Market evolution: Zinc-carbon batteries (CN 850610) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in manganese dioxide cells and batteries (CN 850610) over the 2015–2025 period. The product heading encompasses alkaline and non-alkaline primary cells in cylindrical and non-cylindrical forms — the everyday batteries powering remote controls, flashlights, and countless consumer devices.

Over the decade, the EU market has undergone a structural transformation. While both import and export values have grown, the underlying dynamics tell a story of deepening dependence on a single supplier (China), declining domestic production, and a widening trade deficit in volume terms — even as the EU has simultaneously become a more competitive exporter in certain corridors. The period from 2020 onwards, shaped by the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions, and energy price shocks, has intensified these pre-existing trends rather than reversing them.

For a complete product definition and data context, see Scope & Definitions.

1. Rising volumes, falling unit prices: the volume-price divergence

A central feature of the 2015–2025 period is the divergence between trade volumes and unit prices on the import side, while exports have moved in the opposite direction.

1.1. Import volumes surged while prices eroded

Between 2015 and 2025, EU imports of CN 850610 grew from 77,565 tonnes to 108,880 tonnes — a gain of 40.4%. Yet the average import price fell from €4,723/t to €4,290/t (–9.2%). In supplementary-unit terms, the picture is even more striking: the number of items imported rose from 2.0 billion to 3.7 billion (+86.7%), while the per-item price dropped from €0.183 to just €0.125 (–31.7%). This suggests that the EU is importing ever-greater quantities of lower-cost batteries — consistent with the growing dominance of Asian mass-market suppliers.

Source: General Overview — Trade

1.2. Exports grew faster in value than in volume, reflecting higher-value positioning

EU exports tell a different story. Value rose from €256M to €368M (+43.6%), while tonnage increased from 31,237t to 41,850t (+34.0%). Crucially, the average export price climbed from €8,201/t to €8,795/t (+7.2%). This indicates that the EU has maintained — and slightly improved — its position in higher-value segments, even as it cedes volume-driven, lower-value market share to imports.

Source: General Overview — Trade

1.3. The trade deficit narrowed in value but widened structurally

The EU's trade deficit in CN 850610 improved modestly in value terms — from –€110M in 2015 to –€99M in 2025 (–10%). However, net import reliance rose from 36.0% to 51.8% (+43.7%), meaning that over half of the EU's apparent consumption now depends on net imports. This widening structural gap reflects the sharp decline in domestic production.

Source: Net Import Reliance

2. China's consolidation as the EU's dominant battery supplier

The most consequential structural shift in the EU's CN 850610 trade has been the dramatic concentration of imports around China, accompanied by the retreat of virtually every other major supplier.

2.1. China's share of EU imports more than doubled in value

Chinese exports of manganese dioxide batteries to the EU surged from €199M in 2015 to €401M in 2025 — an increase of 101.6%. Over the same period, nearly every other traditional supplier saw its share collapse:

Source: Top Partners

2.2. The import concentration index (HHI) more than doubled

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU imports by value rose from 3,424 in 2015 to 7,434 in 2025 — an increase of 117.1%. An HHI above 2,500 is generally considered highly concentrated; at 7,434, the EU's import base for primary batteries is now extremely concentrated around a single origin. The volume-based HHI tells a similar story, rising from 3,489 to 7,984 (+128.8%).

Source: Concentration — HHI

2.3. Viet Nam is the only emerging alternative, but from a negligible base

Viet Nam's exports to the EU surged from virtually zero (€248) to €8.9M — the largest percentage increase of any partner. However, this remains just 1.9% of total EU imports by value. Given that Vietnamese imports also exhibit the highest volatility (coefficient of variation of 1.32 — see Volatility), this nascent diversification source cannot yet be considered reliable.

2.4. EU production has contracted sharply, reinforcing import dependence

The decline of domestic suppliers explains part of the import surge. EU production of manganese dioxide cells fell from 3.2 billion items in 2015 to 2.0 billion in 2025 (–37.4%), and production value dropped from €262M to €217M (–17.1%). As domestic capacity shrinks, imports — overwhelmingly from China — fill the gap.

Source: Production Volumes

3. The EU's reconfigured export landscape: new partners, new risks

While the import side has consolidated around China, the EU's export map has been redrawn by geopolitical disruption — most notably the collapse of trade with Russia — and the emergence of new, faster-growing destinations.

3.1. The UK remains the top export destination, but the US has surged

The United Kingdom absorbed €166M of EU battery exports in 2025 (up from €118M in 2015, +41.1%), remaining the single largest non-EU destination. However, the most dramatic growth has been to the United States: exports there jumped from €16M to €66M (+315.1%), making it the second-largest export market.

Switzerland also saw extraordinary growth, from €2.7M to €20.3M (+660%), possibly reflecting re-export flows through Swiss logistics hubs.

Source: Top Partners — Exports

3.2. Russia's complete disappearance reshaped export flows

EU exports to Russia collapsed from €35.4M to €11,543 — a near-total wipeout. This almost certainly reflects the EU sanctions regime imposed following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The volume lost to Russia (one of the top-three destinations in 2015) was partially redistributed to the US, Switzerland, and Norway, though the data suggests not all of it was recouped. The coefficient of variation for the Russia trade flow (0.84) confirms the abrupt, shock-driven nature of this collapse.

3.3. Belgium has consolidated its role as the EU's battery export hub

Among EU Member States, Belgium dominates exports, growing from €190M to €240M (+26.2%). Poland has emerged as the second-fastest grower, with exports rising from €14M to €38M (+173.2%). Spain also posted strong growth (+355%), albeit from a small base. Meanwhile, Germany — the EU's largest economy — saw its exports decline from €54M to €43M (–20.5%).

Belgium's specialisation data is revealing: with a Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) of 0.64 and a production share of 38% of EU output, it functions as the bloc's primary battery export platform, likely leveraging its deep-water port infrastructure and logistics networks.

Source: Top Reporters — Exports

3.4. The alkaline cylindrical segment dominates, but non-alkaline imports are growing

Breaking down imports by sub-product, alkaline cylindrical cells (CN 85061011) account for the overwhelming majority — 93,395 tonnes and 3.0 billion items in 2025, representing 86% of import tonnage and 82% of supplementary units. However, non-alkaline cylindrical imports (CN 85061091) have nearly doubled in tonnage (from 4,359t to 7,819t) and more than doubled in item count (from 225M to 467M), suggesting growing demand for non-alkaline alternatives — potentially driven by lower-cost consumer electronics applications or emerging market re-exports.

Source: Product Segment Breakdown

Conclusion

The EU's trade in manganese dioxide batteries over 2015–2025 has been defined by a paradox: the bloc has simultaneously become a more competitive exporter (with higher-value shipments to the UK, US, and new markets) while deepening its structural dependence on Chinese imports. Domestic production has contracted by over a third, net import reliance has breached 50%, and the import concentration index has more than doubled — all pointing to a market that is increasingly vulnerable to supply-side disruption from a single origin.

The geopolitical shocks of 2022 (Russia sanctions, energy crisis) accelerated a pre-existing trend rather than creating it. China's dominance was already growing before 2020; the pandemic and subsequent disruptions merely removed the remaining competitive alternatives. For policymakers concerned with supply-chain resilience, the data on CN 850610 offers a cautionary case study: a mature, high-volume product category where the EU's domestic industrial base has eroded while its import exposure has compounded.

Looking forward, the key question is whether the EU can translate its export-side competitiveness — particularly through Belgium and Poland — into a broader strategy for reshoring or diversifying primary battery production, or whether the cost advantages of Asian manufacturing will continue to pull the market toward further import concentration.