Market evolution: Hot-rolled steel strip thick coil narrow (CN 721114) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in product CN 721114 — flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width < 600 mm, not further worked than hot-rolled, not clad, plated or coated, of a thickness ≥ 4.75 mm, excluding "wide flats." Over the decade from 2015 to 2025, the EU's external trade in this niche segment of hot-rolled steel strip underwent a profound structural contraction, driven by falling volumes, rising prices, and significant shifts in trading partners. The EU remained a consistent net exporter throughout the period, but the magnitude of both exports and imports declined sharply, reflecting the combined influence of trade defence instruments, geopolitical shocks, and changing competitive dynamics.

1. A Decade of Contraction: Dramatic Declines in Both Export and Import Volumes

Export volumes fell by over 60% while prices nearly doubled

The EU's external exports of CN 721114 contracted significantly over the period. In value terms, exports fell from €34.8 million in 2015 to €21.6 million in 2025 (−37.9%). In volume terms, the decline was far steeper, dropping from 56,900 tonnes to just 20,939 tonnes (−63.2%). The average export price, however, rose from €612/t to €1,026/t (+67.7%), partially offsetting the volume decline in value terms. This suggests that the EU has retreated from lower-value segments of this market while retaining activity in higher-value niches, or that global steel price inflation — driven by raw material costs, carbon pricing, and supply disruptions — has lifted unit values across the board.

Import volumes collapsed even more sharply

The contraction on the import side was even more dramatic. EU imports of CN 721114 fell from €9.3 million (15,768 tonnes) in 2015 to just €1.07 million (1,116 tonnes) in 2025, representing declines of −88.5% in value and −92.9% in volume. Import prices rose by 62.1% (from €590/t to €956/t), mirroring the export price trajectory. The near-total evaporation of imports signals that the EU market has become substantially more self-sufficient in this product category over the decade.

The EU's trade balance remained positive but narrowed

Despite the larger proportional decline in exports, the EU maintained a positive trade balance throughout. The balance narrowed by 19.4% (from €25.5 million to €20.6 million), indicating that the import collapse was even more pronounced than the export decline in absolute terms.

2. Shifting Partners: From Russia and the UK to Emerging Destinations

EU imports decoupled from traditional suppliers

The most striking feature of the import landscape is the near-total withdrawal of the EU's two historical top suppliers. Imports from the United Kingdom collapsed by −96.9%, from €3.9 million to just €122 thousand — a natural consequence of Brexit-related trade frictions, new customs barriers, and the application of rules of origin requirements. Imports from the Russian Federation fell by −66.5%, from €3.0 million to €1.0 million; while this decline was already underway before 2022, EU sanctions imposed following the invasion of Ukraine accelerated the decoupling.

Türkiye emerged as the only major partner to significantly increase its EU-bound shipments (+379.5%), suggesting a partial reorientation of supply chains. Chinese imports remained relatively stable in absolute terms (−2.5%), though they represent a small share.

Switzerland dominated EU exports but lost ground

On the export side, Switzerland was by far the largest destination throughout the period, absorbing €25.9 million of EU exports in 2015 and €12.2 million in 2025 (−52.9%). The dominance of Switzerland reflects the close industrial integration between the EU and its Alpine neighbour, particularly in precision manufacturing and mechanical engineering. However, several emerging partners saw explosive growth:

Brazil (+683.9%) and Norway (+441.9%) stood out as fast-growing destinations, possibly reflecting niche industrial demand or the search for alternative markets as traditional flows contracted.

The EU's export market became more diversified

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for exports fell from 5,633 to 3,411 (−39.4%), indicating a marked reduction in concentration. This is consistent with the declining share of Switzerland and the rise of diversified secondary destinations. Import concentration remained broadly unchanged in value terms (HHI around 3,005), though it fell modestly by volume (−17.9%).

3. Structural Autonomy: The EU's Growing Self-Sufficiency and Declining Trade Exposure

The EU became substantially less reliant on imports

The net import reliance indicator, which measures the net import position relative to apparent consumption, moved from −9.9% in 2015 to −3.5% in 2025 (where negative values indicate net export status). This confirms that the EU remained a net exporter of CN 721114 throughout, but the shrinking gap suggests that domestic consumption increasingly absorbed EU production rather than the surplus being exported. The peak net export position was reached in 2020 (−27.7%), likely reflecting pandemic-driven demand shifts.

Trade intensity and export propensity collapsed

Two key vulnerability metrics tell a striking story:

Trade intensity (total extra-EU trade as a share of production) fell from 17.0% to just 4.9%, and export propensity (extra-EU exports as a share of production) declined from 13.4% to 4.2%. This dramatic inward turn is partly explained by stable domestic production volumes (2.77 billion kg in 2015 vs. 2.84 billion kg in 2025, +2.4%) combined with the collapse in external trade flows. In other words, the EU produced roughly the same quantity but channelled far less of it to external markets.

Production shifted toward higher value-added

While production quantities were essentially flat (+2.4%), the production value increased by 26.7% (from €1.80 billion to €2.28 billion). This divergence — stable tonnes but rising euros — implies significant unit-value appreciation over the decade, driven by raw material cost inflation, energy price increases (particularly after 2021), carbon costs under the EU Emissions Trading System, and a possible compositional shift toward higher-specification products.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in CN 721114 over 2015–2025 tells the story of a market that turned inward. Export and import volumes both contracted dramatically (−63% and −93% respectively), while prices roughly doubled. The EU remained a net exporter, but the surplus narrowed as the collapse in imports slightly outpaced the decline in exports in absolute terms. Geopolitical events — Brexit and the Russia-Ukraine conflict — severed two of the EU's most important traditional import sources (the UK and Russia), while trade defence measures including EU safeguard quotas and anti-dumping duties progressively insulated the domestic market. On the export side, Switzerland remained the dominant but shrinking destination, while markets such as Brazil and Norway emerged as new growth outlets. The net result was a steel strip market with markedly lower trade exposure, higher self-sufficiency, and elevated unit values — a configuration that appears durable absent a significant shift in EU trade policy or global demand conditions.