Market evolution: Battery parts (CN 850790) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU trade in products classified under CN 850790 — Plates, separators and other parts of electric accumulators, n.e.s. over the period 2015–2025. This heading covers components essential to battery manufacturing — notably accumulator parts excluding separators (subheading 85079080, which dominates reported trade) and separator films. The period spans the entire rise of Europe's electromobility transition, making this product category a revealing lens on the structural transformation of the EU's battery supply chain. What emerges from the data is a story of massive import growth outpacing export expansion, a dramatic reorientation of supplier geography, and a persistent — though recently narrowing — trade deficit that underscores the EU's evolving strategic dependencies.

1. An Import-Driven Market Surging in Value and Volume

EU imports have grown far more rapidly than exports

The most striking dynamic in the CN 850790 trade data is the asymmetry between import and export growth. EU extra-EU imports rose from €164.2 million in 2015 to €1,105.5 million in 2025, an increase of +573.3% in value. Over the same period, extra-EU exports grew from €191.8 million to €558.0 million (+190.9%). The EU thus swung from a small trade surplus of +€27.6 million in 2015 to a deficit of −€547.5 million in 2025. At its widest point — likely around 2022 given the reported minimum of −€1,245.0 million — the deficit was dramatically larger.

Volumes confirm the trend, but prices amplified it

Import volumes rose from 32,243 t to 106,212 t (+229.4%), while export volumes grew from 41,448 t to 49,362 t (+19.1%). However, price increases substantially amplified the value effect. The average import unit price climbed from €5,092/t to €10,408/t (+104.4%), while export prices rose from €4,627/t to €11,304/t (+144.3%). The subheading-level data for 85079080 (parts of accumulators, excl. separators) shows import prices peaking at €16,390/t in 2022 before retreating to €10,369/t in 2025, suggesting that supply-chain tightness and commodity price spikes inflated unit values during 2020–2022 before a correction set in.

EU domestic production expanded substantially but lagged behind demand

EU production value for this product category grew from €308.9 million to €750.0 million (+142.8%), with a peak at €920.0 million. This is a significant ramp-up, reflecting the wave of battery gigafactory investments across Europe. Nonetheless, import growth (+573.3% in value) far outpaced domestic production growth, indicating that new EU assembly capacity initially relied heavily on imported components.

2. A Radical Reorientation of Supplier Geography

China became the dominant source of EU imports

The most dramatic geographic shift occurred on the import side. EU imports from China surged from just €12.3 million in 2015 to €564.6 million in 2025 (+4,471.7%), with a peak of €974.2 million along the way. By the mid-2020s, China alone accounted for roughly half of all EU extra-EU imports in this category. This mirrors the broader consolidation of the global battery supply chain around Chinese producers of cell components and accumulator parts.

South Korea and Serbia emerged as major secondary suppliers

EU imports from South Korea grew from €1.1 million to €196.9 million (+18,030.3%), peaking at €695.0 million — a trajectory driven by Korean battery cell manufacturers (LG, Samsung SDI, SK) establishing European gigafactory operations and sourcing components from their home supply chains. Meanwhile, Serbia surged from near-zero (€3,514) to €106.9 million, reflecting the country's emergence as a nearshoring hub for battery component manufacturing. North Macedonia followed a similar, if smaller, trajectory (€0.9M → €24.2M).

The United Kingdom, historically a significant supplier, remained relatively stable (€79.8M → €87.2M), suggesting its role is rooted in legacy supply chains rather than the new battery economy.

