Market evolution: Silico-manganese steel wire coils (CN 722920) — 2015–2025
Introduction
This report examines the evolution of EU trade in silico-manganese steel wire coils (customs code 722920) over the 2015–2025 period. The product — used extensively in welding wire, spring manufacturing, and automotive components — sits within the broader alloy steel wire category (CN 7229) and maps to PRODCOM code 24.34.13.00. Over the decade under review, the EU's trade position underwent significant structural change: the bloc shifted from a net exporter to a net importer, imports grew substantially in volume, and the geographic composition of both import and export flows was reshaped by geopolitical events, trade policy shifts, and evolving demand patterns. The sections below analyse these dynamics in detail.
Overview of CN 722920 trade data
1. From net exporter to net importer: the deepening EU trade deficit
1.1. The EU's trade balance reversed over the period
The most striking structural shift in CN 722920 trade is the EU's transition from a net-exporting to a net-importing position. In 2015, the EU recorded a trade deficit of €25.2 million in this product; by 2025, the deficit had widened to €46.5 million, an 84.5% deterioration. The net import reliance ratio — which measures the share of apparent consumption supplied by imports — moved from −11.9% (i.e., the EU was a net exporter) in 2015 to +8.6% in 2025, a swing of 172.3%. At its peak (the data reports a maximum of 21.6%), the EU was significantly reliant on external supply.
1.2. Import volumes grew far faster than exports
The volume dynamics tell a clear story. EU imports of CN 722920 grew from 65,867 tonnes in 2015 to 115,425 tonnes in 2025 — a 75.2% increase — reaching their maximum in the final year of the series. Over the same period, export volumes grew more modestly from 26,838 tonnes to 36,952 tonnes (+37.7%). The import-to-export volume ratio thus widened considerably: in 2015, the EU imported roughly 2.5 tonnes for every tonne exported; by 2025, this ratio had risen to approximately 3.1.
| Metric | 2015 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imports (value, €M) | 55.4 | 110.4 | +99.1% |
| Imports (volume, t) | 65,867 | 115,425 | +75.2% |
| Imports (price, €/t) | 842 | 956 | +13.6% |
| Exports (value, €M) | 30.2 | 63.9 | +111.3% |
| Exports (volume, t) | 26,838 | 36,952 | +37.7% |
| Exports (price, €/t) | 1,126 | 1,729 | +53.5% |
| Trade balance (€M) | −25.2 | −46.5 | −84.5% |
1.3. Rising unit values suggest a product-mix and cost-driven market
An important nuance is the divergence in unit-value trends. EU export prices rose sharply by 53.5% (from €1,126/t to €1,729/t), while import prices increased only 13.6% (from €842/t to €956/t). The persistent price premium on EU-origin wire — nearly double the import price by 2025 — reflects both a higher-value product mix in EU exports and the cost competitiveness advantage enjoyed by third-country suppliers. This price gap has likely been a structural driver of rising import penetration, as downstream users substitute toward lower-cost imported wire where specifications permit.
2. Geopolitical shocks and the reconfiguration of trade partners
2.1. China remained the dominant supplier but import sources diversified
China was the EU's largest supplier of silico-manganese steel wire throughout the period, accounting for €48.5 million in 2015 and growing to €73.5 million by 2025 (+51.5%). Notably, Chinese exports exhibited the lowest volatility among all major partners (coefficient of variation of just 0.16), confirming their role as the stable backbone of EU import supply. However, China's share of total EU imports declined over the period, as several other suppliers grew more rapidly.
| Import partner | Value 2015 (€M) | Value 2025 (€M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 48.5 | 73.5 | +51.5% |
| Türkiye | 3.6 | 7.7 | +110.7% |
| United Kingdom | 0.08 | 9.8 | +11,492% |
| Viet Nam | 0.4 | 6.1 | +1,619% |
| Korea, Republic of | 2.0 | 9.9 | +386.0% |
| North Macedonia | 0.3 | 1.1 | +292.2% |
| Ukraine | 0.002 | 0.13 | +5,904% |
2.2. Brexit re-routed UK–EU trade flows in both directions
The United Kingdom's departure from the EU single market had profound effects on CN 722920 trade patterns. On the import side, UK-origin wire entering the EU surged from a negligible €84,000 in 2015 to €9.8 million in 2025 — an increase of over 11,000%. This likely reflects UK production that was previously counted as intra-EU trade now being recorded as extra-EU imports. The flow was also highly volatile (CV of 1.16), consistent with the disruptive adjustment period around Brexit.
