Market evolution: Natural gas (CN 271121) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of European Union trade in natural gas in gaseous state (customs code CN 271121) over the period 2015–2025. The EU has historically been one of the world's largest importers of pipeline and gaseous natural gas, and the decade under review captures some of the most dramatic shifts in the continent's energy landscape in modern history. From the gradual build-out of LNG-related infrastructure to the seismic geopolitical disruptions of 2022, the EU's gas trade flows have been fundamentally reshaped in terms of partner composition, pricing dynamics, and trade volumes.
Over the full period, the EU's import bill for CN 271121 rose from approximately €26.6 billion to €34.1 billion (+28.4%), while import volumes actually declined from roughly 82.7 million tonnes to 63.1 million tonnes (−23.6%). This divergence between value and volume — driven by sharp price increases — is one of the defining features of the decade. Meanwhile, EU exports of natural gas in gaseous state, though still a fraction of imports, surged from €332 million to over €2.7 billion (+717.9%), reflecting the EU's growing role as a regional redistributor of gas. The sections below unpack these dynamics in detail.
1. The Great Diversification: EU Import Partners Restructured by Geopolitics
Russia's share eroded dramatically after 2022
The most consequential structural shift in the EU's natural gas trade over 2015–2025 has been the decline of Russia as a supplier. In 2015, Russian Federation imports stood at approximately €11.9 billion, making Russia by far the EU's largest gas supplier by value. Russian imports peaked at approximately €31.4 billion before falling to just €5.8 billion in 2025 — a decline of 51.1% from the 2015 baseline and a far steeper drop from peak levels. This collapse directly reflects the EU's deliberate policy of reducing dependence on Russian gas following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, as well as Russia's own supply curtailments through pipeline routes such as Nord Stream.
Norway and Algeria filled the supply gap
To compensate for lost Russian volumes, the EU turned overwhelmingly to two traditional suppliers: Norway and Algeria. Norwegian imports grew from €4.1 billion in 2015 to €8.9 billion in 2025 (+114.1%), while Algerian imports rose from €5.5 billion to €9.8 billion (+77.6%). By 2025, Algeria had become the EU's top import partner by value, followed closely by Norway — a complete inversion of the 2015 hierarchy. Norway's pipeline infrastructure via the North Sea and Algeria's pipeline connections to Spain and Italy made them the most readily available alternatives.
Azerbaijan emerged as a major new supplier
Perhaps the most striking long-term structural change has been the rise of Azerbaijan. In 2015, Azerbaijani gas imports to the EU were negligible at just €2.1 million. By 2025, they had surged to approximately €4.6 billion — a growth of over 215,000%. This dramatic increase was enabled by the Southern Gas Corridor, particularly the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which became fully operational in late 2020 and allowed Caspian gas to flow directly to Italy and the broader Southern European market. Azerbaijan now ranks among the EU's top five gas suppliers.
Supply concentration decreased, reflecting deliberate diversification
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU gas import concentration by value fell from 2,834 in 2015 to 2,090 in 2025 (−26.3%), moving the EU from a moderately concentrated import structure toward a more diversified one. The HHI for imports by volume showed a similar trend, declining from 2,707 to 2,234 (−17.5%). This confirms that the EU's supply-side reshuffling was not merely a price effect but also involved genuine broadening of physical supply sources.
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russian imports (€bn) | 11.9 | 5.8 | −51.1% |
| Algerian imports (€bn) | 5.5 | 9.8 | +77.6% |
| Norwegian imports (€bn) | 4.1 | 8.9 | +114.1% |
| Azerbaijani imports (€bn) | 0.002 | 4.6 | +215,475% |
| Import HHI (value) | 2,834 | 2,090 | −26.3% |
2. Price Supershocks: The 2021–2022 Energy Crisis and Its Aftermath
Gas prices surged to unprecedented levels between 2021 and 2022
The period 2021–2022 witnessed an extraordinary spike in natural gas prices that dominated the EU's trade statistics. The average EU import price per tonne rose from a low of approximately €173/t to a peak of roughly €1,316/t — an increase of more than 660%. Similarly, the supplementary price per terajoule (TJ) reached a maximum of about €25,032/TJ, up from a trough near €3,006/TJ. This price explosion translated the EU's import bill into a record deficit of approximately −€109.7 billion in 2022, despite volumes that were actually declining.
Specific price shocks were concentrated around 2021–2022
The shock detection analysis reveals three extraordinary price shock events:
| Shock event | Type | Year | Abnormality score | Price shift |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norway (imports) | Price | 2021 | 15.5 | +432.7% |
| Algeria (imports) | Price | 2022 | 15.3 | +221.5% |
| UK (exports) | Price | 2022 | 16.9 | +286.9% |
The Norwegian import price shock in 2021 — with a shift of +432.7% — was the largest in magnitude and came slightly earlier than the others, reflecting the tightening of European gas markets even before the full onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Algeria and UK shocks in 2022 confirm that the crisis was broad-based and affected both import and export pricing across multiple corridors.
