Market evolution: Base stations (CN 851761) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in base stations for voice, image and data transmission (customs code 851761) over the period 2015–2025. The decade under review witnessed a fundamental transformation of the EU's position in this market: the bloc shifted from being a major net exporter — with a trade surplus of €681 million in 2015 — to a net importer by 2025, posting a deficit of €64 million. EU export values fell by 84.1% while domestic production value collapsed by 87.5%, pointing to a structural erosion of the EU's manufacturing and export base in telecommunications infrastructure equipment. The following sections trace the key dynamics behind this shift, the reorientation of trade partners, and the geopolitical and price-related shocks that have shaped the market.

1. The erosion of EU export capacity and the collapse of domestic production

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the dramatic contraction of the EU's role as a global supplier of base station equipment. Both production and exports declined to a fraction of their 2015 levels, fundamentally altering the EU's trade balance in this product category.

1.1. EU exports declined by over 80% in value and nearly 95% in volume

Between 2015 and 2025, EU exports of base stations to non-EU countries fell from €950 million to €151 million (–84.1%). In volumetric terms, the decline was even steeper: export quantity dropped from 23,319 tonnes to just 1,249 tonnes (–94.6%). The unit price of exports, however, nearly tripled — rising from €40,739 per tonne to €120,755 per tonne (+196.4%) — suggesting that the remaining exports consisted of higher-value, more technologically advanced equipment. The supplementary unit count (number of items) also fell sharply, from 1,316,849 to 441,527 units (–66.5%), with the unit price declining from €721 to €342 per item (–52.6%), indicating a possible shift toward lighter but more expensive per-weight-unit products.

1.2. Domestic production collapsed, losing over 87% of its value

EU production figures tell an equally dramatic story. According to PRODCOM data, production quantity (code 26.30.23.10) fell from 2,586,557 items to 450,000 items (–82.6%), while production value declined from approximately €5.03 billion to €630 million (–87.5%). This collapse in domestic output is the fundamental driver of the export decline: with far fewer units being manufactured in the EU, fewer were available for export.

1.3. The trade balance swung from a large surplus to a deficit

The combined effect of falling exports and relatively more resilient imports was a complete reversal of the EU's trade position. The trade balance moved from +€681 million in 2015 to –€64 million in 2025 (–109.3%), and at its trough reached –€142 million. Net import reliance shifted accordingly, moving from –78% (indicating a strong net-export position) to +6% (indicating modest net-import dependence). Export propensity — the share of domestic production that is exported — collapsed from 57% to 27%, further confirming the loss of the EU's export orientation in this sector.

1.4. Sweden and Hungary saw the steepest export declines among EU members

The decline in exports was concentrated in a few historically dominant EU member states. Sweden, which exported €444 million in 2015, saw its shipments fall to just €8 million in 2025 (–98.2%), reflecting the decline of Ericsson's European manufacturing footprint. Hungary's exports dropped from €152 million to €6.3 million (–95.9%). The Netherlands fell from €120 million to €9 million (–92.5%). A notable exception was Romania, which saw its exports surge from €1 million to €33 million (+3,294%), possibly reflecting new production investments or re-export activity. Germany remained the most resilient major exporter, declining from €80 million to €22 million (–72.4%).

2. The Asian pivot: Geographic reorientation of EU import supply chains

While the EU's overall import value remained relatively stable (declining only 20.5% from €270 million to €214 million), the geographic composition of import sources shifted significantly toward Asia, reflecting broader global trends in telecommunications equipment manufacturing.

2.1. China remained the dominant import source throughout the period

China was consistently the EU's largest supplier of base stations, with import values ranging from €89 million to €220 million over the decade and settling at €106 million in 2025 (–14.8% relative to 2015). China's share of total EU imports grew as other sources contracted. The concentration of import value among suppliers, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), remained elevated at around 2,918 in 2025, indicating a moderately concentrated import market heavily weighted toward a single supplier.

2.2. Vietnam and Malaysia emerged as fast-growing alternative suppliers

Against the backdrop of supply-chain diversification efforts and rising geopolitical concerns about dependence on China, several Southeast Asian suppliers gained substantial ground. Vietnamese exports to the EU surged from €2.8 million to €25 million (+779.5%), while Malaysian imports rose from €1.1 million to €5.3 million (+360.4%). These trends are consistent with the broader relocation of electronics and telecom equipment manufacturing to Southeast Asia, partly driven by manufacturers seeking to mitigate tariff and sanctions risks associated with Chinese-origin goods.

