Market evolution: Cold-rolled steel coils (CN 72091690) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in cold-rolled, non-alloy steel coils of 1–3 mm thickness (customs code 72091690) over the period 2015–2025. This product is a key input for automotive, construction, and appliance manufacturing. Over the decade, the EU's trade position in this commodity has shifted significantly: the trade deficit has nearly doubled, export volumes have halved, and the geography of imports has been dramatically reconfigured. Three interlocking dynamics stand out — a structural deterioration of the trade balance driven by diverging volumes and prices, a radical reshuffling of import supply origins away from China and towards Asian and Near Eastern producers, and a growing concentration of export capacity within a small number of EU member states. The following sections develop each of these findings in detail.

I. A Widening Trade Deficit Under Rising Price Pressure

The most striking headline from the decade is the near-doubling of the EU's trade deficit in this product. Behind this aggregate figure, however, lie sharply divergent trajectories on the import and export sides — in terms of both volume and price.

The trade balance deteriorated from €–312 million to €–617 million

Over the full period, the EU's trade deficit in CN 72091690 expanded by nearly 98%, moving from –€311.8 million in 2015 to –€616.9 million in 2025. At its widest, the deficit reached –€909.8 million (in the intervening years), while at its narrowest it stood at –€103.0 million.

Export volumes collapsed while import volumes held relatively steady

The deficit widened primarily because EU exports suffered a dramatic volume contraction. Export quantities fell from 534,804 tonnes to 258,457 tonnes — a decline of 51.7%. By contrast, import quantities declined only modestly, from 1,361,256 tonnes to 1,294,559 tonnes (–4.9%). The EU thus continued to absorb roughly similar volumes from abroad even as its own outbound shipments shrank by half.

Price inflation masked the severity of the volume shock on both sides

A sustained rise in unit values — of 42.7% for exports (from €559/t to €797/t) and 41.7% for imports (from €449/t to €636/t) — partially cushioned the value-side impact of falling export volumes. Without this price effect, the deterioration of the trade balance would have been far more severe. The convergence of import and export unit prices is also notable: while EU exporters still command a premium (€797/t vs. €636/t in 2025), the gap has narrowed from €110/t in 2015 to €162/t in 2025, suggesting that import pricing has risen faster in relative terms — likely reflecting both raw material inflation and the reorientation towards higher-cost supplier origins.

II. A Radical Reorientation of Import Supply Sources

Perhaps the most consequential structural change over the decade has been the transformation of the EU's import geography. Traditional suppliers have been displaced, new sources have surged, and the overall supply base has become more diversified — though not without new concentrations emerging.

China's share of EU imports collapsed from dominance to marginality

In 2015, China was by far the EU's largest single import source, supplying €254.7 million — more than any other partner. By 2025, Chinese imports had fallen to just €25.4 million, a decline of 90.0%. This collapse coincides with the imposition of EU trade defence measures (anti-dumping and countervailing duties) on Chinese steel products from 2017–2018 onward, as well as broader geopolitical decoupling dynamics.

India, South Korea, Taiwan, and Türkiye filled the vacuum

The retrenchment of Chinese supply opened the door for several alternative suppliers, which collectively more than compensated for the loss:

Taiwan's growth from under €1 million to €122 million is particularly striking, as is Türkiye's emergence from a negligible base to nearly €69 million. South Korea and India both multiplied their sales to the EU roughly fivefold.

Brexit sharply reduced trade with the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom's departure from the EU single market had a dramatic effect on both sides of the ledger. UK imports into the EU fell from €61.6 million to €2.5 million (–95.9%), while EU exports to the UK declined from €54.3 million to €34.2 million (–37.0%). The asymmetric impact — near-total loss of UK imports but only partial loss of exports — may reflect the UK's own steel trade defence posture and sourcing shifts post-Brexit.

The import concentration index (HHI) halved, confirming diversification

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for import concentration fell from 2,524 in 2015 to 1,212 in 2025 (–52.0%). In 2015, with China accounting for a dominant share, the market was classified as "moderately concentrated" by competition standards. By 2025, the supply base is considerably more dispersed. This diversification reduces single-source dependency risk but has also introduced new sources of price and delivery volatility (see below).

III. Structural Reconfiguration of EU Production and Export Capacity

Alongside the import-side transformation, the EU's own production structure and export profile have undergone significant changes. Domestic production figures have grown substantially, export geography has shifted, and trade with certain partners has become markedly more volatile.

Reported EU production volumes increased substantially

According to PRODCOM data, EU production of this product (as measured by proxy code 24104110) grew from 838,163 tonnes to 5,720,000 tonnes (+582%), with production value rising from €293 million to €4,490 million (+1,433%). While this headline growth is extraordinary, it should be interpreted with caution: improved reporting coverage across EU member states over the period may account for a significant share of the apparent increase. Nevertheless, the trajectory is consistent with capacity expansions in several member states, particularly those that have also grown their import volumes (e.g., Belgium and Poland).

Belgium consolidated its position as the EU's primary trade hub

Among EU reporting countries, Belgium stands out on both sides of the trade ledger. Belgian imports surged from €162.7 million to €336.0 million (+106.6%), making it the EU's largest import destination — absorbing over 40% of total EU imports by value. Belgium also remained the EU's largest exporter (€60.7 million in 2025), though its export value declined by 20.5%. With a revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) of 0.63 and a production share of 37.8%, Belgium is by far the most specialised EU producer of this steel grade.

Export capacity became more geographically concentrated within the EU

While the import supply base diversified, the opposite occurred on the export side. The export HHI rose from 1,049 to 1,719 (+64.0%), indicating that EU exports became concentrated in fewer member states. Several traditional exporters saw sharp declines: Italy (–89.4%), Romania (–98.3%), Spain (–55.4%), and Germany (–51.3%). Only Sweden (+22.2%) and, to a lesser extent, Belgium and Türkiye (as a destination) bucked the trend. This growing concentration raises questions about the resilience of EU export capacity in the event of disruptions in a small number of member states.

Import volatility intensified with the rise of new suppliers

The volatility analysis reveals that the new import supply sources are significantly more volatile than the ones they replaced. Russian imports show a coefficient of variation (CV) of 2.71, Chinese imports 2.10, and Taiwanese imports 0.92 — all well above the volatility of traditional European or developed-country suppliers. A price shock in Chinese imports around 2018 (with an abnormality score of 82.4 and a price shift of +1,350%) coincided with the period of trade defence enforcement. On the export side, price shocks were detected in trade with the United States (2021, +82.2% price shift) and Türkiye (2021, +51.0%), likely reflecting post-pandemic supply chain disruptions and the global steel price spike of that year.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in cold-rolled steel coils (CN 72091690) has undergone a profound transformation between 2015 and 2025. The trade deficit has nearly doubled to €617 million, driven by a halving of export volumes that was only partially offset by price increases. The import landscape has been redrawn: China's near-total displacement as a supplier — from €255 million to €25 million — has been offset by the rapid rise of India, South Korea, Taiwan, and Türkiye, making the import base more diversified but also more volatile. Within the EU, Belgium has consolidated its role as the dominant trade hub, while several member states have retreated from the export market, concentrating outbound trade flows. These shifts reflect the combined impact of EU trade defence policy, Brexit, post-pandemic market dynamics, and the broader strategic reorientation of global steel supply chains. Looking ahead, the sustainability of the EU's position will depend on whether its domestic production base can recover export competitiveness, and whether the newly diversified import sources prove resilient or give way to new supply disruptions.