Market evolution: Doped semiconductor wafers (CN 38180090) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in chemical elements and compounds doped for use in electronics (excluding doped silicon), classified under customs code 38180090, over the 2015–2025 period. This product category covers semiconductor wafers, discs, and rods used in the electronics industry—materials that are central to the global semiconductor supply chain.

The decade under review was marked by transformative dynamics: the COVID-19 pandemic, the global chip shortage, the EU Chips Act, and an escalating geopolitical competition for semiconductor sovereignty. These forces shaped both the volumes and values of EU trade in this critical segment.

Three main findings emerge from the data:

1. A striking divergence between physical volumes and trade values, with quantities declining sharply while values surged—pointing to a fundamental repricing of semiconductor-grade materials.
2. A dramatic reshaping of the EU's trade geography, with China emerging as the EU's largest import supplier, South Korea becoming a key export destination, and the EU's traditional reliance on Japan becoming more nuanced.
3. Rising EU production capacity alongside persistent structural vulnerabilities, including supply concentration, extreme price shocks in certain trade corridors, and uneven internal specialisation.

1. The Great Divergence: Soaring Values Amid Falling Volumes

The most striking feature of EU trade in CN 38180090 over 2015–2025 is the sharp divergence between physical trade volumes and their monetary value. While the tonnage of doped semiconductor wafers crossing EU borders declined substantially, the trade value increased dramatically—a pattern consistent with a global repricing of advanced semiconductor materials.

1.1 Import volumes fell by a quarter, but values nearly tripled

EU imports of CN 38180090 decreased in quantity from 533.1 tonnes in 2015 to 399.3 tonnes in 2025, a decline of 25.1%. Yet over the same period, import values rose from €176.0 million to €455.4 million (+158.7%). This divergence is explained by a dramatic increase in the unit price of imports, which climbed from €330,000 per tonne to €1,127,637 per tonne—an increase of 241.7%.

1.2 Export volumes halved, but values nearly tripled

The pattern is even more pronounced on the export side. EU exports fell from 406.8 tonnes to just 203.0 tonnes (−50.1%), while their value rose from €135.1 million to €374.5 million (+177.1%). The unit export price surged from €331,655 per tonne to €1,823,237 per tonne—an increase of 449.7%. By 2025, the EU was exporting significantly fewer tonnes of material but earning nearly three times as much.

1.3 The price surge reflects a structural repricing of semiconductor materials

The near-quadrupling of unit prices for this product category over a decade is consistent with several underlying forces: (i) the global semiconductor shortage of 2020–2023, which drove up prices across the supply chain; (ii) a product mix shift toward higher-value, more advanced materials (e.g., compound semiconductors like GaAs, GaN, InP for 5G, EVs, and photonics), which command higher per-kilogram prices than traditional materials; and (iii) general inflationary pressures in energy-intensive manufacturing. The fact that export prices rose faster (+449.7%) than import prices (+241.7%) suggests that the EU may be increasingly specialised in higher-value segments of the doped-materials market.

1.4 The trade deficit narrowed during the chip boom, then widened again

The EU's trade balance in CN 38180090 was consistently negative over the period, but its trajectory was highly variable. The deficit started at −€40.9 million in 2015, ballooned to a peak of −€197.7 million (likely around 2018–2020), then narrowed to just −€9.6 million before widening again to −€80.9 million in 2025. This oscillation likely reflects the timing of the chip shortage: during the shortage's peak, the EU's export values may have surged faster than import values due to preferential pricing for EU-origin specialty materials. As the market normalised, the structural import dependency reasserted itself.

2. A Shifting Map: The Reconfiguration of EU Semiconductor Trade Partners

Beyond price dynamics, the 2015–2025 period saw a fundamental reshaping of the EU's trade geography for doped semiconductor materials. New suppliers rose to prominence, traditional relationships were recalibrated, and the EU's concentration of import sources evolved in ways that carry both opportunities and risks.

2.1 China emerged as the EU's largest import source, with explosive growth

The most dramatic shift in import partners was the rise of China. EU imports of CN 38180090 from China surged from €13.4 million in 2015 to €103.9 million in 2025—an increase of 675.5%. This made China the single largest supplier to the EU by value in 2025, overtaking Japan. This growth reflects China's massive state-driven investment in semiconductor materials production under successive industrial policies (Made in China 2025, the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund), which has enabled Chinese producers to scale up output of doped materials for electronics.

2.2 Japan remained a cornerstone supplier, but its relative weight eroded

Japan, historically the EU's dominant supplier of high-purity doped semiconductor materials (home to Shin-Etsu, SUMCO, and other leading wafer producers), remained a major source with imports of €98.5 million in 2025. However, its growth over the decade was modest at +9.3%, meaning that Japan's share of EU imports declined substantially as China, the United States, Taiwan, and South Korea all grew faster. Japan's stable but slow-growing exports to the EU may reflect capacity constraints or a strategic focus on serving Asian fabrication plants.

2.3 South Korea became the EU's fastest-growing export destination

On the export side, the most striking development was the rise of South Korea as a destination. EU exports to South Korea surged from just €0.5 million in 2015 to €33.8 million in 2025—an increase of 6,712.6%. This growth is consistent with Samsung and SK Hynix's massive capacity expansions in advanced memory and logic chips, which would increase demand for specialty doped materials. The data also shows that this corridor experienced a major price shock in 2022, with an abnormality score of 83.3 and a value shift of +4,200%, suggesting a possible surge in high-value, specialised shipments.