On the export side, the effect was mirrored: EU exports to the UK fell from €10.9 million to €5.5 million (−49.2%), suggesting that some trade that previously flowed freely now faced friction, or that UK buyers increasingly sourced domestically or from third countries.
2.3. EU exports to Russia collapsed following sanctions
EU exports to the Russian Federation fell from €7.2 million in 2015 to just €124,000 in 2025 — a decline of 98.3%. The collapse was driven by EU sanctions imposed in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which restricted steel and iron product exports. Before the sanctions, Russia had been one of the EU's top export markets for this product; its effective disappearance from the data represents one of the most dramatic geopolitical disruptions visible in the series.
2.4. The United States and Türkiye emerged as major export destinations
The loss of the Russian market was partly compensated by the rapid growth of EU exports to other destinations. Most strikingly, exports to the United States surged from €795,000 to €18.7 million (+2,249%), making the US the EU's largest single export market by 2025 — a position it did not hold in 2015. This growth was subject to significant price shocks (notably in 2021, with an abnormality score of 5.9 and a price shift of +64.7%), likely linked to post-pandemic supply chain disruptions and US infrastructure spending.
Similarly, EU exports to Türkiye grew from €789,000 to €10.9 million (+1,283%), and to Canada from €40,000 to €4.9 million (+11,988%). These shifts suggest a geographic reorientation of EU export capacity toward transatlantic and NATO-aligned markets.
| Export partner | Value 2015 (€M) | Value 2025 (€M) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 10.9 | 5.5 | −49.2% |
| Russian Federation | 7.2 | 0.1 | −98.3% |
| United States | 0.8 | 18.7 | +2,249% |
| Türkiye | 0.8 | 10.9 | +1,283% |
| Serbia | 1.2 | 2.0 | +62.1% |
| Canada | 0.04 | 4.9 | +11,988% |
| Switzerland | 0.7 | 3.2 | +342.3% |
2.5. Import concentration declined as supply sources broadened
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for EU imports by value fell from 7,708 in 2015 to 4,672 in 2025 (−39.4%), indicating a meaningful diversification of import supply. While China remained dominant, the rapid growth of suppliers such as South Korea, Viet Nam, and the UK reduced the market's structural dependence on a single source. The HHI for exports also declined (from 1,950 to 1,400, −28.2%), reflecting the broadening of EU export destinations away from the former concentration on the UK and Russia.
Import and export concentration (HHI)
3. Internal EU dynamics: production, specialisation, and vulnerability
3.1. EU production volumes stagnated while values surged
According to PRODCOM data, EU domestic production of alloy steel wire (PRODCOM 24.34.13.00, the closest mapping to CN 722920) declined slightly in volume — from 531,612 tonnes to 510,000 tonnes (−4.1%) — while production value increased dramatically from €439 million to €1.12 billion (+155.3%). This divergence implies a sharp increase in domestic production unit values, consistent with the general inflation in steel product prices observed in the 2021–2023 period, and potentially reflecting a shift toward higher-specification output.
3.2. Czechia and Italy are the EU's most specialised producers
Revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA) data for 2025 identifies Czechia (RSCA = 0.80, RCA = 8.94) and Italy (RSCA = 0.50, RCA = 3.03) as the EU member states with the strongest specialisation in silico-manganese steel wire. Czechia alone accounts for 43.0% of EU production in this product, while Italy contributes 24.3%. Together, these two countries represent over two-thirds of the EU's productive capacity. This concentration of production has implications for supply resilience, as disruptions in either country would have outsized effects on total EU output.
