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Market evolution: Forged iron or steel bars (CN 721410) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in forged bars and rods of iron or non-alloy steel (customs code 721410) over the 2015–2025 period. The product encompasses bars and rods that have been forged but not further worked, excluding those in irregularly wound coils. It falls within the broader iron and steel category (CN 72) and is classified under PRODCOM code 24.10.62.50, covering forged bars and hot-rolled bars of non-alloy steel.

The decade under review has been marked by profound structural changes in the EU's trade position. The bloc has shifted from being a modest net exporter to a substantial net importer, with the trade deficit widening dramatically. Several forces have driven this transformation: the contraction of domestic production, the surge of Chinese supply, the disruption of traditional trade flows following Brexit and sanctions on Russia, and significant price volatility triggered by geopolitical shocks.

A Structural Collapse in EU Exports Amidst Surging Imports

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the simultaneous collapse of EU exports and the rapid expansion of imports, fundamentally reshaping the trade balance for forged steel bars.

EU exports contracted dramatically across both volume and value

Over the period, EU exports of CN 721410 fell from 65,403 tonnes in 2015 to just 7,095 tonnes in 2025 — a decline of 89.2%. In value terms, exports dropped from €34.0 million to €9.9 million (−71.0%). The decline was steep and largely uninterrupted, with export volumes hitting a trough of only 5,344 tonnes at their lowest point. Export prices rose considerably over the period (from €520/t to €1,390/t, a +167% increase), which partially cushioned the value decline but could not offset the sheer volume collapse.

Metric 2015 2025 Change
Export volume (t) 65,403 7,095 −89.2%
Export value (€M) 34.0 9.9 −71.0%
Export price (€/t) 520 1,390 +167.2%

Source: EU trade overview

Imports grew strongly, driven by rising volumes and prices

EU imports moved in the opposite direction. Import volumes rose from 55,973 tonnes to 107,566 tonnes (+92.2%), while import values surged from €40.3 million to €89.2 million (+121.3%). The import price also increased, albeit more moderately, from €720/t to €830/t (+15.2%). The combination of growing volumes and rising prices pushed the trade balance from a deficit of −€6.3 million in 2015 to −€79.4 million in 2025 — a deterioration of over 1,160%.

Metric 2015 2025 Change
Import volume (t) 55,973 107,566 +92.2%
Import value (€M) 40.3 89.2 +121.3%
Import price (€/t) 720 830 +15.2%
Trade balance (€M) −6.3 −79.4 −1,160.6%

Domestic production decline underlies the export collapse

The trade shift is inseparable from the contraction of EU domestic production volumes. Output fell from approximately 5.07 billion kg in 2015 to 2.0 billion kg in 2025, a decline of 60.5%. Production value declined less sharply (−23.6%), reflecting the broader price inflation observed across steel products. This structural contraction in manufacturing capacity is the primary explanation for both the export decline and the growing need for imports.

China's Dominance and the Reshaping of EU Import Dependencies

The geographic composition of EU imports has undergone a radical restructuring, with China emerging as the overwhelmingly dominant supplier and import concentration rising sharply.

China became the EU's primary source, eclipsing all other suppliers

Chinese exports to the EU of CN 721410 grew from €18.4 million in 2015 to €87.3 million in 2025, an increase of 375.5%. At its peak, Chinese imports reached €114.1 million. China's share of total EU imports has grown to near-dominance, a fact reflected in the dramatic increase in the import concentration index (HHI), which rose from 3,061 to 9,584 (+213.1%). An HHI above 2,500 is generally considered highly concentrated; at nearly 10,000, EU imports of this product are now extremely dependent on a single source.

Import partner 2015 value (€M) 2025 value (€M) Change
China 18.4 87.3 +375.5%
Russian Federation 11.2 23.0 +105.4%
Türkiye 0.8 0.7 −8.2%
United Kingdom 2.3 0.2 −92.0%
Montenegro 5.3 <0.01 −99.7%

Source: Top import partners

Geopolitical shocks disrupted traditional supply flows

Several geopolitical events reshaped the import landscape. The 2023 supply shock from Russia — classified as a complete supply disruption (−100% shift, abnormality score 6.5) — reflects the impact of EU sanctions imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Prior to this disruption, Russia had been a significant supplier (€11.2M in 2015, peaking at €23.0M). The loss of this supply channel likely accelerated the pivot toward Chinese imports.

Brexit similarly impacted the UK as both a trade partner and an EU member reporter. UK imports into the EU fell from €2.3 million to €0.2 million (−92.0%). Montenegro's near-total disappearance as a supplier (from €5.3M to €14K, −99.7%) further concentrated import flows.

