Market evolution: Demonstration instruments and models (CN 9023) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU extra-EU trade in demonstration instruments and models (Customs/Nomenclature code 9023) over the period 2015–2025. This product category covers instruments, apparatus and models designed for demonstrational purposes — for instance in education or exhibitions — that are unsuitable for other uses. It excludes ground flying trainers, collectors' pieces and antiques.

Over the eleven-year window, the EU's trade in this product class underwent significant structural transformation. The overall trade data reveals a market characterised by surging trade values — both in exports and especially in imports — while physical volumes evolved at markedly different paces. The EU maintained a consistent trade surplus throughout the period, yet that surplus narrowed considerably. This report is organised around three principal findings: the divergence between value and volume growth, the geographic reconfiguration of trade partners (notably driven by Brexit and China's rising role), and the EU's evolving competitive position and strategic autonomy in this product segment.

I. Price-Driven Growth: Export Values Rise While Physical Volumes Retreat

The most striking macro-level feature of the 2015–2025 period is the divergence between the monetary value and the physical volume of EU exports. While the aggregate value of EU exports in demonstration instruments and models rose substantially, the tonnes shipped actually declined — pointing to a market in which unit values (prices) climbed sharply.

EU export value grew by 37.6 % while tonnes fell by 22.2 %

Between the first and last years of the period, EU exports rose from €490.3 million to €674.5 million, representing a 37.6 % increase in value. Over the same span, however, the quantity exported fell from 7,365 tonnes to 5,732 tonnes — a 22.2 % contraction. The implied average export price consequently surged from approximately €66,561 per tonne in the first year to €117,651 per tonne in the last year, a 76.8 % increase. This pattern suggests that the EU has been shifting toward higher-value, more specialised demonstration equipment rather than competing on volume.

Import growth was far more vigorous: +141.8 % in value and +80.5 % in volume

Imports told a dramatically different story. Import values surged from €207.6 million to €502.1 million (+141.8 %), while imported quantities grew from 4,537 tonnes to 8,189 tonnes (+80.5 %). The average import price rose more moderately, from €45,736 to €61,307 per tonne (+34.0 %). The much stronger volume growth on the import side — compared to the export side — indicates that the EU's domestic demand for demonstration instruments was increasingly satisfied by foreign suppliers, many of whom appear to compete on volume and cost rather than on premium positioning.

Source: General Overview — Trade

The trade surplus narrowed from €283 million to €172 million

As a direct consequence of faster import growth, the EU's trade surplus in this product contracted by 39.0 %, from €282.7 million to €172.4 million. The EU remained a net exporter throughout — net import reliance stayed negative at −174.9 % in the first year and −60.0 % in the last — but the trajectory clearly pointed toward a more balanced position. The minimum surplus during the period dipped to approximately €133.8 million (around 2020–2021), likely amplified by the COVID-19 disruption, before partially recovering.

Domestic production doubled in value, signalling robust underlying demand

EU production of demonstration instruments and models grew from €274.0 million in the first available year to €560.0 million in the last, an increase of 104.4 %. Production quantity also rose from 7.8 million kg to 11.8 million kg (+50.8 %). This doubling of production value — coupled with the steady rise in export prices — confirms that the EU industry was moving up the value chain, producing more sophisticated (and more expensive) demonstration equipment for both the domestic and export markets.

II. Reconfigured Trade Partnerships: Brexit Realignment, China's Ascent and the Russia Collapse

Behind the aggregate figures lie important geographic shifts. The composition of the EU's trading partners evolved substantially between 2015 and 2025, driven by structural changes (most notably the UK's departure from the EU single market), the growing role of emerging economies, and geopolitical disruptions.

The United Kingdom emerged as the fastest-growing import partner — a likely Brexit effect

Among the EU's top import partners, the United Kingdom registered the most explosive growth, with imports rising by 397.2 % (from €14.5 million to €72.3 million). This surge almost certainly reflects the reclassification of previously intra-EU trade as extra-EU trade following the UK's formal exit from the single market at the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020. Before that date, UK–EU trade in this product was not recorded as "extra-EU" and would not appear in this dataset. The magnitude of the change — the UK jumping from a marginal to the fourth-largest import source — is therefore more a statistical artefact of Brexit than a signal of genuinely new trade flows, although continued growth after reclassification may reflect some real expansion.

China and the United States remained the dominant extra-EU partners

China's imports into the EU grew by 208.8 % (from €34.8 million to €107.6 million), making it the largest single import partner by the end of the period. The United States followed with imports growing by 117.7 % (from €66.9 million to €145.7 million). On the export side, the US was the EU's single largest destination, absorbing €166.9 million in the last year (+138.5 %), followed by the UK (€88.4 million, +161.8 %) and Switzerland (€49.4 million, +142.8 %). China, by contrast, saw a slight decline in EU exports (−13.7 %), suggesting that China's own domestic production was increasingly meeting local demand and reducing its need for EU-made demonstration instruments.

