Market evolution: Hot rolled narrow strip (CN 721119) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in product CN 721119 — flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width below 600 mm, simply hot-rolled, not clad, plated or coated, of a thickness below 4.75 mm, excluding "wide flats." Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU market for this niche but industrially important steel product underwent a profound transformation. Both import and export volumes contracted sharply, while unit prices roughly doubled. At the same time, geopolitical upheavals — Brexit, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the resulting sanctions regime — fundamentally reconfigured the EU's trade partner landscape. This report identifies three central dynamics that define the market's evolution and provides data-driven interpretation of each.

I. A Sharp Contraction in Trade Volumes, Masked by Price Inflation

The most striking feature of the EU's trade in CN 721119 over the past decade is the sheer magnitude of the decline in physical quantities traded. At first glance, value-based figures might suggest a moderate downturn, but a closer look at volumes reveals a much more dramatic structural retreat from international markets.

Export volumes fell by nearly two-thirds while import volumes shrank by three-quarters

Between 2015 and 2025, the EU's export quantity of this product dropped from 131,338 tonnes to 47,546 tonnes — a decline of 63.8%. Over the same period, import quantities fell even more steeply, from 52,199 tonnes to just 12,642 tonnes — a contraction of 75.8%. The EU thus became a significantly less trade-intensive market for this product: trade intensity collapsed from 17.0% in 2015 to 4.9% in 2025, and export propensity fell from 13.4% to 4.2%.

Surging unit prices partially cushioned the value decline

While volumes collapsed, unit prices moved in the opposite direction. Export prices rose from €598 per tonne to €1,084 per tonne (+81.1%), and import prices increased from €558 per tonne to €826 per tonne (+48.1%). This price inflation — driven by rising raw material costs, energy price surges, and reduced global supply — partially offset the volume decline in value terms. Consequently, the value of exports fell by "only" 32.9% (from €78.6 million to €52.8 million), and import values declined by 64.1% (from €29.1 million to €10.4 million). The gap between volume and value trends underscores the importance of looking beyond headline figures: the market's real contraction was far steeper than nominal values suggest.

EU domestic production remained remarkably stable despite the trade collapse

A notable counterpoint to the trade contraction is the relative stability of EU production. Production quantity moved from approximately 2,773 million kg in 2015 to 2,839 million kg in 2025, an increase of 2.4%. Production value, however, rose much more steeply — by 26.7% — from €1.80 billion to €2.28 billion, mirroring the same price inflation seen in trade data. This suggests that the EU's domestic steel industry maintained its output capacity while the international dimension of this market shrank considerably, pointing to a more self-contained European market.

II. From West to East: A Tectonic Shift in Trade Partners

If the first story of this decade is one of contraction, the second is one of radical reorientation. The EU's trade partner composition for CN 721119 was reshaped by two major geopolitical events: Brexit (effective January 2021) and Russia's invasion of Ukraine (February 2022), followed by successive rounds of EU sanctions. The result was a dramatic shift from established Western and Russian suppliers toward Turkish and Belarusian sources.

The collapse of Russia and the United Kingdom as import sources

In 2015, Russia and the United Kingdom were the EU's two largest import partners for this product, each supplying roughly €10.5–10.6 million in value. By 2025, Russian imports had fallen to just €461,000 — a decline of 95.7%, directly attributable to the EU sanctions regime imposed following Russia's aggression against Ukraine. UK imports fell to €713,000 — a drop of 93.2% — likely reflecting both the trade friction introduced by Brexit and the broader contraction of the market. Norway and Switzerland also saw their role as EU suppliers virtually eliminated (−99.9% and −94.6% respectively).

Türkiye and Belarus emerged as the dominant new suppliers

The vacuum left by Russia and the UK was not filled symmetrically. Türkiye's exports to the EU surged from €492,000 to €8.0 million, an increase of over 1,500%, making it the EU's largest extra-EU supplier by 2025. Belarus grew from a negligible €9,000 to €6.2 million — an extraordinary expansion that warrants scrutiny in the context of EU sanctions on Belarus and potential circumvention concerns. North Macedonia showed a more modest but steady increase of 31.4%.

