Market evolution: Stainless steel strip (CN 722090) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of EU extra-EU trade in CN 722090 — flat-rolled stainless steel products of a width below 600 mm that have been hot- or cold-rolled and further worked — over the period 2015–2025. The product sits within a broader family of narrow stainless steel strip and encompasses both perforated (72209020) and non-perforated (72209080) sub-categories. EU production data indicate a dramatic contraction in output volumes (–60.9 %), even as production value edged upward (+7.3 %), signalling a fundamental price-driven transformation across the entire value chain. The overall trade data show that this shift has reshaped the EU's trade balance, its geographic exposure, and the competitive landscape for this specialised product.
1. From Surplus to Deficit: The Reversal of the EU Trade Balance
The trade balance turned negative after a decade of erosion
In 2015 the EU held a comfortable trade surplus of approximately EUR 9.9 million in CN 722090, exporting EUR 46.7 million against imports of EUR 36.8 million. By 2025, the surplus had flipped into a deficit of roughly EUR –5.2 million: exports stood at EUR 48.2 million while imports had climbed to EUR 53.4 million. The trade overview shows that the reversal was driven almost entirely by a +45.2 % increase in import value, while export value grew only modestly (+3.2 %).
EU export volumes collapsed while import volumes proved more resilient
Behind the value figures lies a striking volume divergence. EU export quantities fell from 11,422 tonnes in 2015 to just 4,255 tonnes in 2025 — a decline of 62.8 %. Import volumes, by contrast, decreased only 9.7 % (from 6,721 t to 6,068 t). This means the EU's competitive position in third-country markets has eroded considerably, with fewer physical units leaving the bloc even as the remaining exports command higher prices.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Export value (EUR m) | 46.7 | 48.2 | +3.2 % |
| Export quantity (t) | 11,422 | 4,255 | –62.8 % |
| Export unit price (EUR/t) | 4,090 | 11,325 | +176.9 % |
| Import value (EUR m) | 36.8 | 53.4 | +45.2 % |
| Import quantity (t) | 6,721 | 6,068 | –9.7 % |
| Import unit price (EUR/t) | 5,474 | 8,805 | +60.8 % |
| Balance (EUR m) | +9.9 | –5.2 | — |
Italy emerged as the dominant EU importer, while several member states retreated
The geographic distribution of extra-EU imports within the EU shifted dramatically. Italy's share soared from EUR 5.6 million to EUR 31.1 million (+453.7 %), making it by far the largest EU destination for imports of this product by 2025. Germany remained the second-largest importer at EUR 14.4 million (+51.4 %). Meanwhile, several historically significant importers saw sharp declines: Greece (–99.8 %), the United Kingdom (–84.6 %, reflecting post-Brexit reporting changes), Poland (–77.3 %), Czechia (–67.9 %), Belgium (–64.7 %), and France (–57.7 %). The reporter breakdown thus reveals a growing concentration of import activity in a smaller number of EU member states.
2. A Price-Driven Market: Unit Values Surging Across Both Flows
Export unit prices nearly tripled, masking the volume decline in headline values
The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the surge in unit prices. EU export prices rose from EUR 4,090/t to EUR 11,325/t (+176.9 %), while import prices increased from EUR 5,474/t to EUR 8,805/t (+60.8 %). This means that the apparent stability of export values (up just 3.2 %) conceals a volume collapse of nearly two-thirds; higher prices have kept the top line roughly flat despite far fewer tonnes being shipped.
The non-perforated sub-product dominates volumes, but the perforated sub-product commands far higher prices
A breakdown by sub-product shows that 72209080 (non-perforated) accounts for the overwhelming share of trade by volume — roughly 97–99 % of both imports and exports in any given year. In 2025, non-perforated imports stood at 5,980 t versus 88 t for the perforated variant (72209020). However, the perforated product commands dramatically higher unit prices: in 2025, EUR 30,143/t for perforated exports versus EUR 10,333/t for non-perforated. This price premium reflects the additional processing and niche applications (e.g., filtration, architectural uses) that perforation entails.
