Market evolution: Unwrought lead (CN 7801) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in unwrought lead (customs code 7801) over the period 2015–2025. The product heading covers refined unwrought lead (780110), lead containing antimony as the principal other element (780191), and other unwrought lead (780199). Over the decade, the EU has remained a consistent net importer of unwrought lead, but the structural dynamics of this trade have shifted considerably. The trade deficit widened from €67 million in 2015 to €241 million in 2025, driven by a combination of declining export volumes, rising import values, and a reshuffling of key trading partners. Three major themes emerge: a deepening structural import dependence, a dramatic reconfiguration of supply sources partly driven by geopolitical events, and a sharp increase in unit prices reflecting global market tightening.

1. Widening Deficit: The EU's Deepening Structural Import Dependence

The most prominent trend over the decade is the growing gap between imports and exports of unwrought lead. While the EU's import bill rose substantially, its export revenues declined, producing a trade deficit that nearly quadrupled in value terms.

1.1 Imports grew in both value and volume

EU imports of unwrought lead rose from €330 million (182,658 tonnes) in 2015 to €451 million (209,140 tonnes) in 2025 — increases of 36.6% in value and 14.5% in volume. The import bill peaked at €853 million in 2022, a year marked by elevated global commodity prices. After that peak, imports moderated but remained well above the 2015 baseline, suggesting that the upward shift in prices was partly sustained.

1.2 Export volumes contracted sharply

Over the same period, EU exports fell from 148,281 tonnes (€263 million) in 2015 to 102,761 tonnes (€210 million) in 2025 — declines of 30.7% in volume and 20.1% in value. The export quantity hit a low of just 64,933 tonnes in 2020, likely influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic's disruption to industrial activity and logistics.

1.3 The trade deficit widened nearly fourfold

The net import reliance declined from 19.2% to 9.7%, which at first glance might suggest improved autonomy. However, this metric measures net imports as a share of apparent consumption (production + imports − exports). With EU production rising 17.1% in volume (from 1,299 million kg to 1,521 million kg) and 113.9% in value (from €1.37 billion to €2.93 billion), the apparent improvement in import reliance reflects growing domestic production more than a reduction in import needs. Meanwhile, export propensity increased by 59.8% (from 5.8% to 9.2%), indicating that a growing share of domestic output is being directed to third-country markets, even as absolute export volumes fall — a pattern consistent with higher domestic consumption absorbing production.

1.4 Unit prices confirm a structurally tighter market

Average import prices rose from €1,808/t to €2,157/t (+19.3%), while export prices increased from €1,774/t to €2,047/t (+15.4%). Prices peaked in 2022 at approximately €2,347/t for imports and €2,341/t for exports, coinciding with the post-pandemic commodity price surge and the energy crisis in Europe. The persistence of elevated prices after 2022 suggests that structural supply constraints, including battery-recycling demand and reduced mine output in some regions, have contributed to a higher price floor.

2. Shifting Supply Chains: Geopolitical Disruption and New Partners

The geographic composition of the EU's unwrought lead trade changed markedly between 2015 and 2025, with geopolitical events — notably the post-2022 sanctions on Russia and the Ukraine conflict — leaving a clear imprint on trade flows.

2.1 The United Kingdom consolidated its position as the dominant supplier

The United Kingdom remained the EU's largest source of unwrought lead imports throughout the period, growing from €165 million in 2015 to €218 million in 2025 (+32.1%). This is consistent with the UK's established lead smelting and recycling capacity. The relationship deepened after Brexit, as UK lead — no longer benefiting from intra-EU free movement — entered the EU under preferential trade arrangements that preserved duty-free access.

2.2 Russian supply collapsed under the weight of sanctions

EU imports from Russia fell from €63 million in 2015 to just €24 million in 2025 (−62.5%), with the sharpest decline occurring after 2022 when the EU imposed sanctions on Russian metals. Russia had previously been the EU's second-largest supplier, and its partial displacement created space for new entrants.

2.3 New and emerging suppliers filled the gap

Several countries dramatically increased their share of EU lead imports:

Lebanon's surge likely reflects re-routing of Middle Eastern or recycled lead through Lebanese free zones. Serbia's near-complete emergence from a negligible base (€30,262 in 2015 to €27.6 million in 2025) points to the development of smelting or recycling capacity in the Western Balkans, possibly supported by EU investment and proximity.

