Explore live data

Market evolution: Lead oxides and red lead (CN 2824) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in lead oxides, red lead, and orange lead (Combined Nomenclature code 2824) over the period 2015–2025. The product heading covers two subcategories: lead monoxide or litharge/massicot (282410), and all other lead oxides including red and orange lead (282490). These products are used primarily in battery manufacturing, glass and ceramics, pigments, and corrosion-protection coatings.

The EU maintains a consistent trade surplus in this product category. Over the period examined, total exports reached €9.1 million in 2025 against €1.5 million in imports. However, beneath this headline stability, the period reveals significant structural shifts: a contraction in traded volumes, a reshuffling of partner countries, rising unit values, and an increasing orientation of domestic production toward export markets.


1. Volume contraction offset by rising unit values

1.1 Both import and export volumes declined markedly

Between 2015 and 2025, the quantity of EU exports of CN 2824 fell from 5,315 tonnes to 3,805 tonnes, a decline of 28.4%. Import volumes contracted by a similar proportion, from 983 tonnes to 700 tonnes (−28.7%). This suggests a broad structural contraction in the physical traded market, likely reflecting declining demand from downstream sectors such as traditional lead-acid batteries and lead-based pigments.

1.2 Export unit values rose while import prices fell

Despite the volume decline, the value of exports fell only 11.5% (from €10.3 million to €9.1 million), cushioned by a 23.7% rise in average export unit values from €1,942/t to €2,402/t. Import prices, conversely, declined 16.8% from €2,633/t to €2,191/t. The divergent price trends may reflect product-mix effects — EU exports increasingly concentrated in higher-value-added oxide grades — while import prices were pressured by competitive supply from Asia and Eastern Europe.

1.3 The 2016 anomaly and subsequent normalisation

The year 2016 stands out as an anomaly: import volumes surged to 6,081 tonnes (versus 983 tonnes in 2015 and 1,359 tonnes in 2017), driven overwhelmingly by a spike in lead monoxide (282410) imports of 4,879 tonnes. This was accompanied by an import value peak of €5.4 million and an exceptionally low average import price of €886/t, suggesting a large, below-market transaction — possibly a bulk purchase or stock-building exercise by a single buyer. By 2017, volumes and prices had normalised.

1.4 The two product subcategories followed different paths

Subcategory Direction Key pattern
282410 (Lead monoxide) Imports collapsed From 772t in 2015 to just 80t in 2025; import prices quadrupled from €2,187/t to €4,367/t
282490 (Other lead oxides) Exports became dominant Export value grew from €4.6M to €6.0M; quantity stable around 2,290t

On the export side, 282490 overtook 282410 as the primary export product. In 2015, lead monoxide exports (3,349t, €5.7M) exceeded other lead oxides (1,967t, €4.6M); by 2025 the positions had reversed (1,515t / €3.1M for monoxide versus 2,290t / €6.0M for other oxides). This suggests that EU producers are shifting toward higher-value, more specialised oxide products in their export portfolio.


2. A reshuffling of trade partners and reduced concentration

2.1 Import sources: collapse of traditional suppliers, rise of Türkiye

The geographic composition of EU imports changed dramatically:

Partner 2015 (€) 2025 (€) Change
Russian Federation 1,066,512 530,732 −50.2%
Malaysia 1,166,977 94,410 −91.9%
Kosovo 922,923 569,335 −38.3%
Türkiye 49,149 321,653 +554.4%
Japan 322,944 176,232 −45.4%
Korea, Republic of 140,333 44 −100.0%
India 315,481 7,306 −97.7%

Malaysia, once the largest import source, effectively exited the market. South Korea and India similarly vanished. Russia, while still present, halved its shipments — a trend likely reinforced by EU sanctions following 2022. The single major beneficiary was Türkiye, which grew from a marginal €49K supplier to €322K, making it the third-largest source by 2025.

2.2 Export destinations: Colombia and North Macedonia anchor demand

The top export partners also shifted:

Partner 2015 (€) 2025 (€) Change
Colombia 3,403,178 2,102,320 −38.2%
North Macedonia 1,046,356 2,167,189 +107.1%
United Kingdom 1,708,278 970,789 −43.2%
Türkiye 1,585,226 344,744 −78.3%
Russian Federation 428,060 1,316 −99.7%
Australia 445,025 702,702 +57.9%
Brazil 533,984 109,534 −79.5%

Colombia remains the single largest destination but at a reduced level. North Macedonia doubled its intake, becoming the second-largest buyer — likely linked to regional industrial integration in the Balkans. Russia, once a meaningful export market (€428K), collapsed to just €1,316, effectively ceasing as a destination. Brazil and Türkiye also contracted sharply.

