Market evolution: Corded telephones (CN 851718) — 2015–2025

Introduction

CN 851718 covers telephone sets excluding cordless handsets and cellular/wireless telephones — effectively corded and analogue desk phones, plus videophones. Over the 2015–2025 period, EU trade in this product category underwent a dramatic contraction and restructuring. Total EU trade flows fell substantially on both the import and export sides, the trade balance swung from near-equilibrium into a pronounced deficit, and the geographic profile of trade was reshaped by geopolitical events and market consolidation. This report analyses the main dynamics driving these changes and their implications for the EU's position in a shrinking but structurally evolving niche.

1. A Market in Contraction: The Steep Decline of EU Trade Flows

1.1 Exports fell more sharply than imports, reversing the EU's trade position

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the sheer magnitude of the decline on both sides of EU trade. As shown below, EU extra-EU exports of CN 851718 goods collapsed by 66.3% in value (from €516.5 million in 2015 to €174.2 million in 2025), while imports declined by a still-significant 38.1% (from €516.2 million to €319.7 million). Because the export decline was nearly twice as steep in proportional terms, the EU went from a roughly balanced trade position (a marginal surplus of €0.3 million in 2015) to a deficit of €145.4 million in 2025.

1.2 Volume declines outpaced value declines, indicating a shift toward higher unit values

Both traded volumes and values fell, but quantities declined faster than values in both directions. Export volumes dropped 69.5% (from 4,539 tonnes to 1,385 tonnes) versus the 66.3% value decline; import volumes fell 54.4% (from 9,633 tonnes to 4,393 tonnes) versus a 38.1% value drop. This implies that average unit values (EUR per tonne) rose on both sides — export prices increased by 10.5% (from €113,764/t to €125,754/t) and import prices by 35.8% (from €53,580/t to €72,764/t). The sharper rise in import prices likely reflects the increasing dominance of China, which supplies at a higher average price point than some of the lower-value partners (such as Thailand or Hong Kong) whose volumes have collapsed.

1.3 The underlying driver is the long-term obsolescence of the product category

CN 851718 is a residual category that excludes the two segments driving modern telephone demand: cordless handsets and smartphones. What remains — traditional corded desk phones, conference phones, and videophones — serves a niche market (offices, hotels, institutional procurement) that has been shrinking for over a decade as Voice-over-IP, unified communications platforms, and mobile-first strategies displace fixed-line telephony. The persistent decline in both import and export volumes over the entire period is consistent with a structural demand contraction rather than a cyclical fluctuation.

2. The Geopolitical Reshaping of EU Trade Partners

2.1 China consolidated its position as the overwhelmingly dominant supplier

Among EU import partners, China stood out as the sole partner that maintained near-stable import values despite the overall market contraction. EU imports from China moved from €222.2 million in 2015 to €208.5 million in 2025, a modest decline of just 6.1%. Given that total EU imports fell by 38.1%, China's share of EU extra-EU imports necessarily surged — from approximately 43% to roughly 65%. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import concentration confirms this: it rose from 2,891 in 2015 to 4,541 in 2025 (+57.1%), crossing well into moderately concentrated territory.

China's low coefficient of variation (0.28) further indicates that its supply role has been remarkably stable — it was not a boom-and-bust story but rather a steady, dominant presence.

2.2 The United Kingdom's trade collapse reflects Brexit and market decline in tandem

The most dramatic partner-level shifts involved the United Kingdom. On the import side, EU imports from the UK fell from €140.6 million to €13.5 million (−90.4%), and on the export side, EU exports to the UK dropped from €213.4 million to €27.3 million (−87.2%). In both directions, the UK went from being the EU's single largest partner (or close to it) to a marginal one. Brexit — with the end of frictionless trade, customs formalities, and regulatory alignment from January 2021 — is the most obvious structural explanation, though the high volatility of UK trade flows (CV of 0.91 for imports) suggests the transition was neither smooth nor linear. It is also likely that some of the pre-Brexit UK trade reflected re-exports and distribution hub activity rather than final demand.

