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Market evolution: Women's knit blouses (CN 610620) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report analyses the evolution of EU trade in women's or girls' knitted blouses, shirts and shirt-blouses made of man-made fibres (CN 610620) over the period 2015–2025. The decade under review spans several major disruptions — the COVID-19 pandemic, Brexit, and accelerating global supply-chain realignment — all of which have left deep imprints on this market. Three overarching dynamics emerge from the data: a dramatic collapse of EU domestic production, a fundamental reorientation of import sourcing from neighbouring countries toward Asia, and a widening divergence in performance among EU member states.


1. The Erosion of EU Manufacturing: Shrinking Production and Deepening Import Reliance

EU production of this garment category collapsed by three-quarters in volume

The most striking structural feature of the decade is the near-disappearance of EU manufacturing capacity for this product. EU production fell from 132.5 million pieces in 2015 to 32.9 million pieces in 2025, a decline of 75.2%. In value terms, output shrank from €648 million to €371 million (−42.8%). The fact that value declined less steeply than quantity indicates that the surviving EU production base has migrated toward higher-value segments, but this partial repositioning has not prevented a fundamental hollowing-out of the manufacturing footprint.

The EU shifted from near self-sufficiency to heavy import dependence

As domestic production contracted, the EU's reliance on external suppliers surged. Net import reliance — the share of apparent consumption covered by net imports — rose from 19.6% in 2015 to 53.8% in 2025, having peaked at 64.7% along the way. This near-tripling represents a structural transformation: in 2015 the EU was largely self-sufficient in this category; by 2025, more than half of what consumers wore was produced outside the bloc.

The broader integration metrics confirm this shift. Trade intensity rose from 62.0% to 87.4%, meaning the EU market has become deeply embedded in global trade flows. Export propensity — the share of EU production shipped to non-EU destinations — climbed from 38.2% to 64.5%, indicating that the EU's remaining production is increasingly oriented toward external markets rather than feeding domestic demand.

A widening price gap between EU exports and imports signals structural polarisation

A pronounced price divergence emerged over the period, reflecting the EU's shift upmarket. Key price metrics are summarised below:

Metric 2015 2025 Change
Export unit value (€/t) 35,316 52,743 +49.3%
Import unit value (€/t) 22,141 21,842 −1.4%
Export price per piece (€/p/st) 7.25 10.14 +39.9%
Import price per piece (€/p/st) 4.67 4.78 +2.3%

Source: General Overview

By 2025, EU exports commanded a 2.1× premium over import prices per piece, up from 1.6× in 2015. This widening gap is consistent with a market bifurcation in which mass-market production has migrated offshore while the EU retains niche, branded, or design-intensive manufacturing. Export prices per piece peaked at €13.93 at their highest point, further underscoring the premium positioning of surviving EU output.

The overall trade balance remained in deficit throughout, moving from −€309 million in 2015 to −€300 million in 2025 (a modest 2.8% improvement). At its narrowest point (−€168 million, likely during the 2020 pandemic trough), the deficit temporarily compressed, but the structural gap has proven persistent.


2. The Eastward Pivot: How EU Sourcing Shifted from Türkiye to South and East Asia

Türkiye lost its position as the EU's dominant supplier

In 2015, Türkiye was the EU's largest import source for CN 610620, shipping €138 million to the bloc. By 2025, this figure had fallen to €73 million (−47.3%). The decline of the EU's primary nearshoring partner reflects multiple compounding pressures: rising domestic labour costs, chronic lira depreciation, and intensifying competition from lower-cost Asian producers. Despite retaining geographical proximity and customs-union advantages, Türkiye could not sustain its market share against these structural headwinds.

China consolidated its lead while Bangladesh and Vietnam surged

China, already a significant supplier at €109 million in 2015, grew to €134 million by 2025 (+23.0%), overtaking Türkiye to become the EU's single largest import source. More dramatically, two South and Southeast Asian suppliers posted exceptional growth:

Partner 2015 (€M) 2025 (€M) Change
China 109.0 134.0 +23.0%
Bangladesh 31.1 53.0 +70.1%
Vietnam 9.9 28.6 +189.2%

Source: Top partners by value

Vietnam's near-tripling is particularly noteworthy and likely reflects the benefits of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (in force since August 2020), combined with the country's established textile-apparel ecosystem and competitive labour costs. Bangladesh's strong growth follows a similar pattern of sustained cost competitiveness, although its trade volatility (coefficient of variation of 0.25) was lower than Vietnam's (0.24), suggesting relatively steady sourcing relationships.

