Market evolution: Cold rolled steel coil (CN 72091790) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report analyses the trade performance of CN 72091790 — flat-rolled, cold-reduced non-alloy steel coils of 0.5–1 mm thickness — across the European Union's external trade with non-EU partners between 2015 and 2025. This product is a fundamental semi-finished steel input used in automotive, appliance, construction, and general manufacturing supply chains.

The period under review spans major disruptions to the EU steel sector: the EU's anti-dumping actions against Chinese steel (2016–2018), the US Section 232 tariffs (2018), the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021), the global steel price spike of 2021–2022, and the energy and supply-chain fallout from the Russia–Ukraine war (2022–2023). The decade closed with an EU trade deficit that had widened substantially, even as unit values rose and the structure of trade partners was fundamentally reshaped.

1. A Widening Structural Deficit and the Divergence of Volume and Value

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the simultaneous collapse of EU export volumes and the sustained growth of import values, despite falling import volumes. This points to a structural reorientation of the EU's position in this product segment.

1.1. Export volumes fell by more than half while import volumes held up

Over the period, EU exports of CN 72091790 declined from 420,685 tonnes in 2015 to 179,999 tonnes in 2025 — a contraction of 57.2%. Import volumes, by contrast, fell only 14.4%, from 1,108,450 tonnes to 948,834 tonnes. The EU's trade deficit in value terms widened from −€282 million to −€477 million (+69.4% in absolute terms).

Source: General Overview

The key insight is that the decline in export volumes was far steeper than the decline in imports. EU producers increasingly ceded the lower- and mid-range segments of this product to foreign competitors, while retaining — or even growing — their position in higher-value niches.

1.2. Unit values rose sharply, but exporters gained more price ground than importers

Both import and export unit values rose substantially over the decade, driven by raw-material inflation, energy-price shocks, and the global supply dislocations of 2021–2022. However, the EU maintained a persistent export price premium over imports:

Export unit values rose 46.1% over the decade (from €528/t to €772/t), while import unit values rose 43.5% (from €452/t to €649/t). The widening price differential is consistent with EU producers increasingly specialising in higher-specification, higher-margin product grades.

1.3. The EU was already a net importer before the period — the deficit simply deepened

The trade deficit was negative throughout the entire period (2015–2025), meaning the EU never achieved self-sufficiency in this product during the review window. The deficit fluctuated, reaching its narrowest point around −€112 million and its widest at approximately −€672 million. By 2025, the deficit stood at −€477 million — well above the 2015 starting point, indicating a structural dependence on external supply that has not been reversed.

2. A Complete Reorientation of the Import Partner Landscape

If the trade balance tells the macro story, the partner composition reveals the micro-level transformation. The EU's import sources underwent a near-total restructuring over the decade, driven by trade-defence policy, geopolitical realignment, and the rise of new production centres.

2.1. China and the United Kingdom collapsed as import sources

In 2015, China and the United Kingdom were the two largest non-EU suppliers of CN 72091790 to the EU, together accounting for €243 million in import value — nearly half of all non-EU imports.

By 2025, their combined share had fallen to just €13 million:

China's decline was the direct consequence of EU anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures imposed from 2016 onwards, which made Chinese cold-rolled steel coils significantly less price-competitive. The shock-detection data confirms a severe price abnormality in Chinese imports around 2018, with import prices surging by 852.8% relative to prior norms — consistent with the implementation of duties.

The UK's near-total disappearance from EU import statistics reflects the combined impact of Brexit (effective January 2021), the introduction of customs formalities, rules-of-origin requirements, and the UK's own steel safeguard measures. The UK share fell from €91 million to under €1 million.

2.2. India, South Korea, Türkiye, and Taiwan filled the vacuum

The void left by China and the UK was filled by a new group of suppliers that collectively grew from €116 million to €442 million:

Source: Top partners by value

India's rise to become the single largest non-EU supplier (€153.9M) is particularly notable. India's massive steelmaking capacity expansion — and its cost competitiveness in basic flat products — positioned it well to capture market share following the closure of the China channel. South Korea, already a significant supplier in 2015, more than doubled its value.

The most dramatic relative growth came from Taiwan (+8,823%) and Türkiye (+2,270%). Both are mid-range steel producers that were marginal suppliers in 2015 but became major players by 2025, likely benefiting from capacity modernisation and trade-agreement advantages (in the case of Türkiye, via the EU–Türkiye customs union). Ukraine's growth, despite the ongoing conflict, reflects the EU's deliberate policy to support Ukrainian industry through trade facilitation.

2.3. Import concentration fell as sourcing diversified

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of import concentration by value declined from 2,114 to 1,422 (−32.7%). While an HHI of ~1,400 still indicates a moderately concentrated market (the conventional threshold for "unconcentrated" is below 1,500), the direction of travel is clearly towards greater diversification.

This has strategic significance: the EU reduced its dependence on any single supplier, and particularly on China, which had previously been the dominant origin. The new structure, with five or six significant suppliers, is more resilient to single-country disruptions — though it does create new dependencies (on Indian, Korean, and Turkish supply flows).

