Market evolution: Basic refractory bricks (CN 690210) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of EU trade in basic refractory bricks and ceramic constructional goods (Customs code 690210 — products containing over 50% by weight of MgO, CaO, or Cr₂O₃) over the period 2015–2025. These products are critical inputs for high-temperature industrial processes, notably in the steel, cement, glass, and non-ferrous metals sectors.
Over the decade under review, the EU's position in this market has shifted markedly. The overall trade data reveals a structural transformation: the EU has moved from a position of robust net exporter toward growing import dependence, with domestic production volumes declining sharply while prices have risen. Three main dynamics — which form the backbone of the sections below — stand out.
1. A Production Decline Masked by Rising Unit Values
Domestic production volumes fell by nearly two-thirds
EU production quantities collapsed from 1,369,510 tonnes in the first year of the dataset to 478,510 tonnes in the last — a decline of 65.1%. In contrast, production value decreased by a much more modest 18.5% (from €782M to €638M). This divergence indicates that EU producers have significantly increased their average output prices, pointing to either a move up the value chain, cost-pressure pass-through, or both.
Export volumes declined steeply, but prices compensated
Over the same period, EU exports told a similar story:
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (EUR) | 316,352,046 | 265,612,931 | –16.0% |
| Export volume (tonnes) | 292,908 | 162,067 | –44.7% |
| Unit export price (EUR/t) | 1,080 | 1,639 | +51.7% |
EU export volumes nearly halved over the decade. Yet, export value contracted by only 16% because unit prices rose by over 50%. This suggests that the EU has retr
This report examines the evolution of EU trade in basic refractory bricks and ceramic constructional goods (CN 690210) over the period spanning 2015 to 2025. This product category — refractory bricks, blocks, tiles and similar refractory ceramic constructional goods containing more than 50% by weight of MgO, CaO or Cr₂O₃ — is a foundation of heavy industry, supplying the steel, cement, glass, and non-ferrous metals sectors where extreme-temperature linings are essential.
The overall trade picture reveals a period of profound structural change. EU export volumes contracted by nearly half, while imports more than doubled in value. The deficit structurally widened, production collapsed, and reliance on China deepened. Three major dynamics emerge from the data and form the basis of the sections below.
1. A Shrunken EU Export Base with Rising Prices
Export volumes fell by nearly half while unit prices surged
The most striking feature of the decade is the sharp contraction in EU export volumes. Export data shows that the EU exported 292,908 tonnes in 2015 but only 162,067 tonnes in 2025 — a decline of 44.7%. In value terms, exports fell from approximately €316 million to €266 million (–16.0%). The much milder contraction in value compared to volume is explained by a 51.7% rise in average unit prices, from roughly €1,080/t to €1,639/t.
This pattern — volumes collapsing while prices rise — suggests a selective retreat: EU producers likely abandoned lower-margin product segments and export destinations while retaining higher-value niches, filtering in part through. The price increase also reflects wider macro cost pressures (energy, raw materials) that have characterized European manufacturing since the post-pandemic period and the 2022 energy crisis.
Austria and Germany remain the EU's export pillars, but France exited almost entirely
The exporter breakdown by EU Member State identifies Austria and Germany as the dominant exporters by value:
| EU Exporter | Exports 2015 (EUR) | Exports 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 148,378,319 | 110,658,136 | –25.4% |
| Germany | 122,143,460 | 92,340,304 | –24.4% |
| Spain | 6,020,445 | 35,921,786 | +496.7% |
| Poland | 13,538,250 | 10,686,933 | –21.1% |
| France | 11,363,115 | 469,214 | –95.9% |
France's near-complete withdrawal from the export market stands out, with a 95.9% decline in export value. Spain, by contrast, dramatically increased its export footprint by nearly a factor of six, emerging as a more significant player. Meanwhile, Austria and Germany, though still dominant, each saw roughly a quarter of their export value erode.
The EU's specialisation profile confirms a concentrated production landscape
Specialisation data for 2025 reveals that Austria dominates EU production with a Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) of 0.74 and controls over 22% of EU production. Slovakia (RSCA 0.49, 6% of production) and Spain (RSCA 0.43, 15% of production) are the other notable specialised producers. Several smaller Member States — including Denmark, Latvia, and Lithuania — have no meaningful domestic production at all.
2. Import Dependence Shifted Dramatically Toward China
Imports nearly doubled in value and grew by 65% in volume
While the EU's export capacity contracted, its imports surged. Import value rose from €34 million in 2015 to €67 million in 2025 — a 97.9% increase. Import volumes grew by 64.5% (from 44,525 tonnes to 73,230 tonnes), while unit prices gained 20.3%.
Importantly, imports peaked at around €101 million (in value terms) before declining to the 2025 level, indicating that the most acute phase of import growth occurred roughly between 2019 and 2023, coinciding with the post-COVID industrial recovery, the European energy crisis, and supply-chain reconfigurations.