Meanwhile, Cambodia — a significant supplier at €40 million in 2015 — declined to €27 million (−31.9%), possibly reflecting capacity constraints, compliance challenges, or preference erosion. India also contracted from €17 million to €8 million (−53.5%), indicating a loss of competitive ground in this specific product niche.

Brexit sharply disrupted UK-EU trade flows

The United Kingdom's departure from the EU single market had a dramatic impact on bilateral trade in this category. On the import side, the UK's share of EU sourcing fell from €32 million to €6 million (−82.7%) — the steepest decline of any major partner and reflecting the introduction of customs formalities and rules-of-origin requirements.

The effect on exports was equally severe: the UK had been the EU's largest non-EU export destination at €49 million in 2015; by 2025, this had collapsed to €17 million (−66.2%). The UK's coefficient of variation for imports (1.43) was by far the highest of any partner, confirming the structural break caused by Brexit. Other traditional export markets also contracted — Russia fell from €11 million to €4 million (−68.0%), likely compounded by sanctions, and Mexico from €7 million to €2 million (−76.4%). The United States was the major exception, growing from €6 million to €11 million (+78.1%) and overtaking the UK as the EU's leading non-European export market by 2025.


3. A Two-Speed Union: Poland's Rise Amid Southern Europe's Retreat

Poland emerged as the EU's most dynamic national player

Poland stands out as the most striking success story among EU member states in this product category. Polish imports grew from €22 million to €59 million (+176.1%), while exports surged from €5 million to €13 million (+162.4%). Poland's revealed comparative advantage (RCA of 2.13) and positive RSCA (0.36) in 2025 confirm its growing specialisation. The combination of competitive intra-EU labour costs, EU structural fund investments in manufacturing infrastructure, and a central geographic position has enabled Poland to absorb market share from both Western and Southern European producers. Poland's production share within the EU reached 14.2% by 2025.

Southern European producers suffered dramatic declines

In stark contrast, several Southern and peripheral EU members saw their positions erode severely. The table below captures the scale of the retreat among the EU's top exporters:

Country 2015 exports (€M) 2025 exports (€M) Change
Spain 49.8 7.5 −84.9%
Greece 11.8 2.5 −78.5%
Denmark 8.6 6.1 −29.3%
Italy 9.7 12.6 +29.9%
France 8.1 11.4 +41.9%
Germany 19.8 21.9 +10.3%

Spain's export collapse is the largest in absolute terms, wiping out over €42 million in annual shipments. Greece, despite maintaining the EU's highest specialisation index (RSCA 0.79) in 2025, saw its exports shrink to a fraction of their former level — a sign of high concentration in a category whose overall trade position is weakening.

By contrast, Italy and France managed positive export growth, likely reflecting their ability to retain higher-value, design-led segments. Germany remained the EU's largest exporter (€22 million) and largest importer (€87 million, down from €118 million, −26.6%), serving as both a major consumer market and a re-export hub.

Import concentration rose while export destinations diversified

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports increased in both value (from 1,708 to 1,800, +5.4%) and volume (from 1,405 to 1,758, +25.1%), indicating growing concentration of sourcing — consistent with the dominance of China and the erosion of diversified suppliers such as Türkiye, Cambodia, and India.

Export HHI, conversely, fell sharply (from 1,408 to 996 in value, −29.3%; from 1,590 to 826 in volume, −48.1%). This suggests that as total EU exports declined, the remaining flows spread more evenly across destination markets — likely reflecting opportunistic diversification into smaller markets as traditional large destinations (UK, Russia, Mexico) contracted.


Conclusion

The decade 2015–2025 witnessed a fundamental restructuring of the EU market for women's knit blouses of man-made fibres. EU production collapsed by 75% in volume, driving net import reliance from under 20% to over 50%. The sourcing map was redrawn around an eastward axis: Türkiye halved its shipments, while China consolidated its lead and Bangladesh and Vietnam emerged as fast-growing suppliers. Brexit sharply severed UK-EU trade flows in both directions. Within the EU, a clear two-speed dynamic took hold: Poland rose as a manufacturing and trade hub, absorbing market share as Spain and Greece saw their positions collapse. The remaining EU production has pivoted toward higher-value segments, with export prices rising nearly 50% while import prices stayed flat. These converging trends point to a market that is increasingly dependent on Asian supply chains, with a shrinking but more specialised EU manufacturing base concentrated in Central Europe — a pattern likely to deepen further in the absence of significant policy intervention or reshoring incentives.

Generated on 2026-08-09. Figures reflect Eurostat data at generation time and do not include later revisions.

Auto-generated: this report is meant to accelerate, but not to replace, human analysis.

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