2.4. Export partnerships remained relatively stable but smaller in scale

On the export side, the EU's main destinations changed less dramatically, reflecting the fact that export volumes were declining rather than shifting:

Mexico stands out as a growth market (+95.7%), potentially reflecting nearshoring dynamics and Mexico's integration into global manufacturing supply chains. Morocco's decline (−87.3%) may reflect political and trade-policy shifts in the North African market. The UK and Switzerland, as geographically proximate markets, remained relatively stable.

2.5. EU export concentration rose — a sign of shrinking market breadth

In contrast to imports, the export HHI increased from 960 to 1,376 (+43.4%). This indicates that as export volumes contracted, EU exports became more concentrated in fewer destination markets. The combination of declining volumes and rising concentration suggests that EU producers were progressively retreating from marginal export markets and focusing on their most loyal or highest-value customers.

3. Domestic Specialisation, Capacity Investment, and Supply Vulnerability

Beyond the trade-flow data, the period reveals important developments in the EU's domestic production structure and the vulnerability profile of its supply chains.

3.1. A handful of EU member states dominated both imports and exports

The intra-EU picture is one of strong geographic concentration. On the import side, Italy (€171M), Belgium (€156M), and Spain (€147M) together accounted for the lion's share of non-EU imports in 2025, up from €271M combined in 2015 — a 76% increase:

Source: Top reporters by value

The Netherlands' collapse from €29M to €0.1M (−99.7%) is striking and may reflect a shift in that country's role from importer/distributor to re-exporter, or the relocation of procurement activity to other EU hubs.

On the export side, Belgium maintained its position as the leading EU exporter (€52.7M, stable), while traditional producers Germany (−64.2%), Italy (−79.9%), and Spain (−82.5%) saw steep declines. Sweden was a notable exception, growing exports from €12M to €21M (+71.0%).

3.2. The EU revealed a clear pattern of specialisation — Belgium, Austria, and Sweden led

The specialisation data for 2025 shows that a small number of EU member states had a strong comparative advantage (RSCA > 0) in this product:

Conversely, Croatia (RSCA −0.993), Denmark (−0.984), and Hungary (−0.982) had virtually no specialisation, indicating that these countries neither produce nor trade this product competitively.

This pattern is consistent with the geography of the EU's integrated steel industry: Belgium (with ArcelorMittal's major facilities), Austria (with Voestalpine), and Sweden (with SSAB) are home to advanced flat-rolled steel production, while Central and Eastern European members remain largely dependent on imports for this product grade.

3.3. EU production expanded — but the figures warrant caution

The data shows a remarkable increase in EU domestic production: production volume grew from 838 million kg in 2015 to 5,720 million kg in 2025 (+582%), and production value from €293 million to €4,490 million (+1,433%). While some of this growth is real — reflecting capacity expansions, particularly in the early period — the magnitude of the increase (an order of magnitude) suggests that definitional or reporting-methodology changes in the Prodcom classification may also play a role. The data should therefore be interpreted as directionally indicative of growth rather than as precise absolute figures.

3.4. Price shocks clustered in 2018 and 2021, with distinct causes

The shock-detection analysis identified three significant price abnormality events:

The 2018 Chinese import shock is directly attributable to the EU's anti-dumping duties, which dramatically altered the cost base of Chinese steel entering the EU market.

The 2021 US export shock coincides with the post-COVID global steel price spike and the pent-up demand release in US infrastructure and manufacturing. The abnormality score of 257.5 — the highest in the dataset — indicates an extreme deviation from normal pricing patterns. This event affected 11.1% of EU export value, making it commercially significant.

3.5. Supply-chain volatility was highest for the most geopolitically sensitive origins

The coefficient of variation (CV) of import flows from different partners reveals stark differences in supply reliability:

Russia and China — both subject to sanctions, trade-defence measures, or geopolitical disruption — show the highest volatility. By contrast, South Korea (CV 0.15) and India (CV 0.35) emerge as the most reliable supply sources among major partners, which may partly explain their growing market share.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in cold-rolled steel coils (CN 72091790) underwent a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. The period opened with China and the UK as the dominant non-EU suppliers and closed with India, South Korea, Türkiye, and Taiwan in their place — a near-complete reorientation of the import landscape driven by trade-defence policy and geopolitical shifts.

The EU's structural trade deficit widened to −€477 million in 2025, as export volumes collapsed by 57% while import volumes held up more firmly. However, the price premium that EU exporters command over imports grew, suggesting that EU producers are retreating to higher-value, more specialised segments of the market — a pattern confirmed by the strong specialisation indices of Belgium, Austria, and Sweden.

The concentration of imports has declined (HHI from 2,114 to 1,422), offering greater supply resilience, but new dependencies on Indian, Korean, and Turkish sources are emerging. Export concentration has risen (HHI from 960 to 1,376), reflecting a narrowing of the EU's external customer base.

Looking ahead, the key risks are: (i) the durability of trade-defence measures protecting the EU market from Chinese overcapacity; (ii) the energy-cost competitiveness of EU producers in a context of ongoing decarbonisation pressures; and (iii) the potential for supply disruption from new dominant partners, particularly if geopolitical tensions escalate in Asia or the Eastern Mediterranean.