Market evolution: Aluminium alloy sheets (CN 76061292) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report analyses the EU's trade in aluminium alloy sheets and strip (CN 76061292) — flat-rolled products of aluminium alloys, between 0.2 mm and 3 mm thick, excluding coated, expanded or beverage-can stock — over the period 2015 to 2025. The data covers trade flows with non-EU partners, member-state specialisation, concentration, volatility and vulnerability indicators.
Over the decade, the EU's trade position in this product underwent a structural transformation. Once a strong net exporter with a trade surplus exceeding €1 billion, the bloc saw that surplus erode to roughly €141 million by 2025. The volume of exports fell by more than half, while unit values surged — a pattern consistent with a combination of rising energy costs, shifting global supply chains and the post-pandemic commodity price cycle.
1. The collapse of export volumes and the shift toward import dependence
1.1 EU exports halved in volume while import volumes held steady
The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the divergence between export and import trajectories.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exports — Value (€) | 1,909 M | 1,261 M | −33.9% |
| Exports — Volume (t) | 667,256 | 286,415 | −57.1% |
| Exports — Unit price (€/t) | 2,861 | 4,404 | +53.9% |
| Imports — Value (€) | 891 M | 1,120 M | +25.7% |
| Imports — Volume (t) | 310,268 | 309,272 | −0.3% |
| Imports — Unit price (€/t) | 2,872 | 3,622 | +26.1% |
Export volumes peaked near 773,000 tonnes before falling to barely 286,000 tonnes, a 57% contraction. In contrast, import volumes remained essentially flat over the same period, fluctuating within a narrow band around 310,000 tonnes. The result was a dramatic compression of the trade surplus: from €1.02 billion to just €141 million (−86.1%), with a brief deficit recorded mid-period.
1.2 Rising unit prices masked the severity of the volume collapse
Both exports and imports experienced significant price inflation. Export unit values rose 54% to €4,404/tonne by 2025, while import prices increased 26% to €3,622/tonne. This partly reflects the global aluminium price surge of 2021–2022 driven by energy costs and supply disruptions, and partly a compositional shift toward higher-value product segments in EU exports. However, the faster growth in export prices relative to import prices could not compensate for the volume losses: export value still declined by 34%.
1.3 Net import reliance improved but the EU's export orientation weakened
The net import reliance ratio moved from −14.6% (indicating a net export position) to −8.3%. While the EU remains a net exporter in this product, the surplus margin has narrowed considerably. The trade intensity fell from 46.6% to 36.7%, and export propensity dropped from 34.8% to 25.5%, suggesting the EU is increasingly directing domestic production toward its own market rather than exports.
2. A reshuffling of trading partners, accelerated by Brexit and geopolitical shifts
2.1 The United Kingdom: from dominant partner to bilateral restructuring
The United Kingdom was by far the EU's largest export destination and a significant import source throughout the period. However, post-Brexit trade restructuring is clearly visible in the data.
| Flow | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| EU → UK exports | €834 M | €360 M | −56.9% |
| UK → EU imports | €39 M | €167 M | +326.1% |
EU exports to the UK fell by more than half, from €834 million to €360 million, while imports from the UK surged from €39 million to €167 million. This pattern — dramatically higher volatility on the UK export corridor (coefficient of variation of 0.60) — points to a fundamental reorientation of UK-EU aluminium sheet trade following the end of the transition period in January 2021.
2.2 China's decline and Switzerland's rise among EU suppliers
Among import partners, two contrasting trajectories stand out:
| Partner | 2015 imports | 2025 imports | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Switzerland | €281 M | €403 M | +43.8% |
| China | €115 M | €41 M | −64.6% |
| Norway | €49 M | €157 M | +222.3% |
| United Kingdom | €39 M | €167 M | +326.1% |
Switzerland consolidated its position as the EU's top import source, growing to €403 million. China, by contrast, saw its share collapse from €115 million to just €41 million (−64.6%). The coefficient of variation for China imports stood at 0.58, indicating highly volatile flows — likely reflecting EU trade defence measures and the broader trend of de-risking supply chains from China. Norway also emerged as a major supplier, with imports more than tripling to €157 million, reflecting the role of Norwegian hydropower-based aluminium production.
