Market evolution: Welding machines (CN 851580) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the trade evolution of EU customs code 851580 — covering electric machines for laser, ultrasonic, electron beam, magnetic pulse, and plasma arc welding, as well as hot-spraying apparatus for metals and cermets — over the period 2015 to 2025. The product grouping is a residual category within heading 8515, bundling advanced welding and surface-coating technologies that are distinct from conventional resistance or arc welding machines. The analysis draws on EU trade data aggregated at the annual frequency, covering all extra-EU flows.

Over the decade, the EU's trade position in this product category has undergone a structural transformation. While the Union maintained a consistent trade surplus, that surplus narrowed by 40.6% — from €390 million in 2015 to €232 million in 2025. This erosion occurred not because EU exports collapsed in value, but because imports surged even faster. The most dramatic shift was the rise of China as an import source, whose share of EU imports grew nearly eightfold. Meanwhile, EU exports shifted toward higher-value, lower-volume shipments, suggesting a move up the technology and price ladder. Domestic production expanded dramatically, yet import penetration intensified, pointing to a growing and increasingly competitive internal market.

1. A Surplus Under Pressure: The Diverging Trajectories of Exports and Imports

1.1 Exports held in value but shed volume

EU exports of CN 851580 goods to non-EU countries were remarkably stable in nominal value over the full period, starting at €531.8 million in 2015 and ending at €533.1 million in 2025 — a change of just +0.2%. Beneath this surface stability, however, lay a dramatic compositional shift. Export volume in tonnes fell from 11,409 tonnes to 7,279 tonnes (−36.2%), while the average unit price rose from €46,611 per tonne to €73,225 per tonne (+57.1%). In supplementary unit terms (number of items), exports actually surged from 169,245 to 792,844 pieces (+368.5%), while the per-piece price collapsed from €3,131 to €672 (−78.5%). This pattern is consistent with a shift toward exporting a much larger number of smaller, lighter, but higher-value-density items — likely more compact laser or ultrasonic welding systems and hot-spraying apparatus rather than heavy industrial units.

1.2 Imports more than doubled in value and volume

EU imports tell a very different story. Import value rose from €141.5 million to €301.4 million (+112.9%), while import volume climbed from 4,461 tonnes to 11,392 tonnes (+155.4%). The average import price actually declined from €31,728 per tonne to €26,454 per tonne (−16.6%), suggesting that the import surge was not driven by price inflation but by genuine increases in the physical quantities being sourced from abroad — and that foreign suppliers were becoming more competitive on price. In supplementary unit terms, imports grew from 1.25 million to 2.10 million items (+68.2%), with the per-item price rising from €113 to €143 (+26.5%), indicating that each imported item became somewhat more expensive on average even as tonnage prices fell.

1.3 The trade surplus narrowed by 40%

The combined effect of flat export values and rapidly rising import values was a sharp erosion of the EU's trade surplus. The surplus fell from €390.2 million in 2015 to €231.7 million in 2025 (−40.6%). This represents the convergence of two forces: an EU industry that maintained its export revenue by moving upmarket, and an import base that expanded dramatically in physical terms, likely reflecting growing demand for cost-competitive welding equipment from Asian suppliers.

2. The Rise of China and the Reconfiguration of EU Trade Partners

2.1 China became the dominant story on the import side

The most striking feature of the partner data is the explosive growth of Chinese exports to the EU in this product category. EU imports from China surged from €13.7 million in 2015 to €120.2 million in 2025 — an increase of 775%. China thus went from a relatively minor supplier to the single largest source of EU imports by value, overtaking Switzerland. This trajectory is consistent with China's broader industrial strategy of building capacity in advanced manufacturing equipment, including laser and ultrasonic welding systems. The pace of growth accelerated particularly from 2020 onward, coinciding with global supply-chain restructuring and increased Chinese investment in automation technologies.

2.2 Switzerland and Japan remained important but grew more modestly

Switzerland, historically the EU's top import partner for this product, saw its imports grow from €67.4 million to €98.4 million (+46.0%). Switzerland's peak was in 2022 at €152.6 million, after which imports moderated — likely reflecting inventory adjustments or shifts in sourcing. Japan's imports grew by 76.4% (from €10.1 million to €17.8 million), maintaining its position as a supplier of high-precision equipment. Türkiye (+157.1%) and Korea (+70.0%) also showed significant growth, while the United Kingdom's share declined (−35.8%), possibly a consequence of Brexit-related trade friction.

2.3 Export markets showed divergent fortunes

On the export side, the United States consolidated its position as the EU's top destination, growing from €97.4 million to €132.1 million (+35.6%). Canada also showed strong growth (+77.5%). However, several key markets contracted: exports to China fell by 35.6% (from €122.5 million to €78.9 million), and exports to the Republic of Korea collapsed by 65.8% (from €36.2 million to €12.4 million). The decline in EU exports to China is particularly noteworthy given the simultaneous surge in Chinese exports to the EU, suggesting a progressive substitution of EU equipment by domestically produced alternatives in the Chinese market. Türkiye (−19.3%) also declined, while Mexico (+20.6%) and the United Kingdom (+4.4%) showed moderate gains.

2.4 Import concentration increased while export markets diversified slightly

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports rose from 2,705 to 2,790 (+3.2% by value), indicating a moderately concentrated import structure that became slightly more so — largely driven by China's growing dominance. In contrast, export concentration edged down from 1,060 to 1,025 (−3.3%), reflecting a modest diversification of EU export destinations. The gap between import and export concentration underscores a structural asymmetry: the EU sources its imports from a narrower set of suppliers than it sells to, making import supply chains potentially more vulnerable to disruptions from individual partner countries.

