Market evolution: Insulated electric wire and cable (CN 85444991) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report analyses the evolution of EU external trade in insulated electric wire and cables (CN 85444991) — products for a voltage ≤ 1,000 V, not fitted with connectors, with individual conductor wires of a diameter > 0.51 mm — over the period 2015 to 2025. The decade witnessed a dramatic transformation of the EU's trade position: once a net exporter with a comfortable surplus, the bloc shifted to a structural trade deficit by the end of the period. This reversal was driven by an extraordinary surge in imports — particularly from Türkiye and Ukraine — while export growth remained more modest and increasingly concentrated in value rather than volume. The report identifies three principal dynamics: a widening trade deficit fuelled by import growth, a significant reshuffling of trade partners reflecting geopolitical shifts, and a growing vulnerability of the EU's external trade despite robust domestic production.

All data refer to EU trade with non-EU countries, with values in EUR and quantities in metric tonnes unless otherwise noted.

1. From surplus to deficit: the structural reversal of EU trade balances

1.1 Import volumes and values tripled over the decade

The most striking feature of the decade is the explosion in EU imports of CN 85444991 products. In value terms, imports rose from €220 million in 2015 to €666 million in 2025 — an increase of +202.8%. In volume, imports grew from 54,777 tonnes to 97,425 tonnes (+77.9%). The gap between value and volume growth signals a significant rise in unit import prices, which climbed from €4,017 per tonne to €6,840 per tonne (+70.2%).

By contrast, EU exports grew in value (+32.5%, from €395 million to €524 million) but declined in volume (-10.0%, from 64,605 tonnes to 58,171 tonnes). Export prices rose from €6,121 to €9,005 per tonne (+47.1%), indicating a shift toward higher-value-added or premium-priced shipments rather than volume expansion.

1.2 The trade surplus collapsed into a persistent deficit

In 2015, the EU held a trade surplus of €175 million in this product category. By 2025, this had reversed into a deficit of €143 million — a swing of €318 million or -181.3%. This reversal reflects a fundamental structural change rather than a cyclical fluctuation: imports grew six times faster than exports in value terms.

The net import reliance metric confirms this shift: the ratio moved from -19.8% in 2015 to -8.3% in 2025, meaning the EU progressively lost its net-exporter status. The narrowest deficit on this measure (-7.8%) was reached in 2024, suggesting the EU came closest to balance in that year before the deficit widened again.

1.3 The trade deficit is driven by price, not just volume

A closer look at price dynamics reveals an important nuance. EU export prices consistently exceeded import prices throughout the period, rising from a €2,104/tonne premium in 2015 to a €2,165/tonne premium in 2025. This suggests the EU retained a comparative advantage in higher-specification or premium-quality products. However, the faster growth in import prices (+70.2%) compared to export prices (+47.1%) narrowed the relative price gap and eroded the EU's price-based competitive edge. The simultaneous decline in export volumes alongside rising import volumes further underscores a loss of market share at the quantity level.

2. A reshaped partner landscape: geopolitical realignments and new supply routes

2.1 Türkiye emerged as the dominant import supplier

The most dramatic shift in the partner structure was the rise of Türkiye. Turkish imports into the EU grew from €24 million in 2015 to €235 million in 2025 — an extraordinary increase of +872.3%. By 2025, Türkiye alone accounted for over one-third of total EU imports in this category by value. This growth was also among the most volatile in the dataset, with a coefficient of variation (CV) of 1.29, indicating sharp year-to-year swings.

2.2 Ukraine's emergence and Belarus's collapse reflect conflict-driven trade shifts

Ukraine went from a negligible supplier (€2.5 million in 2015) to the second-largest import partner (€80.2 million in 2025), a +3,066.4% increase. This trajectory accelerated markedly after 2022, likely reflecting both EU efforts to support Ukraine's economy through trade facilitation and the reorientation of Ukrainian export capacity away from disrupted eastward routes. Ukraine's imports also showed high volatility (CV = 0.84).

The mirror image of Ukraine's rise is Belarus's near-total disappearance as a supplier. Belarus imports fell from €8.2 million in 2015 to essentially zero in 2025, following a peak of €82.4 million in 2019. This collapse almost certainly reflects the EU sanctions regime imposed on Belarus from 2020 onwards, which progressively restricted trade in industrial goods. The high volatility (CV = 0.66) captures the sharp boom-and-bust cycle.

