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Market evolution: Starter motors (CN 851140) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in starter motors and dual-purpose starter-generators for internal combustion engines (CN 851140) over the period 2015–2025. The decade has been one of structural transformation for this product category. While trade values have grown on both the import and export sides, the EU has transitioned from a position of near self-sufficiency to a notable net importer. Domestic production has contracted sharply, import volumes have risen, and the geographic composition of trade has shifted significantly — with Asian suppliers gaining ground and Russia's role collapsing. The following sections unpack these dynamics.


1. A structural shift from self-sufficiency to import reliance

1.1 Domestic production has declined markedly

The most striking structural change in the EU starter motor market over the past decade is the contraction of domestic production. Production volume fell from 92.4 million kg in 2015 to 54.0 million kg by 2025 — a decline of 41.6%. Production value followed a similar trajectory, declining from €1,023 million to €800 million (−21.8%), implying that unit values within domestic production have actually risen.

Indicator 2015 2025 Change
Production volume (million kg) 92.4 54.0 −41.6%
Production value (€ million) 1,023 800 −21.8%

This contraction in domestic output is a key driver of the changes observed in trade flows: with less production at home, the EU has increasingly turned to external suppliers.

1.2 Net import reliance has surged

The decline in production translated directly into growing net import reliance. In 2015, the EU's net import reliance stood at essentially zero (−0.03%), indicating a balanced trade position. By 2025, it had climbed to 21.3%, meaning roughly one-fifth of apparent consumption is now sourced from imports. The peak reached 29.0% in an intermediate year, suggesting that this shift accelerated through the mid-period.

Year Net import reliance
2015 −0.03%
2025 21.3%

1.3 Import volumes have grown while export volumes have stagnated

The trade overview reveals a clear asymmetry. Import quantities grew by 25.2% (from 40,624 tonnes to 50,877 tonnes), while export quantities slightly contracted by 1.7% (from 27,673 tonnes to 27,199 tonnes). Both flows experienced significant value growth — imports up 49.1% and exports up 34.7% — but this was largely price-driven. The EU trade deficit in this product widened from €83 million in 2015 to €178 million in 2025 (−115.2%).

Metric Exports (2015) Exports (2025) Change Imports (2015) Imports (2025) Change
Value (€ million) 378.6 509.9 +34.7% 461.2 687.7 +49.1%
Quantity (tonnes) 27,673 27,199 −1.7% 40,624 50,877 +25.2%
Price (€/tonne) 13,680 18,746 +37.0% 11,353 13,517 +19.1%

Notably, EU export prices rose faster (+37.0%) than import prices (+19.1%), which may reflect a shift in the EU's output mix toward higher-value or more technologically advanced products even as total volumes eroded.

1.4 The EU has become more integrated into global trade

Two vulnerability indicators confirm deepening global integration. Trade intensity (total trade as a share of production) nearly doubled, rising from 37.9% to 79.5% (+109.9%). Export propensity (exports as a share of production) rose even more steeply, from 23.4% to 61.4% (+162.5%). These figures suggest that the EU's starter motor sector is increasingly embedded in international supply chains, both as an importer and an exporter.


2. A reconfiguration of trade partners driven by Asian growth and geopolitical disruption

2.1 Asian suppliers have captured increasing market share

The most pronounced shift on the import side has been the rise of Asian suppliers. South Korea, China, and India all recorded dramatic increases in exports to the EU:

Partner Imports 2015 (€M) Imports 2025 (€M) Change
South Korea 22.8 82.1 +259.9%
India 22.4 56.6 +152.6%
China 86.5 172.5 +99.4%

China is now the EU's second-largest supplier (after Japan), having nearly doubled its share. South Korea's growth is particularly striking — its exports to the EU grew by a factor of 3.6 over the decade, likely reflecting the expansion of Korean automotive OEMs and tier-1 suppliers in Europe and globally.

Japan remains the EU's top supplier but has seen its share erode, with import values declining 19.9% from €166.4 million to €133.3 million. Mexico, once a significant source, has contracted by 48.5%.

2.2 Geopolitical events have reshaped EU export markets

On the export side, the most dramatic change has been the near-total collapse of exports to Russia. EU exports to Russia fell from €29.1 million to just €0.7 million (−97.6%), reflecting the impact of EU sanctions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This represents a loss of a meaningful export market.

Conversely, the United States has become the EU's largest export destination, with exports surging 90.0% from €79.2 million to €150.4 million. Exports to Ukraine also grew sharply (+252.1%), though from a low base. China also absorbed significantly more EU exports (+126.7%).