2.3 Trade became less concentrated on both sides

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for import concentration fell from 2,695 to 2,103 (−22%), and for export concentration from 1,775 to 1,441 (−18.8%). This indicates a diversification of trade relationships. On the import side, the exit of dominant suppliers like Malaysia was not replaced by a single new source but rather spread across several smaller origins, reducing dependency risk. On the export side, the decline of some large buyers was partially offset by growth in secondary markets.

2.4 Notable supply shocks concentrated in Türkiye

The volatility and shock analysis reveals that the most extreme price events involved Türkiye:

  • In 2020, EU imports from Türkiye experienced a price shock with an abnormality score of 27.2 and a year-on-year shift of +1,636.9%, suggesting either a sudden supply scarcity or a shift to a premium product mix.
  • In 2021, EU exports to Türkiye showed a price shock (abnormality 9.0, shift +33.6%).

These events highlight the sensitivity of the Türkiye trade corridor to supply-demand imbalances, even as the overall bilateral value remained moderate.


3. Growing export orientation amid stable self-sufficiency

3.1 Domestic production volumes declined but values held steady

According to production data, EU production of CN 2824 fell from 57,636 tonnes to 45,000 tonnes (−21.9%) in quantity terms. However, production value rose slightly from €116.6 million to €120.0 million (+2.9%). This mirrors the trade-side pattern: fewer tonnes produced, but at higher average values, pointing to a shift in the product mix toward more specialised, higher-margin oxides.

3.2 The EU maintained moderate self-sufficiency throughout

The net import reliance ratio remained broadly stable, moving from 39.4% to 40.8% (+3.7 percentage points). This means the EU consistently consumed more lead oxides than it produced domestically, but the gap was small and did not widen materially. The relatively modest import reliance, combined with a persistent trade surplus, indicates that EU industry retains a competitive position in this product space.

3.3 Export propensity increased significantly, signaling outward reorientation

The most striking autonomy metric is the export propensity, which rose from 33.4% to 46.3% (+38.7%). In other words, nearly half of EU-produced lead oxides were exported in 2025, up from about one-third in 2015. This occurred even as production volumes fell, meaning the absolute quantity exported as a share of a shrinking production base increased substantially. Trade intensity also rose from 66.4% to 75.1%, confirming that the EU's lead oxide market became more internationally connected over the decade.

3.4 Production is concentrated in a few specialised Member States

The specialisation analysis for 2025 shows that lead oxide production is highly concentrated:

Member State RSCA index Production share Export share
Germany 0.4545 56.4% 21.2%
Italy 0.3601 17.0% 8.0%
Spain 0.2723 10.1% 5.8%
Belgium 0.1353 11.1% 8.5%

Germany alone accounts for over half of EU production and is the most specialised producer (RSCA of 0.45). Meanwhile, large economies like the Netherlands, France, and Hungary show negligible specialisation in this product. The top four producers together account for roughly 95% of EU output, making the industry structurally dependent on a small number of national producers.

On the exporting side, Germany (€2.1M), Belgium (€2.1M), and Spain (€3.7M) dominate. Spain's export value grew by an extraordinary 546% over the period, overtaking Germany and Belgium to become the leading EU exporter by value — a notable shift in intra-EU trade leadership.


Conclusion

The EU trade market for lead oxides (CN 2824) between 2015 and 2025 underwent a quiet but significant transformation. Traded volumes declined by roughly a quarter on both the import and export sides, consistent with the secular contraction of traditional lead-based industries. However, the value of trade held up far better, as rising unit prices — particularly in exports — offset the physical decline. The EU's trade surplus remained robust at over €7 million annually.

The geographic landscape shifted markedly. Several formerly important Asian suppliers (Malaysia, South Korea, India) virtually disappeared from the import market, while Russia's role diminished on both the import and export sides, likely accelerated by geopolitical sanctions. Türkiye emerged as a growing import source, and North Macedonia became a key export destination. Overall, trade concentration decreased, diversifying the EU's exposure.

Perhaps the most consequential trend is the EU's increasing outward orientation: export propensity rose to 46.3%, meaning nearly half of domestic output is now shipped abroad. Combined with stable net import reliance around 40%, this suggests the EU is not losing competitiveness in lead oxides but rather pivoting toward a more export-driven model, producing fewer tonnes of higher-value products for international markets. The concentration of production in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium underscores the importance of these Member States' continued industrial capacity for the EU's position in this niche chemical market.

Generated on 2026-08-07. Figures reflect Eurostat data at generation time and do not include later revisions.

Auto-generated: this report is meant to accelerate, but not to replace, human analysis.

If you need advice on European trade policy, or representation for your interests in Brussels, please contact me at support@tradedashboard.eu. You can find my CV at this address.