Prices normalised but remained above pre-crisis levels by 2025
By 2025, the average import price had settled at approximately €540/t and the supplementary import price at around €9,600/TJ. While these figures represent a significant retreat from the 2022 peaks, they remain well above the 2015–2019 range of roughly €173–€321/t. This suggests that the energy crisis left a lasting structural imprint on EU gas pricing, partly due to the higher cost of LNG-linked and spot-indexed supplies that replaced discounted Russian pipeline gas. The export price followed a similar trajectory, ending 2025 at about €712/t — 84.2% above its 2015 level.
Import volumes declined as demand destruction and efficiency took hold
A critical corollary of the price shock was a marked decline in physical import volumes. Total EU gas imports fell from a peak of approximately 90.8 million tonnes to 63.1 million tonnes (−23.6% from 2015, and an even steeper drop from the peak). In energy terms, supplementary quantities declined from roughly 5.12 million TJ to 3.55 million TJ (−24.3%). This reflects a combination of demand destruction in energy-intensive industries, behavioural changes by consumers, accelerated deployment of renewable energy, and improved energy efficiency — all catalysed by the price shock.
3. The Rise of EU Gas Re-exports: Regional Redistribution to Neighbouring States
EU gas exports grew more than eightfold, though from a low base
While the EU remains overwhelmingly a net importer of natural gas, one of the notable developments of the period has been the rapid growth in EU gas exports. Total export value rose from €332 million in 2015 to €2.7 billion in 2025 (+717.9%), while export volumes grew from approximately 626,000 tonnes to 3.24 million tonnes (+418.1%). This growth accelerated sharply after 2021, coinciding with the energy crisis and the EU's efforts to support neighbouring countries — particularly Ukraine and Moldova — in the face of Russian supply disruptions.
Ukraine became the EU's largest gas export destination
The most prominent destination for EU gas exports was Ukraine, which went from receiving €120 million worth of gas in 2015 to €1.3 billion in 2025 — a 968.2% increase. Ukraine was the single largest export partner by value by 2025. This reflects the reversal of historical gas flows: Ukraine had previously been a transit country for Russian gas to the EU, but after Russia halted most pipeline deliveries, the EU began sending gas eastward through reverse-flow arrangements, particularly via Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
Moldova, Serbia, and Western Balkan states also saw surging imports from the EU
Beyond Ukraine, several other non-EU states saw dramatic increases in gas imports from the EU:
| Export destination | 2015 (€M) | 2025 (€M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | 120 | 1,283 | +968.2% |
| Switzerland | 128 | 425 | +231.9% |
| Moldova | 0.2 | 575 | +253,781% |
| Serbia | 1.7 | 157 | +8,876.6% |
| North Macedonia | 0.9 | 40 | +4,440.6% |
The Moldova case is particularly striking: from €226,000 in 2015 to €575 million in 2025, reflecting Moldova's acute vulnerability following the loss of Russian gas transit through Ukraine and its growing reliance on EU solidarity mechanisms. Serbia and the Western Balkans similarly pivoted toward EU-sourced gas.
Hungary emerged as the EU's key internal gas redistribution hub
Among EU member states, Hungary was the most dynamic exporter, with export values surging from €123 million to €1.3 billion (+993.2%). Romania also emerged as a significant exporter, growing from €227,000 to €636 million, likely leveraging its own domestic production and Black Sea import infrastructure to channel gas to neighbouring Moldova and Serbia. Hungary's role is consistent with its geographic position as a crossroads for pipeline flows from the Balkan and Central European networks.
Export concentration remained relatively stable despite rapid volume growth
Despite the enormous growth in export values and the shift toward new destinations, the HHI for exports by value declined only modestly, from 3,207 to 3,023 (−5.7%). However, export concentration by volume actually increased from 3,257 to 4,672 (+43.4%), suggesting that while the export base broadened in value terms, a growing share of physical volumes was concentrated in a smaller number of corridors — most likely those supplying Ukraine and Moldova, where reverse-flow pipeline capacity was utilised at scale.
Conclusion
The 2015–2025 period fundamentally transformed the EU's trade in natural gas in gaseous state (CN 271121). Three dynamics stand out. First, the EU achieved a dramatic diversification of its import supply base, reducing its reliance on Russia from the dominant position it held in 2015 to a marginal role by 2025, while elevating Norway, Algeria, and Azerbaijan as primary suppliers. This was reflected in a 26% decline in import concentration (HHI). Second, the 2021–2022 energy crisis produced price shocks of historic magnitude — with Norwegian import prices jumping by 433% and EU-wide average import prices peaking at over six times their pre-crisis lows — leaving a lasting structural adjustment in both prices and volumes. Third, the EU emerged as a significant regional gas redistributor, with exports growing more than eightfold, driven primarily by solidarity flows to Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans.
Despite these shifts, the EU's underlying trade deficit in natural gas widened from −€26.2 billion in 2015 to −€31.4 billion in 2025, underscoring that while diversification improved energy security, it did not reduce the bloc's fundamental import dependency. The combination of higher-cost replacement supplies and a structurally elevated price environment means that natural gas remains a major item in the EU's external trade balance, with continued implications for competitiveness, inflation, and energy policy.