2.3 Import concentration increased, raising supply-chain risk

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import value rose from 1,402 in 2015 to 1,739 in 2025 (+24.0%). In a market of this size, an HHI approaching 1,800 signals moderate-to-high concentration. This increase was largely driven by the dominance of Türkiye, whose share expanded so rapidly that it pulled the entire import base toward a more concentrated structure. By contrast, the export HHI also rose (from 542 to 794, +46.5%), but remained in the low-concentration range, reflecting the EU's diversified export base across Norway, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and several other partners.

2.4 EU export destinations shifted toward Northern and Western Europe

On the export side, the United Kingdom became the largest destination (€98 million, +137.6%), followed by Norway (€62 million, +97.4%) and Switzerland (€63 million, +38.5%). Serbia also emerged as a significant growth market (€24 million, +493.4%), reflecting deepening economic integration with the Western Balkans. By contrast, exports to Morocco (-33.3%) and the United Arab Emirates (-15.5%) declined, suggesting a geographic reorientation of EU exports toward neighbouring European markets.

A notable shock was detected in EU exports to Russia, which collapsed by -99.5% in 2025 (abnormality score: 5.9), reflecting the near-complete cessation of trade following expanded sanctions. This loss, representing 2.6% of the EU's export value base, was the most significant supply-side shock detected in the dataset.

3. Robust domestic production amid growing external dependency

3.1 EU production volumes and values rose substantially

Despite the growing trade deficit, EU domestic production of CN 85444991 products expanded significantly over the period. Output rose from 1.56 billion kg (1.56 million tonnes) in 2015 to 2.37 billion kg in 2025 (+51.8% in volume). In value terms, production increased from €8.6 billion to €16.5 billion (+91.3%), implying strong unit-price appreciation consistent with the broader inflationary and raw-material cost trends in the metals and electrical equipment sectors.

This growth in domestic output is notable because it occurred alongside rising imports — suggesting that EU demand grew faster than domestic supply could keep pace, or that certain segments of the market became more import-dependent.

3.2 Specialisation remained concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe

The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) data for 2025 show that the EU's production specialisation in this product is heavily concentrated in Central and Eastern European member states:

Czechia stands out as the largest single production base within the EU (23.9% of total output), combining high specialisation with high volume. Meanwhile, large economies like Spain (RSCA: -0.86) and Ireland (RSCA: -0.95) show near-zero specialisation in this product, relying heavily on imports or re-exports.

3.3 EU export propensity declined, signalling a loss of external competitiveness

The export propensity — the share of domestic production exported outside the EU — fell from 30.7% in 2015 to 27.6% in 2025 (-9.9%). This is a notable decline: the EU is producing more but exporting proportionally less to non-EU markets. Combined with the stable trade intensity ratio (~39–40%), this suggests that while the EU remains deeply integrated into global trade flows for this product, its outward orientation has weakened.

This dynamic is consistent with the hypothesis that rising EU demand (driven by energy transition investments, grid modernisation, and electric vehicle infrastructure) has increasingly been met by imports rather than by redirecting domestic production toward external markets. The growing import penetration from lower-cost producers like Türkiye may also be crowding out some EU export capacity in price-sensitive segments.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in insulated electric wire and cables (CN 85444991) underwent a structural transformation between 2015 and 2025. The bloc's position shifted from a net exporter with a €175 million surplus to a net importer with a €143 million deficit, driven by a tripling of import values that far outpaced the more modest growth in exports. This shift was underpinned by two reinforcing trends: a dramatic rise in imports from Türkiye (+872%) and Ukraine (+3,066%), and a simultaneous decline in EU export volumes despite rising production.

The reshuffling of trade partners — with Türkiye becoming the dominant supplier, Ukraine emerging as a key partner, and Belarus disappearing from the map — mirrors broader geopolitical realignments, including sanctions regimes and trade facilitation policies. At the same time, the increasing concentration of imports (HHI rising toward 1,740) introduces supply-chain risk that policymakers may wish to monitor.

EU domestic production more than held its own, growing by over 50% in volume and nearly doubling in value. However, the declining export propensity (from 30.7% to 27.6%) and the growing deficit suggest that the additional production capacity has largely served to meet expanding domestic demand rather than reinforcing the EU's position in global markets. Going forward, the interplay between rising infrastructure investment demand, the EU's strategic autonomy objectives, and the competitive pressure from neighbouring low-cost producers will be the key forces shaping this market.