China emerged as the overwhelmingly dominant import supplier
The partner breakdown reveals how dramatically China's share of EU imports grew:
| Supplier | Imports 2015 (EUR) | Imports 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 23,462,410 | 54,578,435 | +132.6% |
| Russian Federation | 728,697 | 9,850,038 | +1,251.7% |
| India | 1,407,623 | 4,859,479 | +245.2% |
| United States | 1,078,885 | 1,552,740 | +43.9% |
| Japan | 1,584,850 | 1,808,882 | +14.1% |
China alone went from accounting for roughly two-thirds of EU basic refractory brick imports at the start of the period to capturing the vast majority by 2025. The Russian Federation also saw a massive proportional spike (+1,252%), though its absolute volumes remain far smaller than China's — and the trajectory may reflect pre-sanctions trading patterns being replaced by third-country transshipment or residual flows.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index for imports confirms this trend: it rose from 4,939 in 2015 to 6,650 in 2025 (+34.6%). While HHI values above 2,500 generally indicate high concentration, values near 6,650 signify an import market that is structurally dependent on a very small number of foreign sources — predominantly China.
Post-2022 energy crisis triggered a price shock in Chinese imports
Shock detection identifies 2022 as a pivotal year. The most significant supply shock detected was a price shock in Chinese imports (centered on 2022), with an abnormality score of 11.5 and a year-on-year price shift of +49.5%. Given China's ~94% share of the import value in the affected year, this shock reverberated throughout the EU import market.
This aligns with the broader 2022 energy and materials crisis in Europe, during which both domestic and imported refractory products saw fierce price escalation linked to rising energy input costs in producing countries and worldwide demand for high-temperature industrial materials.
Between EU importers, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland saw the most dramatic increases:
| EU Importer | Imports 2015 (EUR) | Imports 2025 (EUR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Netherlands | 3,784,864 | 13,088,414 | +245.8% |
| Belgium | 2,969,381 | 12,485,095 | +320.5% |
| Finland | 501,050 | 3,279,566 | +554.5% |
| Italy | 3,068,200 | 7,179,596 | +134.0% |
Finland's explosive increase (+555%) may reflect demand linked to expanded metals processing capacity. Belgium and the Netherlands, as major logistics hubs, may partly reflect warehousing and re-distribution rather than final domestic consumption.
3. Structural Shift Toward Import Dependence and Increased Exposure
Net import reliance deteriorated significantly
A key measure of the EU's strategic position is the net import reliance, which captures how much of domestic demand is met by imports minus exports. Over the period:
| Indicator | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net import reliance (%) | –51.6% | –73.3% | –42.1%* |
| Trade intensity (%) | 39.2% | 57.2% | +45.7% |
| Export propensity (%) | 37.3% | 52.7% | +41.4% |
The net import reliance figure is negative (indicating the EU remained a net exporter throughout), but it moved from –51.6% to –73.3%, meaning the gap between exports and imports relative to demand narrowed substantially. The net export surplus shrank by 29.8% in value terms (from €282M to €198M).
Meanwhile, trade intensity — the share of trade in total production — climbed from 39.2% to 57.2%, confirming that the EU's domestic production base has shrunk faster than trade has contracted, pushing greater weight onto international supply chains. Indeed, EU production volumes in tonnes dropped by 65.1%, from approximately 1.37 billion kg to 479 million kg — a far steeper decline than either export or import flows, indicating that domestic demand was increasingly met from foreign sources.
Import concentration deepened the EU's vulnerability
The rising import HHI (from 4,939 to 6,650) is concerning from a supply-security standpoint. By contrast, the export HHI remained much lower (617 at end-period) and rose only moderately (+61%), reflecting that EU exporters ship to a diversified set of partners.
The contrast is stark: EU exports are geographically diversified and relatively resilient, while EU imports have become dangerously concentrated on a single dominant supplier — China. In a period of heightened geopolitical tension and trade-policy uncertainty (including EU anti-dumping investigations on Chinese refractory products), this concentration represents a material vulnerability for European industry.
Import-weighted instability compounded the risk
Analysis of trade volatility shows that the coefficient of variation for Chinese imports was relatively low (0.20), confirming China as a steady — but dominant — supplier. However, several smaller suppliers exhibit very high volatility (coefficients above 0.85), such as the Russian Federation (0.86), Brazil (1.03), and Thailand (1.09), indicating that diversifying away from China toward these markets would bring its own instability risks.
Conclusion
Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU market for basic refractory bricks (CN 690210) underwent a structural transformation characterised by three reinforcing trends: a severe contraction in domestic production capacity, a corresponding surge in import dependence heavily weighted toward China, and a retreat in export volumes that was only partially offset by higher unit values.
The EU's domestic production fell by over 60% in volume, and its net export surplus shrank by nearly 30% in value. While Austria and Germany maintained their positions as the EU's principal exporters — and Spain emerged as a notable new actor on the export side — France's near-total withdrawal and the concentration of production in only a handful of Member States narrowed the EU's industrial base in this sector significantly.
At the import end, China's dominance grew from an already-strong position to near-hegemonic levels, with the import Herfindahl index rising to levels indicating extreme supply concentration. The 2022 energy crisis amplified these dynamics, triggering acute price shocks that rippled through the market.
For European policymakers and downstream industrial consumers, the trajectory of CN 690210 underscores an important strategic question: whether the EU's declining production footprint in a product category critical to steel, cement, and metals processing represents a tolerable market adjustment — driven by comparative advantage and cost structures — or a supply-chain vulnerability requiring targeted industrial policy intervention. The answer likely depends on the durability of current geopolitical conditions and the degree to which alternative suppliers beyond China can credibly scale.