EU exports diversified but lost key markets to geopolitical shocks

On the export side, the United States became the largest destination, growing from €31.0 million to €163.9 million (+429.2%). Exports to China also rose significantly (€28.8M → €108.9M), as did those to Türkiye (€11.6M → €54.8M) and South Korea (€5.7M → €33.8M). Conversely, exports to Russia collapsed from €11.7 million to €0.1 million (−99.1%) and those to Belarus fell from €6.7 million to €0.5 million (−92.5%) — both reflecting the impact of EU sanctions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Poland, Germany, and Hungary emerged as the EU's main import gateways

Looking at the EU member states driving imports, Poland saw the most explosive growth (€5.2M → €214.1M, +3,999.7%), closely followed by Hungary (€3.0M → €130.5M, +4,241.2%) and the Netherlands (€8.2M → €111.9M, +1,271.5%). Germany remained the largest absolute importer (€34.3M → €380.6M). On the export side, Germany led (€50.9M → €199.6M), with Poland (€14.6M → €84.3M) and Sweden (€11.7M → €44.4M) also showing strong growth — consistent with the geography of European battery gigafactory investments concentrated in Central and Northern Europe.

3. Strategic Autonomy: A Narrowing Gap but Persistent Vulnerabilities

Net import reliance peaked in the early 2020s before declining

The EU's net import reliance for CN 850790 stood at 57.9% in 2015, climbed to a peak of 66.9%, and then declined to 41.7% in 2025 (−27.9% relative change). This suggests that while the EU's appetite for battery parts grew enormously in absolute terms, the scaling-up of domestic production and EU-based exports has begun to reduce the relative dependency on extra-EU suppliers. The trade intensity remained very high (91.6% in 2025, down from 99.7% in 2015), confirming that this product category remains overwhelmingly internationalised. Export propensity declined from 99.1% to 79.0%, indicating that a growing share of EU production is now absorbed domestically rather than exported.

Import concentration remained moderate but shifted geographically

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value was 2,966 in 2015 and 3,105 in 2025, having peaked at 4,851. While the 2025 figure implies a moderate level of concentration, the volume-based HHI fell sharply from 6,250 to 2,410 (−61.4%), suggesting that import volumes diversified across suppliers even as value remained somewhat concentrated — likely reflecting China's high-value shipments of advanced components alongside high-volume shipments from a broader set of countries. Export concentration roughly doubled (HHI 734 → 1,455), indicating that EU exports became more focused on a narrower set of destination markets, particularly the US, China, and Türkiye.

Central-Eastern Europe emerged as the EU's specialised production core

Analysis of revealed comparative advantage in 2025 shows that Luxembourg (RSCA: 0.86), Czechia (0.55), Poland (0.43), Slovakia (0.35), and Bulgaria (0.31) are the most specialised EU member states in this product category. This is consistent with the massive investments by Asian and European battery manufacturers in Central-Eastern Europe — particularly the "Battery Belt" stretching from Poland through Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary. By contrast, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, and Belgium display strong negative specialisation, indicating they are net importers with negligible export advantage in this category.

Volatility and supply shocks highlight remaining risks

The volatility analysis reveals that EU imports from several partners exhibit high year-to-year variability. Serbia (CV: 1.65), North Macedonia (1.03), China (0.99), and Vietnam (1.05) all show substantial import volatility, consistent with an emerging and still-consolidating supply chain. The detected supply shocks include a severe export supply shock to Belarus in 2023 (−98.8%, linked to sanctions), a sharp price spike in exports to Brazil in 2022 (+137.8%, abnormality score 303.5), and a Korean price shock in 2020 (+62.8%). These events illustrate how geopolitical disruptions and demand surges can rapidly ripple through this still-concentrated supply chain.

Conclusion

The EU trade in battery parts (CN 850790) over 2015–2025 tells the story of a market fundamentally reshaped by the energy transition. Total trade volumes and values multiplied several times over, driven by surging demand for accumulator components as Europe scaled up electric vehicle and energy storage production. Imports — especially from China, South Korea, and emerging Western Balkan suppliers — grew far faster than exports, converting a modest 2015 trade surplus into a multi-hundred-million-euro deficit. At the same time, EU domestic production roughly tripled in value, and net import reliance has begun declining from its peak, suggesting that the wave of gigafactory investments is starting to translate into greater self-sufficiency in battery component manufacturing. The geographic concentration of both specialised production (in Central-Eastern Europe) and import sourcing (in China) presents ongoing strategic considerations, even as the diversification of suppliers and the narrowing of the trade deficit point toward a gradually improving — if still structurally dependent — position.