2.3. The United Kingdom's role as an import and export partner declined sharply

The UK, which was the EU's second-largest import source (€58 million in 2015) and its top export destination (€151 million), saw both flows collapse. UK-origin imports fell to €8.5 million (–85.2%) and exports to the UK declined to €23 million (–84.5%). This dramatic decline is partly attributable to Brexit-related trade friction and partly to the UK's own shift in sourcing patterns following its departure from the EU customs union.

2.4. EU imports became more concentrated by value despite geographic diversification

The import HHI by value rose slightly from 2,853 to 2,918 (+2.3%), while the import HHI by volume increased more notably from 3,838 to 4,941 (+28.7%). This indicates that although new suppliers entered the market, the bulk of trade value and especially physical volume remained concentrated among a small number of origins — primarily China. The export HHI, while lower, rose from 770 to 1,076 (+39.8%), reflecting the fact that EU exports became concentrated among fewer destination markets as several major partners (notably Russia and Iran) disappeared from the picture entirely.

3. Geopolitical shocks, price surges, and rising vulnerability

The decade was marked by several geopolitical events that produced sharp disruptions in base station trade flows, as well as a broader structural increase in the EU's vulnerability to supply disruptions.

3.1. EU exports to Russia collapsed to near zero following sanctions

The most dramatic geopolitical disruption was the virtual elimination of EU exports to Russia. From a peak of €189 million, Russian-bound shipments fell to just €1,648 in 2025 (–100.0%). Russia had been the EU's single largest export market for base stations in 2015 (€180 million), and its loss represents a major structural change in the export landscape. Similarly, exports to Iran fell from €19 million to €107,000 (–99.4%), reflecting sanctions-related restrictions. These two markets alone accounted for roughly €200 million in lost annual export value.

3.2. Significant price shocks were detected in UK and US trade flows

The shock detection analysis identified three major price anomalies:

The 2022 UK import price shock (+608%) and the 2022 US import price shock (+240%) both coincide with the post-COVID supply chain disruptions and the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which together created significant upward pressure on equipment prices. The 2019 UK export price shock (+285%) may reflect a compositional shift toward higher-value equipment or pre-Brexit stockpiling effects. These shocks are consistent with the broader pattern of rising unit prices: the EU's import price per tonne rose from €21,218 to €55,225 (+160.3%), while export prices rose even more steeply.

3.3. Several partner relationships exhibited high volatility

The coefficient of variation analysis reveals that certain trade relationships were highly volatile over the period. On the import side, Hong Kong (CV 2.26), Malaysia (CV 1.21), and Switzerland (CV 1.10) showed the greatest instability. On the export side, Iran (CV 2.33), the UAE (CV 1.76), Ukraine (CV 1.77), and Morocco (CV 1.44) were the most volatile, reflecting geopolitical disruptions and the sensitivity of these markets to sanctions and conflict. China, by contrast, was the most stable import partner (CV 0.45), consistent with its role as the EU's anchor supplier.

3.4. The EU's structural vulnerability in base station supply increased

Multiple indicators point to a growing structural vulnerability for the EU in this product category. Trade intensity (the sum of imports and exports as a share of apparent consumption) declined from 62% to 45%, but this masks a qualitative shift: the EU now depends on imports for a product it once produced and exported at scale. The export propensity collapse from 57% to 27% confirms that the EU's domestic production is increasingly oriented toward its own internal market rather than global competitiveness. The concentration of specialisation in a small number of member states — Hungary (RSCA 0.90), Finland (0.36), Denmark (0.32) — further concentrates production risk within the bloc.

Conclusion

The EU's base station market (CN 851761) has undergone a profound structural transformation between 2015 and 2025. The bloc transitioned from a position of strong net export competitiveness — producing over €5 billion worth of equipment domestically and exporting nearly €1 billion annually — to one of net import dependence, with domestic production collapsing by 87.5% and exports falling by 84.1%. The disappearance of major export markets (Russia, Iran, and to a lesser extent the UK) removed over €200 million in annual demand, while the rise of Asian suppliers, particularly Vietnam and Malaysia, reshaped the import landscape around a China-centric core. Price shocks, especially in 2019 and 2022, underscored the market's sensitivity to geopolitical and supply-chain disruptions. The overall picture is one of a sector where the EU has lost significant manufacturing capacity and global market share, becoming more reliant on external suppliers for a critical piece of telecommunications infrastructure. This shift carries implications for the EU's strategic autonomy in digital infrastructure, a concern that is likely to remain central to industrial and trade policy discussions in the years ahead.