Market evolution: High-speed steel wire in coils (CN 72299020) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in high-speed steel wire in coils (CN 72299020) over the period 2015–2025. High-speed steel is a specialty alloy steel used primarily in cutting tools, drill bits, and other applications demanding high wear resistance and hardness at elevated temperatures. The wire-in-coils form traded under this code feeds into downstream manufacturing of springs, fasteners, and tooling components. Despite remaining a net importer throughout the decade, the EU's trade profile shifted markedly: the bloc moved from a position of moderate export capacity to deeper import dependence, while import sources consolidated around fewer suppliers. EU domestic production held broadly steady in volume terms but surged in value, reflecting significant price inflation. The following sections trace these dynamics in detail.

1. From Surplus Capacity to Deepening Import Dependence

The most striking structural shift over 2015–2025 is the EU's transition from a modest net-export position in parts of the period to sustained import dependence by the end. This section documents the quantitative trajectory of that shift and its price and volume components.

1.1. The trade balance reversed from near-equilibrium to a persistent deficit

In 2015, the EU's trade balance stood at –€5.9 million, but by 2025 it had widened to –€6.0 million. The trajectory in between was far more dramatic: at its worst, the deficit reached –€22.0 million, before partially recovering. The net import reliance indicator confirms this picture: it swung from –11.9% in 2015 (meaning the EU was a net exporter relative to its own consumption) to +8.6% in 2025, a +172% change over the decade.

The widening of trade intensity from 23.5% to 37.9% indicates that trade flows grew faster than EU production, embedding the bloc more deeply in cross-border supply chains for this product.

1.2. Import volumes contracted sharply while prices surged

EU imports of high-speed steel wire fell from 620 tonnes (€10.8 M) in 2015 to 485 tonnes (€9.8 M) in 2025—a volume decline of 21.9% that was only partially offset by a 16.7% rise in unit prices to €20,317/t. The peak year saw 1,216 tonnes imported (at €31.0 M), underscoring that volumes have been highly variable. The minimum volume (485 tonnes) was reached in the final year of the data window, suggesting an ongoing contraction.

1.3. Export capacity eroded across both value and volume

EU exports declined from €4.9 M (318 tonnes) in 2015 to €3.9 M (266 tonnes) in 2025, a drop of 20.1% in value and 16.3% in volume. Unlike imports, export prices softened slightly (–4.6%), leaving the EU's export side doubly squeezed. The export propensity edged up from 17.9% to 19.8%, but this modest rise reflects shrinking domestic absorption rather than genuine export dynamism.

2. A Consolidating Supplier Landscape: Japan's Dominance and China's Emergence

The EU's import source structure was transformed over the decade. Traditional suppliers in Europe and North America virtually disappeared from the import table, replaced by an increasingly concentrated Asian supply base. This section traces the key partner-level dynamics and the resulting concentration effects.

2.1. Japan consolidated its position as the dominant supplier

Japan was already the EU's largest import partner in 2015, accounting for €5.4 M, and by 2025 its share had grown to €7.4 M (+36.7%). At its peak, Japanese imports reached €16.2 M. Japan's consistently low coefficient of variation (0.27) signals a stable, structural supply relationship rather than opportunistic trade. In 2022, a price shock was detected in Japanese imports (abnormality score 64.6, +25.6% shift), reflecting the global commodity price spike that year—yet Japan still accounted for 66% of import value, underscoring the EU's deep reliance.

2.2. China surged from a negligible base to become the second-largest supplier

The most dramatic partner-level shift was China's rise from just €17,213 of imports in 2015 to €2.23 M in 2025—a twelve-thousand-percent increase. A major price shock centred on 2018 (abnormality score 204.5, +2,697% shift, 23.8% of import value) coincides with the moment Chinese supply became material. However, China's very high coefficient of variation (1.17) indicates that this supply relationship remains volatile and episodic rather than structurally embedded.

2.3. Traditional Western suppliers collapsed

Several formerly significant import partners saw their EU trade evaporate:

The near-total withdrawal of UK and US suppliers is striking. In the UK's case, Brexit-related trade friction (effective from 2021) likely played a role. For the United States, the decline is steeper and more gradual, potentially reflecting competitiveness shifts or capacity reallocation. Belarus, while still present, saw a 41.6% contraction—its trade was likely affected by EU sanctions regimes introduced from 2022 onwards.