2.4 EU export destinations also shifted dramatically

On the export side, the most striking changes were:

• Türkiye remained the EU's top export destination, growing from €76 million to €91 million (+20.2%), with relatively low volatility (CV = 0.13), making it the most stable major buyer.
• United States imports from the EU collapsed from €42 million to €3.7 million (−91.2%), exhibiting extreme volatility (CV = 2.64). A sharp price shock was detected in 2018, when EU exports to the US surged in value by 1,073% — likely reflecting a one-off arbitrage or restocking event.
• United Kingdom grew from €5.7 million to €27.3 million (+377%), becoming a significant recipient of EU-processed lead.
• Singapore emerged from near-zero (€283,000) to €17 million (+5,893%), possibly as a transit hub for Asian markets.

2.5 Intra-EU specialisation reveals a concentrated production landscape

Within the EU, Bulgaria stands out as the overwhelmingly dominant exporter, with an RCA of 16.26 and an RSCA of 0.88 — the highest specialisation scores among all EU members. Bulgaria's export value rose from €80 million to €117 million (+45.4%), cementing its role as the EU's lead export hub. Other specialised members include Estonia (RCA 4.95), Sweden (4.04), Greece (3.62), and Belgium (2.47).

By contrast, major economies like Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands show low or negative specialisation (RSCA well below zero), indicating that their trade in unwrought lead is driven more by their industrial size than by comparative advantage in lead production. Notably, several of these countries saw their exports collapse over the period: the Netherlands (−96.2%), Italy (−98.4%), and France (−91.7%), suggesting a consolidation of EU export capacity into fewer, more specialised member states.

3. Volatility, Price Shocks, and Market Resilience

The unwrought lead market exhibited significant price and volume volatility over the period, with several identifiable shock episodes linked to geopolitical or macroeconomic disruptions.

3.1 Import partnerships show moderate to high volatility

The coefficient of variation of import values ranges widely across partners. The UK (CV = 0.16) and Russia (CV = 0.36) were relatively stable suppliers in value terms, while Korea (CV = 1.21), Kazakhstan (CV = 1.15), and Nigeria (CV = 0.88) exhibited much more erratic trade patterns, suggesting episodic or opportunistic sourcing rather than established supply chains.

3.2 Export volatility was even more pronounced

EU exports to several partners showed extreme volatility. The United States (CV = 2.64), Singapore (CV = 2.13), Korea (CV = 2.01), Pakistan (CV = 1.51), and Brazil (CV = 1.44) all exhibited very high variability, consistent with the EU acting as a marginal or opportunistic supplier to these markets rather than a committed partner. The sharp decline in EU exports to the US (−91.2%) and Brazil (−90.4%) underscores this fragility.

3.3 Three major price shock events were identified

The Ukraine shock in 2017 had the highest abnormality score (472.9), indicating a sharp deviation from the expected price trajectory. Ukraine's imports from the EU had been growing (peaking at €41 million in 2017) before declining to €8 million by 2025 (−51.6%), a trajectory shaped first by industrial disruption and then by the 2022 conflict.

3.4 The export market became more concentrated, raising fragility

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU exports in value terms rose from 1,366 in 2015 to 2,372 in 2025 (+73.7%), moving from a broadly competitive structure to a more concentrated one. This reflects the increasing dominance of Türkiye and the decline of multiple smaller export partners. For imports, the HHI remained relatively stable (2,939 to 2,337, −6.9%), indicating a moderately concentrated but not tightening supply base.

3.5 Refined lead dominates, but antimony-lead imports declined sharply

Examining the product segment breakdown, refined unwrought lead (780110) accounted for the bulk of both imports and exports throughout the period. However, imports of antimony-containing lead (780191) fell from 52,330 tonnes in 2015 to 17,541 tonnes in 2025 (−66.5%), a decline that may reflect changing alloy requirements in European battery and industrial applications. The price of this sub-product rose from €1,628/t to €2,453/t (+50.6%), the steepest price increase among the three sub-categories, suggesting tightening supply or reduced demand leading to rationalisation of sourcing.

Conclusion

Over the 2015–2025 period, the EU's trade in unwrought lead underwent significant structural transformation. The trade deficit widened nearly fourfold in value terms, driven by a combination of rising import costs and declining export volumes. Geopolitical events — particularly the sanctions on Russia and the Ukraine conflict — reshaped the supply landscape, reducing the role of traditional Eastern European suppliers and opening opportunities for new entrants such as Serbia and Lebanon. Within the EU, export capacity consolidated around Bulgaria, while major economies like the Netherlands, Italy, and France largely exited the export market. Price volatility intensified, with several identifiable shock episodes linked to geopolitical and macroeconomic disruptions. Looking ahead, the EU's dependence on a narrow set of external suppliers, combined with elevated prices and a more concentrated export base, suggests that supply security for unwrought lead remains a policy-relevant concern, particularly as demand from the battery sector is expected to grow.