EU import concentration reflects growing vulnerability

The extreme concentration of imports creates a significant dependency risk. The net import reliance remained relatively stable at around 7% (from 7.4% to 6.9%), suggesting that the EU still produces enough to cover most domestic demand in aggregate. However, the trade intensity rose from 20.5% to 26.3% (+28.4%), indicating that trade flows — particularly imports — have become more important relative to domestic consumption. The concentration on a single supplier (China) at a time of geopolitical tension makes the EU market structurally more exposed to supply disruptions or price shocks from that origin.

The Reconfiguration of EU Export Markets and Internal Specialisation

While the overall export trajectory has been one of decline, the composition of both the EU's external export destinations and the internal distribution of production capacity reveals significant structural shifts.

Traditional export markets collapsed while new patterns emerged

The EU's largest export destination in 2015 was Algeria (€20.4M), which has since virtually disappeared as a market (€25K in 2025, −99.9%). India similarly collapsed from €0.7M to €10K (−98.6%), following a major price shock in 2022 (+432% price shift). Switzerland, a traditional European partner, saw a significant decline (from €3.7M to €1.2M, −66.6%).

Export partner 2015 value (€M) 2025 value (€M) Change
Algeria 20.4 <0.01 −99.9%
United Kingdom 1.6 1.8 +15.5%
Switzerland 3.7 1.2 −66.6%
India 0.7 <0.01 −98.6%
Norway 1.1 0.9 −20.8%

Source: Top export partners

The UK was the only major destination to maintain its position, reflecting the continued but reduced trade flows after Brexit. The export concentration index (HHI) fell sharply from 3,814 to 939 (−75.4%), indicating that the remaining export flows are more diversified across partners than before — though this is largely a statistical artefact of the overall volume shrinking toward near-zero levels.

Internal EU specialisation became highly concentrated

Among EU member states, Belgium emerged as the dominant producer with a Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) of 0.68 and an RCA of 5.24 in 2025, accounting for 44.4% of EU production. Austria (RSCA 0.41), Hungary (0.23), Czechia (0.22), and Lithuania (0.07) round out the group of specialised producers, though none approach Belgium's dominance.

Member State RSCA (2025) RCA (2025) Prod. share
Belgium 0.68 5.24 44.4%
Austria 0.41 2.40 7.9%
Hungary 0.23 1.59 4.3%
Czechia 0.22 1.57 7.6%
Lithuania 0.07 1.16 0.7%

At the other end, several member states show virtually no production capacity in this product category. Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Latvia, and Greece all have RSCA values close to −1.0, indicating they are pure importers. Belgium's imports also surged significantly over the period (from €12.9M to €46.8M, +263.6%), confirming that even the most specialised EU producer is now importing substantially — likely from China — to meet domestic and re-export demand.

Internal trade dynamics reveal a bifurcated market

The member state data reveals a dual reality: a small group of specialised producers (Belgium, Austria, Hungary, Czechia) coexists with a much larger group of member states that have exited production entirely. Spain's imports grew most dramatically (+863.6%, from €0.5M to €5.1M), while its exports collapsed (from €22.1M to €1.3M, −94.1%), illustrating how even previously significant producers have shifted to being net importers. The overall picture is one of consolidation: production has concentrated in fewer locations while the market as a whole has become more dependent on external supply.

Conclusion

The EU market for forged iron and steel bars (CN 721410) has undergone a fundamental transformation between 2015 and 2025. Domestic production has contracted by over 60%, exports have collapsed by nearly 90% in volume, and the trade deficit has expanded more than twelve-fold. The void has been filled primarily by China, which has grown to dominate EU imports so completely that the import concentration index has reached extremely high levels (HHI ~9,600).

This structural shift has been amplified by geopolitical disruptions — notably the EU sanctions on Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the post-Brexit restructuring of UK-EU trade. These events removed significant supply channels and accelerated the EU's reliance on Chinese production.

From a vulnerability standpoint, the aggregate net import reliance remains moderate at around 7%, but the extreme concentration of imports in a single origin creates strategic risks. The EU's export propensity has actually increased (+52.3%), suggesting that the remaining producers are increasingly oriented toward external markets, while the broader market has become more import-dependent. The concentration of production within the EU itself — with Belgium alone accounting for over 44% of output — adds another layer of intra-bloc dependency. Going forward, the sustainability of this configuration will depend on trade policy decisions (particularly regarding Chinese steel imports), the trajectory of EU industrial policy, and the continued evolution of global steel market dynamics.

Generated on 2026-08-07. Figures reflect Eurostat data at generation time and do not include later revisions.

Auto-generated: this report is meant to accelerate, but not to replace, human analysis.

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