Market evolution: Multimeters without recording (CN 903031) — 2015–2025

Introduction

This report examines the EU's external trade in multimeters for voltage, current, resistance or electrical power without a recording device (Combined Nomenclature code 903031) over the period 2015–2025. The EU has historically been a net exporter of these instruments, but the decade saw significant shifts in trade volumes, partner composition and unit values. Drawing on EU-level trade statistics, production data and concentration metrics, we identify three overarching dynamics: (1) a surge in imports that has eroded the EU's trade surplus, (2) a geographic re-orientation of both imports and exports with rising supplier concentration on the import side, and (3) robust domestic production growth that has, paradoxically, coincided with declining trade-intensity and export-propensity ratios.

1. Surging imports and a narrowing trade surplus

1.1 Import growth has far outpaced export growth

Between 2015 and 2025, EU imports of CN 903031 products grew by 79.1% in value, rising from €57.5 million to €102.9 million. Over the same period, exports rose by a more modest 24.0%, from €104.9 million to €130.1 million. In volume terms the contrast is even starker: import quantities increased by 44.8% (from 1,512 tonnes to 2,189 tonnes) while export volumes actually contracted by 31.4% (from 1,201 tonnes to 823 tonnes).

1.2 Diverging unit-value trends reveal a quality shift in exports

EU export unit values surged by 80.8% over the period (from €87,329/t to €157,854/t), while import unit values rose by only 23.7% (from €38,006/t to €47,006/t). This implies that the EU has been shifting towards higher-value, possibly more specialised multimeter exports while importing lower-cost, commodity-grade instruments. The price gap between EU exports and imports widened from roughly 2.3:1 in 2015 to approximately 3.4:1 in 2025, suggesting an increasing specialisation of EU producers in the premium segment of the market.

1.3 The EU remains a net exporter, but the margin has thinned

The net import reliance has remained negative throughout the period (ranging from −32.2% to −15.6%), confirming that the EU consistently exports more than it imports in value terms. However, the trade surplus narrowed from €47.4 million in 2015 to a low of just €4.9 million around 2020 before partially recovering to €27.1 million in 2025. The net import reliance improved marginally by 4.2% over the decade, but the trajectory suggests that growing import demand is gradually compressing the EU's structural advantage.

2. Geographic re-orientation: China's dominance, Korea's emergence and volatility in key corridors

2.1 China has become the overwhelmingly dominant import supplier

Among EU import partners, China stands out as the single largest source, with imports rising by 107.9% from €25.7 million to €53.5 million. China alone now accounts for over half of all EU imports by value. The United States (+104.4% to €13.1 million) and the United Kingdom (+10.6% to €7.6 million) are the next largest suppliers, while Korea, Republic of (+3,157.3% to €5.8 million) and Tunisia (+2,875.3% to €1.3 million) registered the fastest growth rates, albeit from very low bases. Notably, Hong Kong's role as a conduit shrank dramatically (−83.2%), possibly reflecting a redirection of Chinese re-exports through mainland channels.

2.2 Export destinations have shifted toward the UK and North Africa, while China and the US recede

On the export side, the United States remains the largest destination but with a declining share (from €30.4 million to €25.3 million, −16.8%). Exports to China fell even more sharply (−42.1% to €9.3 million), likely reflecting China's own growing production capacity. In contrast, the United Kingdom (+166.7% to €18.0 million) and Morocco (+497.5% to €9.8 million) emerged as major growth markets. The UK's surge may partly reflect post-Brexit trade reorientation and stockpiling patterns, while Morocco's rise could be linked to nearshoring and industrial development in the automotive and electronics sectors.

2.3 Import concentration has increased, while export diversification has improved

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for imports by value rose from 2,493 to 3,036 (+21.8%), indicating moderately concentrated and increasingly dependent import sourcing. This is largely driven by China's growing dominance. For exports, the HHI fell from 1,230 to 788 (−35.9%), reflecting a welcome diversification of EU export destinations. Volume-based concentration followed a similar pattern: import concentration in volume rose by 21.9% while export volume concentration fell by 55.0%.

2.4 China is the most stable import source; several export markets show high volatility

Examining coefficient of variation (CV) across trade partners, China (CV = 0.18) and Thailand (CV = 0.15) are the most stable import sources, consistent with established, large-scale supply chains. In contrast, Malaysia (CV = 0.90) and Japan (CV = 0.86) on the import side are highly volatile, as are Russia (CV = 0.72) and Morocco (CV = 0.65) on the export side.

2.5 Notable price shocks occurred in 2021

The shock analysis identifies several abnormal price events. The most extreme was a massive export price spike to Japan in 2021 (abnormality score of 649.1, with a +210.4% unit-value shift). This likely reflects the global semiconductor and electronics supply-chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic, when a specific high-value shipment may have driven up average prices. Additional price shocks were detected for EU exports to Türkiye in 2021 (+43.3%) and to India in 2019 (+40.8%), both of a more moderate scale.

3. Robust domestic production growth alongside declining trade openness

3.1 EU production volumes and values have grown strongly

EU domestic production of multimeters without recording devices increased by 47.0% in quantity (from 5.78 million pieces to 8.49 million pieces) and by 65.2% in value (from €907 million to €1,498 million) over the period. This implies a rising average production unit value, consistent with a move towards higher-specification instruments manufactured within the EU.

3.2 Trade intensity and export propensity have declined

Despite growing production and export values, trade intensity (total extra-EU trade as a share of production) fell from 66.9% to 57.2%, and export propensity (exports as a share of production) declined from 54.5% to 45.0%. This suggests that a growing share of EU production is being absorbed by the internal market or that production growth is increasingly oriented towards intra-EU rather than extra-EU consumption. The EU appears to be producing more, but a larger share of that output stays within the single market.

3.3 Central and Eastern European economies show high specialisation, while large exporters dominate absolute flows

The specialisation analysis for 2025 reveals that Romania (RSCA = 0.87, RCA = 14.0) and Hungary (RSCA = 0.79, RCA = 8.8) are by far the most specialised EU exporters of CN 903031 products, indicating that multimeter exports represent a disproportionately large share of their total export baskets. Germany, while not specialised in a revealed-comparative-advantage sense (RCA = 0.98), remains the largest absolute exporter at €48.3 million in 2025 (+22.5% vs. 2015). Other notable shifts include Austria's dramatic export growth (+1,914.9%, from €0.8 million to €15.7 million) and Belgium's similarly striking rise (+1,818.6%), while Hungary's exports collapsed from €32.8 million to €5.0 million (−84.9%), suggesting a relocation or restructuring of production and export activities.

Conclusion

Over 2015–2025, the EU market for multimeters without recording devices (CN 903031) underwent a structural transformation. Imports nearly doubled in value, driven predominantly by China and increasingly by emerging suppliers such as Korea and Tunisia, while the EU's trade surplus shrank by 43%. At the same time, EU exports shifted towards higher unit values, and export destinations diversified away from the US and China towards the UK and North Africa. Domestic production grew vigorously in both volume and value, yet trade-intensity and export-propensity ratios declined, suggesting an inward reorientation of the EU's production base. The rising concentration of imports (HHI increasing) coupled with falling export concentration presents a mixed picture from a strategic-dependence perspective: while the EU is selling to a broader set of buyers, it is becoming more reliant on a narrower set of suppliers—most notably China. Price shocks observed during the 2021 pandemic period further highlight the sensitivity of this trade to global supply-chain disruptions.