| Sub-product | Import qty 2025 (t) | Import price 2025 (EUR/t) | Export qty 2025 (t) | Export price 2025 (EUR/t) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 72209080 — non-perforated | 5,980 | 8,789 | 4,041 | 10,333 |
| 72209020 — perforated | 88 | 9,839 | 213 | 30,143 |
EU production volumes collapsed even as output value rose, mirroring the trade-side price effect
EU domestic production volumes in CN 722090 fell from 1,304,225 kg to 510,000 kg (–60.9 %) over the period, while production value rose from EUR 1.64 billion to EUR 1.76 billion (+7.3 %). This confirms that the price inflation observed in trade statistics is rooted in the domestic cost structure: energy, raw material, and labour costs have all risen, particularly following the 2021–2022 commodity and energy price shocks. The result is a market producing far fewer physical units at much higher values.
3. Geopolitical Shifts: Growing Import Concentration and Partner Volatility
Import-source concentration nearly doubled, led by the United States and South Korea
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for EU import sources by value rose from 1,888 to 3,571 (+89.1 %) — moving from moderate to high concentration. Two partners now dominate EU imports:
| Partner | Import value 2015 (EUR m) | Import value 2025 (EUR m) | Change | Share 2025 (est.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 11.9 | 27.4 | +130.0 % | ~51 % |
| Korea, Republic of | 6.1 | 15.5 | +153.0 % | ~29 % |
| Japan | 3.8 | 1.3 | –67.1 % | ~2 % |
| Switzerland | 3.0 | 2.2 | –26.8 % | ~4 % |
| China | 2.9 | 1.9 | –33.4 % | ~4 % |
| United Kingdom | 4.7 | 0.7 | –84.6 % | ~1 % |
Together, the US and South Korea now supply roughly 80 % of EU extra-EU import value, up from about 49 % in 2015. This growing bilateral dependence carries strategic implications, particularly as trade tensions between the EU and both partners have periodically intensified (e.g., US Section 232 tariffs, EU safeguard measures).
Traditional export destinations weakened or vanished; Türkiye emerged as a key growth market
On the export side, several once-important third-country markets contracted sharply. Algeria went from EUR 1.5 million to essentially zero (–100 %), Brazil fell from EUR 2.3 million to EUR 0.3 million (–86.1 %), and Egypt dropped from EUR 1.2 million to EUR 54,223 (–95.5 %). By contrast, Türkiye grew from EUR 1.5 million to EUR 2.8 million (+93.9 %), and the United Kingdom — despite the Brexit transition — rose from EUR 1.9 million to EUR 2.7 million (+43.0 %). Export partner concentration also edged higher, with the HHI rising from 726 to 1,033 (+42.3 %), though it remains far less concentrated than the import side.
Supply-shock events underscore the market's vulnerability to price dislocations
The volatility and shock analysis identified several notable price shocks. The most extreme was a UK-origin import price shock centred on 2021, with an abnormality score of 151.8 and a year-on-year price shift of +505.6 %. A Japanese import price shock followed in 2022 (+81.5 % shift). On the export side, Algeria registered a price shock in 2021 (+236.5 % shift). Several partner relationships also exhibit very high coefficient-of-variation values — notably imports from Malaysia (2.01), Türkiye (1.72), Brazil (1.66), and the United Kingdom (0.97) — indicating that trade flows with these partners have been erratic and unreliable over the period. Meanwhile, the United States and South Korea, the two dominant suppliers, display more moderate volatility (CV of 0.26 and 0.38 respectively), confirming their role as the EU's stable — if increasingly concentrated — sources of supply.
Conclusion
The EU market for CN 722090 has undergone a structural transformation between 2015 and 2025. Domestic production volumes have nearly halved, export volumes have collapsed by over 60 %, and the trade balance has swung from a comfortable surplus to a deficit. Yet these physical declines have been masked by a dramatic escalation in unit prices, which have roughly tripled for exports and risen by over 60 % for imports. The import side has become markedly more concentrated, with the United States and South Korea now accounting for the vast majority of supply — a dependency that warrants close monitoring given the evolving geopolitical landscape. On the export side, the EU has lost several developing-country markets while consolidating its relationship with Türkiye and the UK. Taken together, the data paint a picture of a market adapting to higher costs and lower volumes, with growing reliance on a narrow set of foreign suppliers and an increasingly fragile export base.