2.4. Import concentration nearly doubled, increasing supply-chain risk

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for imports by value rose from 3,321 in 2015 to 6,201 in 2025 (+86.8%). By volume, the HHI climbed from 2,873 to 5,536 (+92.7%). These figures place the market well above the conventional 2,500 threshold for "highly concentrated" markets. The implication is clear: the EU has become significantly more dependent on a small number of import sources, principally Japan, raising vulnerability to supply disruptions.

By contrast, export concentration remained broadly stable (HHI around 4,000–4,100), with Switzerland, the US, and Israel as the main EU export destinations. Export partner volatility was generally higher (e.g., Israel CV 0.38, but Mexico CV 2.19 and Norway CV 2.41), reflecting more opportunistic and less structural export relationships.

3. Domestic Production Held Steady in Volume but Surged in Value

While the external trade picture reveals deepening import dependence, EU domestic production data tells a more nuanced story. This section examines production trends, the geographic specialisation of EU member states, and what the price divergence between production and trade implies.

3.1. EU production volumes were broadly stable while values soared

EU production volumes edged down slightly from 532 million kg (2015) to 510 million kg (2025), a decline of just 4.1%. However, production values surged from €439 million to €1.12 billion (+155.3%). This implies an effective doubling of unit production values, consistent with the broader European steel price inflation driven by energy costs, carbon pricing (EU ETS), and post-pandemic supply chain repricing. Notably, the minimum production volume (322 million kg) and value (€412 M) did not coincide in the same year, suggesting that the COVID-19 and energy-crisis shocks affected volumes and prices on different timelines.

3.2. Specialisation is concentrated in a handful of EU member states

The EU's production of high-speed steel wire is highly geographically concentrated. According to specialisation data for 2025, Germany alone accounts for 60% of EU production in this product category (RSCA 0.48), followed by France at 17% (RSCA 0.38) and Sweden at 6% (RSCA 0.41). These three countries together represent over 83% of EU output.

Estonia, while a marginal producer, exhibits the highest RSCA (0.52) and RCA (3.17), suggesting outsized specialisation relative to its tiny production base. At the other end, large economies like the Netherlands and Romania show near-zero RCA values, indicating negligible domestic capability in this niche product.

3.3. Germany anchors both EU import demand and export supply

Germany emerges as the pivotal EU member in both import and export flows. As an importer, Germany's intake rose from €8.4 M to €9.1 M (+7.5%), making it comfortably the largest EU buyer. Meanwhile, Swedish imports collapsed from €1.9 M to just €140 K (–92.5%), and Austria's fell by 31.7%. On the export side, Austria was the largest exporter (€2.5 M in 2025), followed by France (€809 K) and Italy (€390 K). Sweden's exports, at €757 K in 2015, effectively ceased entirely by 2025 (–100%), completing a broader withdrawal of Sweden from external trade in this product. Italy's export surge (+362.5%) and Belgium's import surge (+4,259%) suggest possible re-routing or intermediary trade patterns.

Conclusion

Over 2015–2025, the EU's trade in high-speed steel wire in coils underwent a structural transformation. The bloc shifted from a position of partial self-sufficiency (net export reliance of –12% in 2015) to clear import dependence (+9% in 2025). This shift was driven not by a collapse in domestic production—EU output volumes fell only 4.1%—but by a combination of eroding export competitiveness and increasing reliance on Asian suppliers, principally Japan and, increasingly, China. Import sources consolidated dramatically (HHI nearly doubling to 6,201), while traditional suppliers from the UK, US, and Türkiye withdrew almost entirely. The remaining supply chain is therefore more geographically concentrated and, by extension, more vulnerable to disruptions from any single source. Meanwhile, production values more than doubled, reflecting inflationary pressures across the European steel sector. Looking ahead, the key question for EU industrial policy is whether domestic capacity can be reinforced to reverse the deepening import dependence, or whether the high-speed steel wire segment will continue its drift toward greater external reliance.