3. Domestic Industry: Growing Production, Shifting Specialisation, and Emerging Vulnerabilities

3.1 EU production expanded dramatically

EU domestic production of CN 851580 products grew enormously over the period, at least as captured by the available data. Production value rose from €122.4 million to €1,015.7 million (+729.9%), while production volume (in supplementary units) increased from 30,800 to 247,277 items (+702.8%). These figures, drawn from production volume data, suggest a massive scaling-up of EU manufacturing capacity in this sector — potentially driven by automation demand, the green transition (electric vehicles, battery manufacturing), and reshoring trends.

3.2 Germany and Italy anchored the EU's export specialisation

The specialisation data for 2025 reveals that Germany was by far the most specialised EU exporter in this category, with a Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) of 0.47 and an RCA of 2.80, accounting for 59.2% of EU production value. Italy ranked second (RSCA 0.35, RCA 2.06, 16.5% of production). Slovakia (RSCA 0.18, RCA 1.43) also showed positive specialisation. Most other EU members had negative RSCA values, indicating they were net importers in this product category relative to their overall trade profiles.

3.3 The EU remained a net exporter but self-sufficiency declined

Despite the import surge, the EU's net import reliance remained negative throughout the period (−66.3% in 2015, −48.9% in 2025), confirming that the EU continued to be a net exporter. However, the 26.3% improvement (i.e., the ratio moved closer to zero) indicates that the gap between exports and imports was narrowing. Similarly, trade intensity declined from 82.4% to 69.1% (−16.2%), and export propensity fell from 76.1% to 60.5% (−20.4%). Both trends suggest that the growing EU production base was increasingly serving the internal market rather than being directed outward — or that the domestic market was absorbing a larger share of output due to strong internal demand.

3.4 Volatility and supply shocks concentrated in specific partners

The volatility analysis reveals that several import partners exhibited high coefficient-of-variation (CV) values, indicating unstable trade flows. Israel (CV 1.22), the Philippines (CV 2.24), and Singapore (CV 2.06) showed the highest import volatility, though their absolute trade shares were small. Among major partners, Korea (CV 0.81) and the United States (CV 0.64) were the most volatile import sources, while China (CV 0.45) and Switzerland (CV 0.31) were more stable. On the export side, Canada (CV 1.16) and Australia (CV 1.32) were the most volatile destinations, while the United Kingdom (CV 0.25) and Türkiye (CV 0.28) were the most stable.

Three notable supply shock events were detected:

• Mexico (exports, 2022): An extreme price shock with an abnormality score of 205.8 and a price shift of +168.2%, representing 7.0% of export value — likely linked to nearshoring demand or specific large contracts.
• Australia (exports, 2020): A price shock with abnormality 43.8 and a +712.8% price shift, though representing only 1.1% of export value — possibly a one-off high-value shipment.
• United Arab Emirates (exports, 2020): Similar pattern (abnormality 38.8, +282.0% shift, 1.1% of export value).

3.5 Product sub-segments reveal divergent import and export structures

The product segment breakdown shows that CN 851580 encompasses two distinct sub-categories:

• 85158090 — machines for welding thermoplastic materials
• 85158010 — machines for welding or hot spraying of metals

On the import side, 85158090 dominated by volume (9,728 tonnes in 2025 vs. 1,645 tonnes for 85158010), reflecting the growing demand for thermoplastic welding equipment — likely driven by the automotive and packaging sectors. However, 85158010 commanded higher unit prices per tonne in several years, consistent with the more specialised nature of metal welding and spraying apparatus. Import volumes for 85158090 grew from 4,022 tonnes in 2015 to 9,728 tonnes in 2025, while 85158010 grew more modestly from 439 to 1,645 tonnes.

On the export side, the picture was different. In 2025, 85158090 accounted for 4,252 tonnes and 85158010 for 3,027 tonnes in export volume. The unit export prices for 85158010 were consistently higher (€84,904/t in 2025) than for 85158090 (€64,911/t), confirming that metal welding/spraying equipment represents the EU's higher-value export niche. Interestingly, the supplementary unit data shows that the EU exported 685,141 items of 85158090 in 2025 but only 107,703 items of 85158010, indicating that thermoplastic welding equipment accounted for the bulk of shipment count while metal apparatus dominated in per-unit value.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in CN 851580 welding and spraying machines over 2015–2025 tells a story of a market in transition. The Union preserved its net-exporter status and maintained export values in nominal terms, but the underlying dynamics point to significant structural shifts. EU exporters moved upmarket, shipping fewer tonnes at substantially higher per-unit prices, while simultaneously facing a flood of imports — particularly from China — that more than doubled in value. The 775% growth in Chinese imports represents the single most consequential change in this market's competitive landscape.

Domestic production surged, suggesting the EU industry is scaling up, yet the declining trade intensity and export propensity indicate that more of this output is being absorbed internally. The concentration of specialisation in Germany and Italy highlights the uneven distribution of competitive advantage across the Union. Going forward, the key question is whether the EU can sustain its technological edge in higher-value segments — particularly metal welding and hot-spraying apparatus — as Chinese competitors continue to expand their presence in both volume and, increasingly, in technological sophistication. The narrowing trade surplus, if the current trajectory persists, may eventually challenge the EU's net-exporter position in this strategically important industrial equipment category.