Russia's collapse exemplifies the impact of geopolitical sanctions

One of the sharpest reversals involved the Russian Federation, where EU exports fell from €11.9 million to just €2.2 million (−81.6 %). This collapse coincides with the EU sanctions regime imposed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The volatility of this bilateral flow was also the highest among major partners, with a coefficient of variation of 0.653 — nearly double that of stable partners like the United States (0.130). A notable price shock in EU exports to Russia was detected in 2018, with an abnormality score of 127.1 and a unit-price shift of +115.0 %, potentially reflecting either a change in product mix or the effects of earlier rounds of sanctions.

Source: Top Partners by Value

Germany dominated intra-EU production, while Sweden emerged as a specialist

Among EU Member States, Germany was by far the largest exporter, accounting for €234.4 million in the last year — though this represented a slight decline of 3.9 % from the first year. Sweden, however, was the standout performer, with exports surging by 193.1 % from €27.8 million to €81.6 million. The Netherlands (+121.6 %) and France (+76.5 %) also recorded strong export growth. The specialisation analysis confirms Sweden's outsized role: with a Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) of 6.87 and an RSCA of 0.75, Sweden was the most specialised EU country in this product category by a wide margin, producing 16.5 % of EU output in this category despite representing only 2.4 % of total EU trade.

III. A Gradually Eroding Competitive Edge: Concentration, Autonomy and Trade Intensity

While the EU remained a net exporter throughout the period, several indicators point to a slow erosion of its competitive dominance and a gradual shift toward a more balanced, though still export-oriented, position.

Export concentration increased sharply, signalling growing dependence on fewer destinations

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU exports by value rose from 517 to 956 (+85.0 %), approaching the threshold typically considered "moderately concentrated." By volume, the export HHI increased from 480 to 771 (+60.6 %). This means that EU exports became progressively more concentrated on a smaller number of destination markets — primarily the United States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. By contrast, the import HHI remained relatively stable at around 1,613–1,647, indicating that import sources were already somewhat concentrated at the start of the period and did not fundamentally change structure, though the volume-based import HHI did rise by 79.9 %.

Trade intensity and export propensity both declined

The EU's trade intensity (total trade as a share of production) fell from 128.7 % to 106.7 % (−17.1 %), while export propensity (exports as a share of production) dropped from 139.3 % to 111.8 % (−19.8 %). Both figures exceeding 100 % indicate that the EU exported more than it produced domestically (suggesting re-export activity or inventory effects), but the declining trend suggests that a growing share of domestic production was being absorbed by the home market, while imports simultaneously filled more of the gap.

The EU remains a net exporter, but the margin is narrowing

Net import reliance moved from −174.9 % to −60.0 % (+65.7 %). The negative values confirm that the EU was consistently a net exporter, but the strong positive change indicates a clear trend toward balance. The EU's self-sufficiency in demonstration instruments, while still robust, was being gradually eroded by faster-growing imports — particularly from China, the United States and (post-Brexit) the United Kingdom.

Price volatility was moderate for major partners, with isolated shocks

Looking at price volatility, the EU's principal trade flows were relatively stable. The United States — both as an import and export partner — exhibited coefficients of variation around 0.13, well below 0.20. More volatile partners included Ukraine (CV of 0.43 for imports, 0.59 for exports) and Serbia (0.57 for imports). The most extreme shock event detected was in exports to Australia in 2021, with an abnormality score of 440.7 and an 81.1 % price shift — possibly reflecting pandemic-related supply disruptions or a one-off large contract at an elevated price.

Conclusion

The EU trade in demonstration instruments and models (CN 9023) over 2015–2025 was shaped by three overarching dynamics: a price-driven export strategy that raised unit values by 76.8 % even as physical volumes declined; a dramatic geographic reconfiguration of trade flows, driven principally by the UK's departure from the EU single market, China's surging export presence, and the near-elimination of Russian trade following sanctions; and a gradual erosion of the EU's net export margin, as imports grew more than twice as fast as exports in value terms.

The EU retained a positive trade balance and a negative net import reliance throughout the period, confirming its continued competitiveness. However, the narrowing surplus, rising export concentration and declining trade intensity suggest that the EU's dominance in this niche market is slowly moderating. The doubling of domestic production value — combined with Sweden's emergence as a hyper-specialised producer and Germany's stable but slightly declining export base — points to an industry in transition, investing in higher-value outputs while ceding volume-oriented segments to lower-cost foreign competitors. Looking ahead, the sustainability of the EU's premium positioning, the continued reshaping of trade flows post-Brexit, and the potential for further geopolitical disruptions (as illustrated by the Russia case) will be the key dynamics to monitor.