Market evolution: Aluminium wire (CN 760511) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in non-alloy aluminium wire with a maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeding 7 mm (CN 760511) over the period 2015–2025. The EU is a structural net importer of this product, and the period under review has been marked by three overarching dynamics: a steep decline in domestic production, a dramatic reorientation of supply sources away from Russia towards new origins in Africa and Asia, and a sustained rise in both import volumes and unit prices that has roughly doubled the trade deficit. Together, these trends point to a market whose import reliance has deepened considerably over the decade.

1. A Widening Structural Deficit Fuelled by Domestic Production Collapse

EU production of non-alloy aluminium wire has contracted dramatically

According to production data, EU production fell from 175,677 tonnes at the start of the period to just 60,000 tonnes in the latest year — a decline of 65.8%. In value terms, production dropped from €425.7 million to €210.0 million (−50.7%), indicating that rising prices partially offset the volume collapse. This contraction reflects the broader structural challenges facing European aluminium smelting, including high energy costs and plant closures across the continent.

Imports have surged to compensate, while exports have withered

With domestic output shrinking, EU imports of CN 760511 rose from €490.8 million to €930.1 million (+89.5% in value). Import volumes grew more moderately, from 250,827 tonnes to 327,895 tonnes (+30.7%), with the remainder of the value increase driven by higher unit prices. Meanwhile, EU exports declined sharply in volume — from 26,674 tonnes to 17,098 tonnes (−35.9%) — though their value remained nearly flat at approximately €55.7 million thanks to unit price increases from €2,145/t to €3,258/t.

The trade deficit has more than doubled and net import reliance now approaches 78%

The EU's trade balance in this product deteriorated from −€433.6 million in 2015 to −€874.4 million in 2025, a deterioration of 101.7%. The deficit peaked at −€986.6 million in an intermediate year. Correspondingly, net import reliance climbed from 51.4% to 77.8% (with a peak of 83.1%), confirming that the EU now sources the vast majority of its non-alloy aluminium wire from outside the bloc.

2. Shifting Supply Chains: From Russia to Africa and Asia

Russia was displaced as a major supplier following sanctions

In 2015, the Russian Federation was the EU's third-largest import source for CN 760511, supplying €123.0 million. Russian imports peaked at €200.2 million in a prior year before collapsing to just €16.0 million in 2025 — a decline of 87.0%. This near-total withdrawal is consistent with EU sanctions on Russian aluminium following 2022, which disrupted what had been a highly significant trade relationship.

Mozambique, Malaysia, and Egypt emerged as replacement suppliers

The gap left by Russia was partially filled by new or expanded supply from several origins:

Mozambique's rise is the most striking: imports surged from €7.1 million to €129.8 million, making the country the EU's fourth-largest supplier by 2025. Malaysia grew from virtually nothing to €59.8 million. Both trajectories reflect the EU's active diversification away from Russian aluminium and towards producers in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Iceland and Norway, whose hydroelectric-powered smelters offer both scale and lower carbon intensity, remained the two dominant suppliers throughout, growing by 48.0% and 60.1% respectively.

Import concentration has fallen, signalling genuine diversification

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports declined from 2,086 to 1,295 (by value), a 37.9% drop that moves the market from a moderately concentrated structure to a more competitive one. The fall in HHI confirms that the loss of Russian supply was not replaced by a single alternative but by a broader set of origins, reducing single-partner dependency.

EU exports became more concentrated and increasingly directed towards the Western Balkans

On the export side, the HHI rose from 1,265 to 1,905 (+50.6%), indicating growing concentration. Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged as the largest export destination, with sales growing from €2.1 million to €18.6 million (+771.3%), while Serbia remained a stable buyer at approximately €11.1 million. Exports to Türkiye, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom all declined substantially over the period.

Among EU members, the Netherlands and Italy dominate import activity

Within the EU, the Netherlands was the largest importer throughout the period, growing from €206.0 million to €319.0 million (+54.8%). Italy, however, experienced the most dramatic growth, with imports surging from €25.9 million to €175.6 million (+577.4%), propelling it to the second-largest EU importer by 2025. Sweden (+104.0%), Poland (+78.1%), and Spain (+59.5%) also registered substantial increases. In terms of exports, Romania remained the leading EU exporter throughout the period despite a modest decline, while Hungary's exports tripled (+205.6%). Romania's role is underpinned by strong revealed comparative advantage (RSCA of 0.82), far ahead of any other member state.

3. Price Inflation, Supply Shocks, and Rising Exposure

Unit prices for aluminium wire have risen by roughly 45–50% across both flows

Over the decade, the EU's average import price increased from €1,957/t to €2,837/t (+45.0%), while export prices rose from €2,145/t to €3,258/t (+51.9%). These increases largely track the global rise in primary aluminium prices driven by energy-cost inflation, supply disruptions, and the post-COVID demand recovery. Import prices peaked at €3,191/t while export prices reached €3,485/t at their respective highs.

Several significant price shocks were detected during the period

The shock detection analysis identifies three notable events:

The Turkish import price shock in 2021 (an abnormality score of 9.9, the highest detected) likely reflects the combination of the global aluminium price spike and currency effects in Türkiye. The Ukrainian export price shock in 2022 coincides with the onset of the war, when trade with Ukraine became logistically disrupted and the product share of Ukraine in EU exports stood at 10.3% of value. The Mozambique import price shock in 2022 may reflect the costs associated with rapidly scaling up a new supply chain from a distant origin.

Supplier volatility varies enormously, highlighting asymmetric risk

The coefficient of variation in import values reveals a sharp contrast between stable Nordic suppliers and newer, more volatile origins:

Iceland and Norway stand out as the most reliable suppliers, with coefficients of variation of just 0.10 and 0.07 respectively. By contrast, several newer or smaller suppliers — including Malaysia (1.33), India (1.45), and the United Kingdom (1.22) — display high volatility, indicating that their contributions to EU supply have been erratic. This pattern underscores that while the EU has successfully diversified away from Russia, some of the replacement sources are considerably less stable in trade-flow terms.

Trade intensity and export propensity confirm deeper global integration

The EU's trade intensity for this product rose from 65.5% to 86.7%, while export propensity increased from 21.6% to 35.5%. These rising ratios are a direct consequence of the production collapse: with less domestic output, a greater share of internal consumption must be sourced from imports, and a larger fraction of residual output is directed to external markets. The export propensity indicator registered the highest salience score (78.96), suggesting that outward orientation — driven partly by demand from Western Balkan neighbours — has become the defining structural feature of the EU's external trade profile in this product.

Conclusion

The EU market for non-alloy aluminium wire (CN 760511) has undergone a profound transformation over the 2015–2025 period. Domestic production has halved in value and fallen by two-thirds in volume, forcing a near-doubling of import expenditure and pushing the trade deficit to €874 million. The most consequential supply-side shift has been the collapse of Russian imports — from €123 million to €16 million — which was absorbed not by a single replacement but by a diversification towards Iceland, Norway, Mozambique, Malaysia, and Egypt, successfully lowering import concentration (HHI down 38%). However, several of these new suppliers exhibit high trade-flow volatility, raising questions about long-term reliability. Unit prices have risen by approximately 45–50%, amplifying the cost of growing import dependency. With net import reliance now at nearly 78% and EU production continuing to shrink, the bloc's exposure to external supply dynamics — whether geopolitical sanctions, logistics disruptions, or global aluminium price swings — has become the central structural vulnerability of this market.