2.3 Hong Kong, Thailand, and other Asian suppliers faded as China absorbed their roles

Hong Kong's import value collapsed from €83.3 million to just €1.3 million (−98.5%), and Thailand's from €20.5 million to €2.4 million (−88.2%). Both had historically served as intermediaries or alternative manufacturing bases for telephone equipment. Their disappearance from the EU's import profile — with extraordinarily high volatility coefficients (1.19 for Hong Kong imports, 0.81 for Thailand) — points to a re-routing of supply chains directly through mainland China, as well as to the broader market shrinkage eliminating the marginal suppliers first.

2.4 EU export destinations contracted broadly, with Russia's trade eliminated entirely

On the export side, nearly all major partners saw steep declines. The United States fell 74.5% (from €41.3M to €10.5M), the United Arab Emirates 85.6% (from €70.9M to €10.2M), and Hong Kong 85.0% (from €14.8M to €2.2M). Russia's case is singular: EU exports to Russia fell from €17.4 million in 2015 to essentially zero (€79) in 2025 (−100%), almost certainly reflecting the impact of EU sanctions following 2022. Switzerland was the notable exception, with a decline of only 7.3% (from €23.2M to €21.5M) — consistent with its geographic proximity, stable institutional demand, and neutral trade policy. The export HHI fell from 2,045 to 742 (−63.7%), indicating that the remaining export flows became more evenly distributed across a smaller base — essentially, the concentrated, large-volume destinations (UK, UAE, Russia) disappeared, and what remained was spread more thinly.

3. EU Domestic Production: Resilient in Volume, Squeezed in Value

3.1 EU production volumes held up even as trade collapsed — but value did not follow

One of the more surprising findings is that EU production volumes for CN 851718 actually increased over the period, rising from approximately 4.4 million units in 2015 to 5.6 million units in 2025 (+28.2%), with a peak of 9.0 million units at some point in between. Yet the production value declined by 7.5% (from €227 million to €210 million). This divergence — more units at lower total value — implies a significant compression in the average unit value of EU-produced goods. European manufacturers appear to have shifted toward higher-volume, lower-margin production, possibly to serve institutional and hospitality procurement at more competitive price points against Chinese imports.

3.2 The EU flipped from net exporter to heavy net importer

The net import reliance metric captures the shift most starkly. In 2015, the EU was a slight net exporter of CN 851718 goods (net import reliance of −10.9%), even reaching a net-exporter peak of −33.1% at some point. By 2025, net import reliance had swung to +63.4%, with a peak of 75.2%. This means that the EU now sources nearly two-thirds of its CN 851718 consumption from outside the bloc — a structural dependency that is almost entirely channelled through China.

3.3 Specialisation patterns reveal a fragmented intra-EU production landscape

Within the EU, export specialisation for CN 851718 is concentrated in a handful of smaller member states. Latvia (RSCA of 0.55), Slovakia (0.54), and the Netherlands (0.35) show the highest revealed comparative advantage. Meanwhile, large economies like Germany, France, and Italy — which dominate the absolute volume of both imports and exports — show no particular specialisation. The Netherlands' position is notable: it accounts for 29.9% of EU production volume for this product but only 14.5% of total EU exports, suggesting it serves partly as a logistics and re-export hub. Germany, the EU's largest exporter in absolute terms, saw its exports fall 74.6% (from €192.0M to €48.7M), while the Netherlands' fell even more sharply by 84.2%.

Conclusion

The EU market for CN 851718 products has undergone a decade-long structural contraction driven by the obsolescence of traditional corded telephony. Trade volumes roughly halved on the import side and fell by two-thirds on the export side between 2015 and 2025. The most consequential structural shifts were geopolitical: Brexit nearly eliminated the United Kingdom as a trade partner in both directions; EU sanctions severed the Russian market entirely; and Hong Kong and Thailand were supplanted by direct Chinese supply chains. China now accounts for an estimated two-thirds of EU imports in this category, with import concentration rising sharply.

Against this backdrop, EU domestic production has shown a degree of resilience — volumes even increased — but at significantly compressed unit values, suggesting a defensive repositioning toward lower-margin segments. The EU's transformation from a near-balanced trader to a heavy net importer (63.4% net import reliance) signals a growing dependency on a single external supplier for a product category that, while niche, still serves critical institutional and commercial functions. The key risk for the EU is not the size of the market — which will likely continue to shrink — but the concentration of its remaining supply chain in one country, in a product segment where substitution options are limited and diminishing.