Partner Exports 2015 (€M) Exports 2025 (€M) Change
United States 79.2 150.4 +90.0%
Russia 29.1 0.7 −97.6%
China 13.6 30.9 +126.7%
Ukraine 1.6 5.8 +252.1%

2.3 Import concentration has decreased while export concentration has held steady

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports fell from 1,947 to 1,502 (−22.9%), indicating that the EU has diversified its import sources. This is consistent with the rise of South Korea, India, and China alongside the relative decline of Japan. Export HHI, by contrast, edged up slightly from 1,225 to 1,283 (+4.7%), remaining in the moderately concentrated range.

2.4 Price volatility varies sharply by partner

The volatility analysis reveals substantial differences in price stability across trade partners. Among imports, Mexico (coefficient of variation 0.82) and South Korea (0.76) are the most volatile, while Japan (0.16) is the most stable. Among export partners, Ukraine (0.57) and Russia (0.50) — prior to the sanctions-driven collapse — showed elevated volatility, while Türkiye (0.10) was remarkably stable.

Notable price shock events include:

  • EU exports to China (2017): A +54.7% price shift with an abnormality score of 5.5, the most extreme event detected.
  • EU imports from the UK (2021): A +67.3% price shift (abnormality 4.2), likely related to post-Brexit supply chain adjustment.
  • EU exports to Tunisia (2022): A +25.7% price shift (abnormality 3.8).

3. A concentrated but evolving production base within the EU

3.1 Germany dominates but Italy and Poland are emerging

The EU-level production breakdown reveals a highly concentrated geography. Germany is by far the largest EU producer and exporter, with 2025 exports of €177.9 million — more than double France (€57.7 million) or Italy (€75.4 million). On the import side, Germany also leads (€140.2 million), reflecting its role as both a producer and a major automotive market.

Reporter (exports) Exports 2015 (€M) Exports 2025 (€M) Change
Germany 159.1 177.9 +11.8%
France 24.9 57.7 +132.0%
Italy 12.7 75.4 +493.8%
Poland 13.2 37.8 +187.3%

Italy's export growth of 493.8% is the most dramatic among major EU exporters, suggesting a significant build-out of production capacity. Poland's rise (+187.3%) is also noteworthy and aligns with its emergence as a Central European manufacturing hub. On the import side, Slovakia (+684.9%) and Poland (+555.2%) saw explosive growth in imports, likely reflecting their roles as assembly locations for automotive OEMs sourcing components from outside the EU.

3.2 Specialisation is concentrated in Central and Southern Europe

The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) analysis for 2025 shows that Hungary is the most specialised EU member state in starter motors, with an RCA of 12.65 — an exceptionally high value indicating that Hungary's share of EU starter motor exports is many times larger than its overall share of EU exports. Slovenia (RCA 3.72) and Poland (RCA 2.50) also display clear comparative advantage.

Member State RCA (2025) Product share of EU production RSCA
Hungary 12.65 34.0% 0.85
Slovenia 3.72 3.7% 0.58
Poland 2.50 16.6% 0.43
Italy 0.88 7.1% −0.06
Romania 0.91 1.5% −0.04

Hungary's dominance in production share (34.0% of EU output, though only 2.7% of total EU exports) suggests a highly specialised production base that may be oriented toward intra-EU supply chains. At the other end of the spectrum, Malta, Luxembourg, and Greece show negligible specialisation in this product.


Conclusion

The EU starter motor market (CN 851140) has undergone a profound structural transformation between 2015 and 2025. Domestic production has declined by over 40% in volume, pushing the EU from near trade balance into a position of moderate net import reliance (21.3%). Trade values have risen on both sides — largely driven by price increases — but import volumes have grown faster than export volumes.

The geographic landscape of trade has shifted significantly. Asian suppliers, particularly South Korea, China, and India, have gained substantial ground at the expense of Japan and Mexico. On the export side, the EU has lost the Russian market almost entirely due to sanctions while pivoting strongly toward the United States. Within the EU, Germany remains the dominant producer and trader, but Italy and Poland have emerged as fast-growing exporters.

The combination of declining domestic production, rising import reliance, and increased trade intensity suggests that the EU's starter motor sector is becoming more globally integrated but also more dependent on external supply. This dependency carries strategic implications, particularly as the automotive industry undergoes its transition to electrification — a shift that will eventually reshape demand for traditional starter motors. In the near term, however, the data indicates that this product category remains a significant trade flow, with growing volumes and evolving supply chain patterns.

Generated on 2026-08-07. Figures reflect Eurostat data at generation time and do not include later revisions.

Auto-generated: this report is meant to accelerate, but not to replace, human analysis.

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