2.3 Export diversification: Mexico's emergence, China's retreat
On the export side, the EU saw a notable geographic reorientation:
| Partner | 2015 exports | 2025 exports | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mexico | €27 M | €81 M | +198.0% |
| United States | €241 M | €306 M | +26.6% |
| China | €66 M | €31 M | −52.7% |
| United Kingdom | €834 M | €360 M | −56.9% |
Mexico's emergence as a destination (€81 million, nearly triple the 2015 level) and the steady growth of exports to the United States suggest a reorientation of EU aluminium sheet exports toward North American markets. Meanwhile, export concentration (HHI) declined from 2,207 to 1,644 (−25.5%), confirming that the EU's export portfolio has become less dependent on any single partner — even as it has shrunk in absolute terms.
3. Domestic production surged while EU member states specialised differently
3.1 EU production grew strongly in both volume and value
Despite the decline in export volumes, EU domestic production expanded significantly over the period:
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Production volume (kg) | 3.23 B | 5.00 B | +54.9% |
| Production value (€) | 7.14 B | 15.00 B | +110.1% |
Production volume rose by 55% while production value more than doubled. This implies a near-doubling of average domestic production unit values — consistent with both higher raw material costs (energy, primary aluminium) and a shift toward higher-value product specifications. The combination of rising production and falling exports suggests that EU producers are increasingly oriented toward the internal market.
3.2 Member-state specialisation reveals divergent industrial strategies
The revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) analysis for 2025 shows wide disparities across the EU:
| Most specialised (highest RSCA) | RSCA | Production share |
|---|---|---|
| Greece | 0.706 | 3.9% |
| Croatia | 0.490 | 1.2% |
| Austria | 0.367 | 7.1% |
| Bulgaria | 0.342 | 1.3% |
| Hungary | 0.304 | 5.0% |
| Least specialised (lowest RSCA) | RSCA | Production share |
|---|---|---|
| Ireland | −1.000 | 0.0% |
| Latvia | −0.996 | ~0% |
| Luxembourg | −0.975 | ~0% |
| Estonia | −0.951 | ~0% |
| Finland | −0.936 | ~0% |
Greece exhibits the strongest specialisation (RSCA = 0.706) with a production share of 3.9%, while several smaller member states — Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Estonia, Finland — show negligible or zero production, indicating they are pure consumers within the single market. Germany, despite being the largest importer by value at €542 million and the largest exporter at €476 million, is notably absent from the most-specialised list — consistent with its role as a high-volume hub rather than a niche producer.
3.3 The 2022 energy-price shock left lasting traces in trade flows
The volatility and shock analysis identifies several acute price dislocations centred on 2022:
| Entity | Flow | Type | Abnormality | Price shift | Value share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norway | Imports | Price | 16.5 | +49.8% | 14.5% |
| Bahrain | Imports | Price | 6.2 | +63.7% | 5.1% |
| Switzerland | Exports | Price | 3.8 | +57.7% | 9.1% |
The Norwegian import price shock — an abnormality score of 16.5, meaning 16.5 standard deviations from normal — and the simultaneous surge in the price of imports from Bahrain (a key Gulf aluminium producer) are consistent with the European energy crisis of 2022, which disproportionately affected smelters reliant on natural gas. These shocks appear to have accelerated the pre-existing trend of declining EU competitiveness in export markets. The Russian import corridor shows the highest volatility of any partner (CV = 1.02), reflecting the disruption of EU-Russia trade following the 2022 sanctions.
Conclusion
The EU's trade in aluminium alloy sheets (CN 76061292) over 2015–2025 tells a story of structural change. The bloc was a major net exporter at the start of the period, but its export volumes contracted by 57% while import volumes remained stable. Rising unit prices — driven by energy costs and the 2022 commodity cycle — cushioned the revenue impact but could not prevent a 34% decline in export value and an 86% erosion of the trade surplus.
Two forces drove this transformation. First, the post-Brexit reconfiguration of UK-EU trade halved exports to the UK while quadrupling imports from it, reshaping the bloc's largest bilateral corridor. Second, domestic production surged by 55% in volume and 110% in value, suggesting EU mills increasingly serve the internal market rather than third-country destinations.
Looking forward, the decline in export propensity to 25.5% and the rising import concentration (HHI) to 1,901 warrant attention. While the EU is not yet import-dependent, the trend toward greater reliance on a smaller number of suppliers — particularly Switzerland and, increasingly, Norway and the UK — creates concentration risks that policy-makers may wish to monitor.