Market evolution: Basic pig iron (CN 720110) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the trade dynamics of non-alloy pig iron in primary forms containing ≤ 0.5 % phosphorus (CN 720110) for the European Union over the period 2015–2025. Pig iron is a critical upstream input for the European steel industry, and the EU has historically relied heavily on external suppliers to cover its demand. Over the decade examined, the market experienced significant shifts driven by collapsing domestic production, geopolitical realignment of supply chains (notably following the Russia–Ukraine conflict), and a secular rise in import dependency. The report is structured around three main themes: the EU's deepening structural trade deficit, the reconfiguration of the supplier base, and the vulnerability implications of declining domestic output and increasing price shocks.

1. A deepening structural trade deficit sustained by rising unit values

The EU's import bill remained high despite shrinking volumes

Over the 2015–2025 period, EU imports of CN 720110 from non-EU countries shifted from a value of €864 million to €909 million, an increase of +5.2 %. However, this apparent stability masks a more dramatic underlying trend: import volumes fell from 3.04 million tonnes to 2.49 million tonnes (–18.1 %), while unit import prices rose from €285/t to €366/t (+28.4 %). In other words, the EU paid more for less physical material, reflecting both commodity-price inflation (especially during the 2021–2022 energy and steel crisis, when import prices peaked at €582/t) and a structural shift toward higher-cost suppliers.

Source: General Overview

Exports doubled but remain marginal relative to imports

EU exports of pig iron, while doubling in value from €17.5 million to €35.0 million (+100.3 %) and nearly doubling in volume (+87.6 %), represent a tiny fraction of the import bill — roughly 3.8 % of import value in 2025. The trade balance therefore remained stubbornly negative at around –€874 million in 2025. The modest rise in exports was largely driven by shipments to Türkiye (the top export destination, growing from €5.3 million to €20.8 million, +289.9 %) and India (from €0.4 million to €3.0 million, +571.5 %), suggesting niche re-export or surplus-offloading patterns rather than a competitive export position.

Net import reliance nearly reached 70 %

The net import reliance ratio rose from 46.2 % in 2015 to 67.7 % in 2025, peaking at 73.2 % in 2022 — the year of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the associated energy and supply-chain crisis. Trade intensity followed a similar trajectory, climbing from 47.3 % to 71.2 %. These figures confirm that the EU's dependence on external pig iron suppliers has become a defining structural feature of this market.

2. Geopolitical shocks reshaped the supplier landscape and diversified import sources

Russia's role diminished sharply after 2022

The Russian Federation was the EU's single largest supplier of pig iron throughout the period, accounting for €403 million in 2015 (47 % of total imports). Russian deliveries peaked at €627 million before declining sharply to €246 million in 2025 (–39.0 % from the first period). This decline is directly attributable to the EU sanctions imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Despite this contraction, Russia remained the top individual supplier in 2025, suggesting that sanctions carved out but did not fully eliminate Russian pig iron from EU supply chains, possibly through continued flows in specific product sub-segments or transitional arrangements.

Ukraine remained resilient despite the war

Ukraine, the second-largest supplier, maintained a remarkably stable import value over the decade — from €208 million in 2015 to €209 million in 2025 (+0.4 %). However, this headline stability hides considerable volatility: the value ranged from a low of €80 million to a high of €460 million across the period, and Ukraine exhibited a coefficient of variation of 0.49 in import values. A notable price shock was detected in 2021, with a 56.3 % price shift and an abnormality score of 15.0, likely reflecting the pre-war escalation and energy-price spike. Ukraine's persistence as a supplier despite active conflict underscores both the strategic importance of its pig iron capacity and EU efforts to maintain access.

Source: Top partners by value

South Africa, Brazil and Canada filled the gap

The most striking growth came from South Africa (+189.6 %, from €46 million to €133 million) and Canada (+81.6 %, from €13 million to €23 million). Brazil, already a significant supplier, grew by 34.9 % to €199 million. These three countries, alongside Norway and Serbia, represent the diversification of EU pig iron sourcing away from Russia. South Africa's near-tripling is particularly noteworthy and likely reflects EU buyers actively seeking non-Russian blast-furnace-grade pig iron. Import concentration (HHI) fell from 3,086 to 1,992 (–35.4 %), confirming a genuine diversification of the import base.

