver has been a severe price compression — unit export prices fell by 45% — rather than a decline in physical volumes.
Geographically, the trade landscape has been redrawn. Brazil's near-total withdrawal as an export destination and the collapse of UK-to-EU imports after Brexit removed two pillars of the pre-2020 trade structure. In their place, China, India, and Israel have emerged as increasingly important import sources, while Southern European exporters (Spain, Italy) have partially offset France's steep decline.
The EU's production response has been to move upmarket: output volumes fell by 64% while holding value nearly flat, indicating a deliberate shift towards higher-value proprietary formulations. This positions the EU as a premium producer in a market increasingly commoditised by Asian generics. However, the declining trade intensity and export propensity suggest that the EU's fungicide sector is gradually pivoting towards serving its own agricultural base rather than competing aggressively for global market share.