The export side: declining traditional partners and growing emerging-market reach

On the export side, the EU's largest customer, Switzerland, saw its purchases fall from €33.0 million to €15.4 million (−53.4%), while UK-bound exports declined from €9.5 million to €3.5 million (−63.3%). By contrast, several emerging-market destinations grew: South Africa (+85.1%), China (+69.2%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (+56.3%), and Türkiye (+35.5%). This diversification — albeit from a lower base — suggests EU exporters were partially redirecting shipments toward non-traditional markets in response to declining demand from their historical core customers.

EU-internal production geography also shifted

The restructuring was not limited to external partners. Within the EU, import flows were redrawn: Romania emerged from near-irrelevance (€273,000 in 2015) to become the EU's largest importer of this product by value (€7.3 million in 2025, +2,556%). Meanwhile, traditional importing members like Germany (−94.6%), Poland (−98.8%), Sweden (−98.7%), and Spain (−97.9%) saw their intake virtually disappear. On the export side, Sweden's outward shipments surged from €139,000 to €4.6 million (+3,166%), and France's exports more than doubled, while Germany (−62.7%) and Austria (−69.7%) saw large declines. These shifts may reflect evolving production capacities, cost competitiveness changes, and supply chain reconfigurations within the EU's single market.

III. Rising Concentration on the Import Side and Price Shocks

A third defining feature of this market's evolution is the growing vulnerability associated with import concentration, alongside notable price shocks from key supplying countries.

Import concentration doubled, while export markets became more diversified

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU imports by value rose from 2,867 to 6,022 — an increase of 110%. This places the import market in a zone of high concentration, meaning that the EU now sources this product from a much narrower set of countries than it did a decade ago. The concentration by volume shows a similar pattern (from 3,305 to 6,189, +87.2%). By contrast, export concentration decreased from an HHI of 2,115 to 1,386 (−34.5%), indicating that EU exports have become more evenly spread across destination countries. The divergence is striking: while the EU has diversified its customer base, it has become more dependent on fewer suppliers — notably Türkiye and Belarus — creating a potential strategic vulnerability.

Significant price shocks were detected from key partners

The volatility analysis reveals several notable shock events. The most significant was a price shock in EU imports from Türkiye in 2021, with an abnormality score of 64.3, a price shift of +49.9%, and a value share of 26.6% — coinciding with the post-pandemic surge in global steel prices and energy costs. A second shock was detected in EU imports from Norway in 2023, with a dramatic price shift of +433.7% (abnormality 32.6), though at a lower value share of 11.2% — likely reflecting a sharp repricing in a declining trade relationship. On the export side, a price shock in shipments to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2021 (+60.7% shift, abnormality 8.5) further illustrates how the broader steel market inflation of 2021–2022 transmitted through this niche product.

EU net export surplus narrowed but the bloc remained a net exporter throughout

Throughout the entire period, the EU maintained a positive trade balance in CN 721119, declining from €49.5 million in 2015 to €42.3 million in 2025 (−14.5%). The net import reliance remained negative throughout — moving from −9.9% to −3.5% — confirming the EU's consistent status as a net exporter of this product. The narrowing of the surplus, combined with stable domestic production, implies that the EU's domestic consumption of this product may have declined, or that more of domestic output is being absorbed internally rather than exported.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in CN 721119 over the 2015–2025 decade tells a story of structural contraction, geopolitical realignment, and growing import-side vulnerability. Trade volumes collapsed — exports by nearly two-thirds, imports by three-quarters — even as surging prices partially disguised this decline in value terms. Domestic production remained remarkably resilient, suggesting a more self-reliant European market. Meanwhile, the loss of Russia and the United Kingdom as major suppliers was compensated primarily by the rapid rise of Türkiye and, notably, Belarus — concentrating import flows and raising strategic questions about supply security. Price shocks, particularly in 2021, underscored the sensitivity of this market to global commodity cycles. Going forward, the key risks for this market lie in the concentration of imports, the potential for further geopolitical disruption, and the sustainability of EU production capacity in an environment of elevated energy and compliance costs.