At the other end, Bulgaria (RSCA = −1.00), Finland (RSCA = −0.99), and the Baltic states show virtually no specialisation, consistent with their smaller and less diversified steel sectors.
| EU Reporter | RSCA (2025) | RCA (2025) | Share of EU production |
|---|---|---|---|
| Czechia | 0.799 | 8.94 | 43.0% |
| Croatia | 0.545 | 3.39 | 1.4% |
| Italy | 0.504 | 3.03 | 24.3% |
| Poland | 0.003 | 1.01 | 6.7% |
| France | −0.306 | 0.53 | 4.2% |
3.3. Italian and German exports grew explosively; Belgian exports collapsed
Among EU member states, the export performance was highly uneven. Italy saw the most dramatic expansion, with exports surging from €1.8 million to €27.3 million (+1,387%), making it the EU's largest exporting member state by 2025. Germany grew from €875,000 to €8.8 million (+904%). By contrast, Belgium — which started as the second-largest EU exporter in 2015 at €8.8 million — saw its exports collapse to just €97,000 (−98.9%), and Slovenia fell from €1.1 million to €202,000 (−82.2%). These shifts suggest a significant redistribution of export capacity within the EU, possibly driven by investment in new production facilities, changes in energy costs, or shifts in downstream industrial demand.
On the import side, France (+518%), the Netherlands (+575%), and Italy (+1,254%) recorded the largest increases in import spending, indicating growing domestic demand for imported wire in these markets.
3.4. Trade intensity increased, signalling deeper integration with world markets
The EU's trade intensity for CN 722920 — the ratio of trade (imports + exports) to domestic production — rose from 23.5% in 2015 to 37.9% in 2025 (+61.7%). At its peak, it reached 48.4%. This indicates that the EU market for this product became substantially more open and internationally integrated over the decade. The export propensity — the share of domestic production exported — rose more modestly, from 17.9% to 19.8% (+10.9%), confirming that the primary driver of increased trade intensity was the growth of imports rather than exports.
3.5. Price shocks in 2021–2022 affected key export markets
The volatility analysis reveals significant price shocks in EU export flows during the 2021–2022 period, coinciding with the post-COVID commodity price spike and the energy crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The most notable shocks were:
| Destination | Type | Year | Abnormality | Price shift | Share of exports |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil | Price | 2022 | 14.4 | +52.3% | 3.0% |
| Switzerland | Price | 2022 | 8.0 | +60.1% | 5.7% |
| United States | Price | 2021 | 5.9 | +64.7% | 24.0% |
The US shock is particularly significant given that the US accounted for 24% of EU export value. The spike likely reflected surging US demand and supply constraints, allowing EU exporters to command substantially higher prices. Among import partners, volatility was generally lower for large suppliers (China, CV = 0.16; North Macedonia, CV = 0.36) but very high for smaller or more erratic sources (Argentina, CV = 1.67; United Kingdom, CV = 1.16; Canada, CV = 1.15).
Conclusion
Over the 2015–2025 decade, the EU market for silico-manganese steel wire coils underwent a fundamental transformation. The bloc shifted from a net exporter to a net importer, with imports growing 75% in volume and the trade deficit nearly doubling. This shift was driven by the cost competitiveness of third-country suppliers — notably China, South Korea, and Viet Nam — whose prices remained substantially below EU domestic levels.
Simultaneously, the geopolitical landscape reshaped trade flows profoundly. Brexit converted former intra-EU UK trade into extra-EU flows, sanctions nearly eliminated EU exports to Russia, and the US emerged as the EU's largest export market. Import supply diversified, with the HHI declining by nearly 40%, reducing — though not eliminating — dependence on Chinese supply.
Within the EU, production concentrated heavily in Czechia and Italy, while the broader market became significantly more trade-intensive (reaching nearly 48% at its peak). The 2021–2022 period introduced notable price volatility, particularly in the high-value US export market.
Looking forward, the key vulnerabilities for the EU lie in its growing net import reliance, its dependence on a small number of specialised producing member states, and its exposure to geopolitical disruptions — whether through sanctions, trade policy changes, or supply chain shocks. The ongoing diversification of both import sources and export destinations provides some mitigation, but the structural deficit is unlikely to reverse without significant investment in domestic capacity or a shift in relative cost competitiveness.