Market evolution: Semiconductor parts (CN 854190) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the evolution of EU external trade in CN 854190 — Parts of diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices; photosensitive semiconductor devices, light emitting diodes and mounted piezoelectric crystals, n.e.s. over the period 2015–2025. These components sit at the heart of the broader semiconductor value chain, serving as essential building blocks for electronics, automotive, industrial, and energy applications.

Over this decade, the EU's trade position in this product category underwent three major transformations: a sharp divergence between export volumes and values driven by price increases; a growing structural dependence on China as an import source; and a significant erosion of the EU's net export surplus, even as domestic production value expanded. Each of these dynamics reflects deeper shifts in global supply chains, post-pandemic demand patterns, and the strategic repositioning of semiconductor manufacturing worldwide.

1. Volume, value, and the price divergence

1.1 Export volumes collapsed while import volumes held steady

The most striking feature of the 2015–2025 period is the dramatic decline in EU export quantities, which fell by 65.8% from 6,296 tonnes to 2,153 tonnes. By contrast, import volumes remained essentially flat, declining by just 0.4% from 10,746 tonnes to 10,703 tonnes. This divergence suggests a fundamental reorientation: the EU is shipping fewer physical units abroad while continuing to absorb similar volumes from the rest of the world.

1.2 Unit prices surged, masking the volume decline in value terms

Despite the steep fall in physical exports, the value of EU exports declined only modestly (−7.5%), thanks to a 169.9% increase in export unit prices — from €29,462 per tonne to €79,532 per tonne. Import prices rose more moderately (+39.2%), from €9,241/t to €12,860/t. The much higher and faster-rising export price indicates that the EU has shifted toward exporting higher-value-added, more specialised semiconductor components, while importing lower-cost commodity-grade parts. The widening price gap — export prices were roughly 3.2× import prices in 2015 and 6.2× in 2025 — is a strong signal of specialisation in the EU's export basket.

1.3 The trade balance eroded significantly

The EU's trade balance in CN 854190 deteriorated from a surplus of €86.1 million in 2015 to €33.7 million in 2025 (−60.8%). Crucially, the data shows the EU briefly swung into a trade deficit of €83.8 million at the trough — the worst position in the entire period. Although the balance recovered, it has not returned to its pre-2020 level, indicating a structural shift rather than a cyclical blip.

2. China's rising dominance and increasing supply concentration

2.1 China became the EU's largest import source

Among import partners, China's share grew most dramatically. EU imports from China rose from €30.2 million in 2015 to €66.2 million in 2025 (+119.3%), peaking at €181.7 million in an intermediate year. China's share of total imports expanded substantially, making it the dominant supplier by value. Taiwan also grew (+86.4%, from €9.9M to €18.4M), while most Southeast Asian suppliers contracted sharply: Malaysia (−70.1%), the Philippines (−65.1%), and the United Kingdom (−45.3%, post-Brexit).

2.2 Import concentration increased sharply

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value rose from 1,575 to 2,894 (+83.7%), while the HHI for imports by volume increased from 3,657 to 8,027 (+119.5%). These are significant increases that signal a growing concentration of supply in fewer partner countries — principally China. A rising HHI in both value and volume terms means the shift is not merely a price effect but reflects a genuine consolidation of sourcing origins. This concentration carries strategic implications for supply chain resilience, particularly given the geopolitical sensitivities surrounding semiconductor supply chains.

2.3 Thailand emerged as a volatile but growing supplier

Thailand stands out with a 730.6% increase in imports (from €61K to €504K) and the highest coefficient of variation among import partners at 3.03. This suggests Thailand is an emerging but unstable source, with trade flows subject to large year-to-year swings — potentially reflecting shifting production footprints or opportunistic sourcing rather than established supply relationships.

3. Geopolitical realignment of export destinations and domestic production growth

3.1 The United States became the EU's dominant export market

On the export side, the most consequential shift was toward the United States. EU exports to the US grew by 160.0%, from €23.3 million to €60.6 million, making it by far the largest destination — nearly doubling the next-largest partner (China at €35.9M). This surge likely reflects the US CHIPS Act-driven demand for specialised semiconductor components and Europe's role as a supplier to American semiconductor fabs and technology firms. Exports to China also grew (+36.2%), but exports to Malaysia collapsed (−74.9%), suggesting a reshaping of intra-Asian supply chains that previously routed EU components through Southeast Asian assembly hubs.

3.2 Germany's export dominance declined; France, Denmark, and Belgium gained ground

Among EU member states, Germany remained the largest exporter but saw its share contract sharply (−55.6%, from €114.1M to €50.6M). Denmark (+165.5%, to €28.3M), France (+155.9%, to €20.3M), Belgium (+64.5%, to €16.3M), and Italy (+54.0%, to €11.6M) all expanded their exports. On the import side, Hungary (+269.2%, to €12.0M) and Italy (+169.9%, to €12.8M) saw the fastest growth, reflecting the increasing role of Central and Southern European economies in semiconductor-related manufacturing.

3.3 EU production value grew, supporting a broader industrial strategy

Despite the trade balance erosion, EU domestic production of CN 854190 products increased by 43.8% in value terms — from €616 million to €886 million. This growth, combined with the shift toward higher-value exports, suggests that the EU's semiconductor component industry has been moving up the value chain. The export propensity (exports as a share of production) declined slightly from 18.6% to 17.3%, indicating that more production is being absorbed domestically or by intra-EU demand — consistent with Europe's push for semiconductor self-sufficiency under the European Chips Act.

Conclusion

The EU's trade in semiconductor parts (CN 854190) over 2015–2025 tells a story of two parallel transformations. On one hand, the net import reliance metric — which shifted from −10.7% to −6.0% — confirms that the EU's net exporter status has weakened, with import growth outpacing export growth. Supply concentration has increased markedly, with China becoming the overwhelmingly dominant import source and the HHI rising to levels that raise resilience concerns.

On the other hand, the data also reveals signs of strategic adaptation: export unit prices more than doubled, domestic production grew by over 40%, and the EU's export portfolio pivoted toward the United States and higher-value segments. The Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Denmark have emerged as specialised exporters within the EU, while the geographic diversification of both imports and exports has narrowed.

The central tension going forward is between the EU's ambitions for semiconductor sovereignty — backed by substantial policy commitments — and the reality of growing import dependence on a small number of Asian suppliers. The data suggests that while the EU is building industrial capacity, it has not yet translated that capacity into a restored trade surplus in this critical product category.