Italy consolidated its position as the EU's main entry point

Within the EU, Italy was by far the largest importer, growing from €397 million to €518 million (+30.7 %) and accounting for 57 % of all EU pig iron imports by value in 2025. The Netherlands held second position (€147 million → €173 million), while Spain grew modestly (+15.9 %). Germany, once a significant importer at €67 million, collapsed to just €11 million (–84.1 %), reflecting both the restructuring of its steel industry and its particular exposure to Russian supply disruption. Conversely, Latvia surged from a negligible €0.2 million to €35 million (+14,268 %), likely reflecting transit flows from Russia or Ukraine through Baltic logistics channels.

Source: Top reporters by value

3. Collapsing domestic production and rising vulnerability expose structural fragility

EU domestic production declined dramatically

Perhaps the most striking statistic in the dataset is the reported collapse of EU domestic pig iron production: from 29.8 billion kg (approximately 29.8 million tonnes) in the first period to just 800 million kg (0.8 million tonnes) in the last — a –97.3 % decline. Production value fell from €2.04 billion to €400 million (–80.4 %). While some of this decline may reflect changes in statistical reporting or the inclusion of spiegeleisen in earlier figures, the scale of the drop is consistent with the well-documented wave of blast-furnace closures across Europe driven by decarbonisation policy, high energy costs, and the shift toward electric-arc-furnace steelmaking. This collapse in domestic output is the primary driver of the rising import reliance documented above.

Product-level data reveals a structural shift in the import mix

Breaking down imports by sub-product reveals important compositional changes:

The dominant sub-product (72011090, low-manganese pig iron) declined modestly in volume but remained overwhelmingly the largest category, accounting for over half of total import volume. Sub-product 72011030 (medium manganese) surged by +58.6 %, suggesting growing demand for this grade. In contrast, the high-manganese, low-silicon grade (72011011) collapsed from 781 kt to 178 kt (–77.2 %), indicating either a shift in downstream processing requirements or the loss of specific supplier sources.

Export concentration increased while the EU remained a marginal exporter

While import concentration fell (HHI from 3,086 to 1,992), export concentration rose sharply (HHI from 1,799 to 3,878, +115.5 %). This reflects the growing dominance of Germany (€25.6 million, 73 % of EU pig iron exports in 2025) and the Netherlands (€6.6 million) as the EU's sole meaningful export channels. Export propensity — the share of domestic production exported — rose from 1.3 % to 8.4 %, though in absolute terms this remains small. The rising trade intensity of 71.2 % in 2025, combined with the 67.7 % net import reliance, paints a picture of a market that is overwhelmingly dependent on external supply.

Price shocks underline supply-chain fragility

The volatility analysis reveals elevated price volatility across multiple supplier relationships. The most extreme shock detected was an export-price spike to the United States in 2022, with an abnormality score of 133.7 and a +1,813 % price shift — likely a one-off or small-volume transaction at an exceptional price during the post-invasion commodity turmoil. More structurally significant was the Ukraine import-price shock in 2021 (+56.3 % shift, abnormality 15.0) and the United Kingdom export-price shock in 2018 (+137.4 % shift). Several key import partners show high volatility coefficients: Serbia (0.63), South Africa (0.52), and Ukraine (0.49), indicating that even the emerging alternative suppliers deliver inconsistent pricing — a further vulnerability for EU buyers.

Conclusion

The EU's basic pig iron market between 2015 and 2025 was defined by three converging dynamics: a structural collapse in domestic production, a near-doubling of import dependency, and a geopolitical reconfiguration of the supplier base. Despite a –18 % decline in import volumes, the import bill barely changed due to a +28 % increase in unit prices. Russia's share fell sharply after 2022, but it remained the largest single supplier in 2025, while South Africa, Brazil, and Canada emerged as key alternatives. Italy consolidated its role as the EU's primary entry port, and Germany's role as both importer and exporter diminished significantly. With net import reliance at nearly 68 % and domestic production at a fraction of its former level, the EU's exposure to external supply disruptions — whether geopolitical, logistical, or price-driven — remains acute. The diversification of suppliers is a positive development, but the high volatility of newer sources and the continued reliance on conflict-affected supply chains suggest that strategic vulnerabilities persist.