2.4 Import concentration decreased, but trade volatility increased

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU imports by value fell from 3,307 in 2015 to 2,335 in 2025 (a decline of 29.4%), indicating that import sources became more diversified over the period. This is partly a natural consequence of new suppliers (China, Taiwan, South Korea) gaining market share at the expense of Japan's dominance. However, this diversification came alongside increased volatility in several corridors: China's import flows had a coefficient of variation of 0.80, and Taiwan's stood at 0.51, indicating that these newer supply relationships were less stable than the traditional Japan corridor (CV of 0.26). For exports, the HHI edged up slightly from 2,115 to 2,311 (+9.2%), suggesting a modest re-concentration around Taiwan, the US, South Korea, and Japan.

2.5 Export concentration became more volatile in volume terms

While the value-based HHI for exports rose only modestly, the volume-based HHI for exports fell sharply from 1,934 to 1,060 (−45.2%). This divergence between value and volume concentration suggests that while the EU exports to a more diverse set of destinations in tonnage terms, high-value shipments remain concentrated in a few key corridors—particularly the US, Taiwan, and Japan, where advanced fabrication facilities absorb premium materials.

3. Growing EU Capacity, Persistent Vulnerabilities

Against the backdrop of shifting trade patterns, the EU's domestic production capacity for doped semiconductor materials expanded significantly over the period. However, this growth coexists with structural vulnerabilities—including uneven specialisation across Member States, high trade intensity, and exposure to price shocks in critical corridors.

3.1 EU production roughly doubled in volume

EU production of CN 38180090 grew from 4,384 tonnes (2015) to 9,698 tonnes (2025), an increase of 121.2%. Production value rose from €871 million to €1,588 million (+82.4%). Notably, production value reached a peak of €2.57 billion at some point during the period (likely during the 2021–2022 chip boom), suggesting that EU producers benefited significantly from the global demand surge. The faster growth in quantity than in value implies that unit production prices did not rise as steeply as trade prices—possibly reflecting that domestic production is weighted toward mid-range materials, while exports are increasingly skewed toward higher-value products.

3.2 Germany dominated EU production and exports

Within the EU, Germany was by far the largest producer and exporter. German exports of CN 38180090 grew from €109.7 million to €282.0 million (+157.1%), accounting for the lion's share of EU export value. Germany's Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) stood at 2.06 in 2025, and its production share within the EU was 43.7%—confirming its central role in the EU's semiconductor materials ecosystem.

3.3 Austria emerged as a major import hub

One of the most striking internal developments was Austria's transformation into a major import hub. Austrian imports surged from €13.8 million to €127.4 million (+819.9%), making it the second-largest EU importer after Germany. This is likely connected to the expansion of semiconductor-related operations in Austria, potentially linked to companies such as ams-OSRAM or new fab investments. Czechia also saw explosive import growth (€0.05 million to €34.6 million), suggesting the emergence of new semiconductor fabrication or assembly capacity in Central Europe.

3.4 EU export propensity doubled, signalling deep global integration

The EU's export propensity (exports as a share of production) rose from 52.8% to 101.4% over the period—a near-doubling. This means that by 2025, the EU was exporting more in value terms than it produced domestically, which is possible when domestic production is weighted toward lower-value materials while exports capture higher-value speciality products. Similarly, trade intensity (imports + exports as a share of production) increased from 72.4% to 100.7% (+39.1%), underscoring the EU's deep integration into global semiconductor supply chains.

3.5 Net import reliance declined but remained positive

The EU's net import reliance (net imports as a share of apparent consumption) declined from 15.4% in 2015 to 12.0% in 2025 (−22.1%). However, the indicator was highly variable, ranging from −21.4% (a brief period of net self-sufficiency, likely during the chip boom when export values temporarily exceeded import values) to a peak of 40.0% (a period of heavy dependence). The persistent positive average indicates that the EU remains a structural net importer of doped semiconductor materials, even as its domestic capacity has grown.

3.6 Price shocks were concentrated in specific corridors

The volatility analysis reveals that extreme price shocks were concentrated in a few export corridors. The most significant was the South Korea export shock in 2022, with an abnormality score of 83.3 and a price shift of +4,200%—consistent with a possible surge in high-value, specialised shipments during the chip shortage. A Ukraine export shock in 2018 (abnormality 75.1, shift +633.4%) and a United Kingdom export shock in 2022 (abnormality 38.3, shift +1,114%) were also notable. On the import side, Norway (CV of 2.01) and United Kingdom (CV of 1.21) exhibited the highest volatility, suggesting that these supply relationships were more episodic or tied to specific project-based demand.

Conclusion

Over 2015–2025, the EU's trade in doped semiconductor wafers (CN 38180090) was defined by a fundamental repricing of materials, a geographic reconfiguration of supply and demand, and a tension between growing domestic capacity and persistent external dependency.

The near-tripling of trade values amid declining physical volumes reflects the structural shift toward higher-value semiconductor materials and the price effects of the global chip shortage. China's emergence as the EU's largest import supplier (from €13.4M to €103.9M) represents a significant strategic consideration for EU policymakers, particularly in the context of the EU Chips Act's ambition to strengthen semiconductor sovereignty. At the same time, the EU's export success—particularly the explosive growth in sales to South Korea and Japan—demonstrates that European producers retain competitive advantages in specialised, high-value segments.

The EU's production capacity roughly doubled over the decade, but it remains concentrated in a few Member States (Germany, France, Sweden, Italy), and the EU as a whole continues to be a net importer. The persistence of price shocks in key corridors, combined with rising trade intensity, suggests that supply chain resilience remains an area of concern. As the EU pursues its goal of producing 20% of the world's semiconductors by 2030, the availability and pricing of upstream materials like those covered by CN 38180090 will be a critical factor to monitor.